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vAbstract
This thesis consists of three essays in the areas of political economy and applied
microeconomics, covering housing, inequality, and public sector pensions.
Once economies of scale are allowed into the production function, income dis-
tribution is no longer necessarily independent of efficiency in a general equilibrium
framework. Chapter 2 analyzes a three-good, three-class general equilibrium model
where external economies of scale exist on goods consumed primarily by the middle-
class, and households have a preference for variety. In the case where the capital-labor
ratio is the same across all goods, a transfer from a wealthy home to several poor
homes increases consumption by the remaining citizens. Furthermore, if economies
of scale are not too small, there exists a transfer from rich to middle-class households
that is Pareto-optimal. Finally, the chapter demonstrates that a proportional increase
in the size of the economy can offer the same benefits as redistribution.
Cities around the world are experiencing a period of rising house prices and slow
development, which is often attributed to increased development regulation. In Chap-
ter 3 I develop a model of the housing market that incorporates congestion, and show
that homeowners prefer to restrict housing supply more than renters. I test this model
using 40 years of census data from two Australian cities. I demonstrate that public
support for regulation can be traced back to homeowners, who seek to restrict sup-
ply below market levels in order to elevate the price of their assets and reduce local
crowding externalities. I find that a 10 percentage-point decrease in home ownership
rates over our period would result in an increase of around 1.6 million dwellings in
Sydney, enough to house 14% of the 2011 population on a two-person-per-dwelling
basis. A move to a centralized governance structure for the whole city would elimi-
vi
nate this relationship. In addition, I find that regardless of governance structure the
proportion of elderly residents is negatively correlated with growth while income is,
if anything, positively correlated with growth.
The present value of unfunded local government defined benefit pension liabili-
ties has escalated since the 2008 financial crisis. Chapter 4 considers the arguments
for and against switching local government pensions from defined benefit schemes to
defined contribution schemes. I note that the relative generosity of government pen-
sion schemes compared with the private sector is not necessarily tied to the pension
structure. Also, defined benefit pensions may sometimes be cheaper for employers
than defined contribution plans, as they allow employers to pool risks that they must
otherwise compensate their employees for bearing. I use propensity score matching to
test the difference between total remuneration of county employees in Nebraska (de-
fined contribution) and Kansas (defined benefit). I find that there is little difference
between the cost of the total package under either plan. Furthermore, any differences
are not consistent in either magnitude or sign between different sub categories of em-
ployees, or over time. I therefore conclude that there is no strong financial reason to
recommend either plan structure over the other.
vii
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
In this thesis, I address three research questions in the areas of inequality and political
economy. I examine three major areas of contention in current debates on the causes
and outcomes of inequality: the benefits of redistribution, the costs and availability
of housing, and the structure of post-retirement pensions.
In the wake of increasing income inequality, interest in its potential social and
economic costs has mounted. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I outline a situation in
which an economy may benefit from redistribution. If economies become too unequal
and agents have a preference for variety, they become unable to leverage economies
of scale in production. Even in economies with a realistic distribution of income
between rich, middle-class, and poor households, I find that the economy as a whole
can benefit from an intervention that re-allocates income from a subset of very wealthy
households to a subset of poor households. More powerfully, we find that a shift of
the tax burden from the middle class to the rich can generate a Pareto-improvement
for all members of the economy, including those households that shoulder an increase
in taxation. By allocating income to those who will voluntarily choose to spend it on
the right subset of goods, the economy can leverage untapped economies of scale to
reduce prices.
Housing inequality has been cited as both a possible outcome of, and an input
to, income inequality. Regulatory restrictions on housing supply can reduce afford-
ability and compound intergenerational inequality. In addition, housing regulation in
one jurisdiction has spillover effects on pricing and supply in other jurisdictions. In
2Chapter 3, I consider the political economy behind housing regulation. Using 40 years
of census data from two Australian cities I demonstrate that low supply growth is
negatively correlated with the number of homeowners within a self-governed district.
Between districts in a centrally governed city this correlation disappears, suggesting
that the main driver of this correlation is political. I find a 10 percentage-point de-
crease in home ownership rates over the period would result in an increase of around
1.6 million dwellings in Sydney and the gains would be potentially even higher if hous-
ing were regulated on a Sydney-wide basis, rather than by smaller local governments.
I hypothesize that these results are based on a combination of asset price protection
and the aversion of residents to local congestion.
In contrast with what one may expect I do not find a negative correlation between
income inequality and housing growth. In fact, if anything higher incomes in a local
neighborhood are correlated with increased housing development in that area. The
proportion of retirement-age (over 65) residents is, however, strongly negatively cor-
related with neighborhood housing growth, and this is not dependent on the political
structure in question.
Notwithstanding any role in housing markets, retirees face hurdles regarding the
availability and security of their pensions. While defined contribution plans have
now taken the place of defined benefit plans in most private sector industries, this
transformation has come with a shift of risk from employers to employees. Chapter
4 examines whether the same shift in pension structure would be beneficial in the
public sector. The public sector has yet to make a wholesale move toward defined
contribution pensions, and there is ongoing debate as to which structure is preferable
in a public sector context. On the one hand, it is argued that defined benefit pen-
sions represent a very large transfer from taxpayers to workers, and are prohibitively
expensive. On the other hand, a move to defined contribution plans represents a
substantial increase in employee risk. I find that the cost savings from switching to a
defined contribution framework appear to be very small, and suggest that to the de-
gree public sector pensions can be cast as overly generous, this is a matter of broader
governance.
3Chapter 2
The Size of the Pie and Who is
Eating It
2.1 Introduction
In 2006, the top 1 per cent of Americans earned over 20 per cent of all income earned;
more than double the share they took home in the late 1970s (Piketty and Saez,
2006). This share has grown further since the recent financial crisis: in 2010, the
top 1 percent captured 93 percent of total income growth (Saez, 2009). The question
of whether inequality matters, how much it matters, and what we should do about
it remains highly divisive within the general population, as evidenced by various
political movements (such as Occupy for example).
In contrast, economists’ traditional general equilibrium models clearly tell us that
distribution does not matter. Not surprisingly then, economists’ attempts to demon-
strate the importance of distribution have relied on the relaxation of traditional
assumptions. While incorporating imperfect capital markets has led to important
breakthroughs in the theory of inequality and education, investigations into the rela-
tionship between inequality and efficiency that do not rely on capital market imper-
fections have been more limited.
This paper examines an alternative mechanism by which distribution may affect
efficiency. We already know that removing the standard assumption of convex pro-
duction sets breaks the independence between distribution and efficiency (Brown and
4Heal, 1979). Or in other words, if we allow firms to have access to economies of scale
then changing the degree of inequality can lead to a change in social welfare. However,
we have little idea of what this might mean in practice. What kind of distributions
are “better”? Under what circumstances?
While this is a complex question, it is relatively easy to show, in some specific,
simplified settings, that output should increase as the distribution becomes more
equal. If consumers have a taste for variety, but are not able to completely satiate it
then society will face a tradeoff: increasing the income of the wealthy at the expense
of the middle-class will increase the variety of goods on the market, but will decrease
the utilization of economies of scale.
Specifically, consider the case where consumers have non-homothetic preferences
that encourage them to consume an increasingly varied bundle of goods as their in-
come increases. Assume further that household income is not conditional on which
goods are being purchased in the economy. We show that if we allow external
economies of scale on the production side, a redistribution from a few very rich to a few
very poor can stimulate an increase in total output. Similarly, assuming economies of
scale are neither too small nor too large, we can obtain a Pareto-optimal redistribution
through leveraging a small tax on the rich to provide a transfer to the middle-class.
Finally, similar increases in output can be obtained by increasing the number of con-
sumers, rather than redistributing wealth from one consumer to another.
Our results reflect the fact that rich people may consume a lot more of something
than middle-class people — but very rich people do not necessarily consume that much
more than rich people. Despite having the income of over 753 median households,
Bill Gates probably doesn’t own as many shirts, iPads, TVs, or cars as all of those
households put together. Instead, he owns a yacht and a private jet — goods that
median households do not (usually) consume. Therefore, instead of producing many
more iPads, we produce a private yacht...and fail to leverage the economies of scale
on either.
This paper first outlines its place in the literature, before presenting a general
equilibrium model of households who have a taste for variety that they cannot afford
5to completely satiate. While these households do not require a varied consumption
bundle in order to obtain some utility, they gain from consuming an increasing variety
of goods as their income rises.
The model includes large numbers of small firms, who are all pricing at marginal
cost. However, there are gains to the firm from producing more, through innovation
in production techniques, learning-by-doing, and so forth. These gains cannot be
captured by the firm alone, but spill over to all firms in the industry. Consequently,
as industry-wide production goes up, prices fall.
Since the model has multiple equilibria, we consider local perturbations around a
Pareto-superior equilibrium. For simplicity, we define two societies, one whose Lorenz
curve lies completely above the other. Within each society, there are three classes:
rich, middle-class, and poor. We assume that economies of scale have been exhausted
on the goods consumed by the poor, and that the goods consumed only by the rich
are too small in number for economies of scale to be significant. Finally, we assume
that firms have a constant capital-labor ratio for all goods, since this eliminates inter-
class conflict based on income sources. Given these assumptions, we show that (a) a
transfer from a small number of rich households to a small number of poor households
increases output and (b) if economies of scale are neither too big nor too small, there
is a tax that can be levied on the rich and distributed to the middle-class that is not
only output-increasing but is also Pareto-optimal.
2.2 Literature
Under standard models of convex production, the second welfare theorem guaran-
tees that distribution cannot impact efficiency. However, this independence breaks
down once production sets are non-convex(Brown and Heal, 1979). Once firms have
economies of scale, there may be transfers within the economy that will improve not
only social welfare, but welfare of all agents.
However, because any general equilibrium with internal economies of scale is sen-
sitive to the price rules used (Brown, 1991) our model utilizes external economies of
6scale (often referred to as Marshallian economies of scale). One way of considering
external economies of scale is as a representation of what Allen (1983) terms “col-
lective invention”, where each firm generates technological improvements through the
process of expansion, which are then passed on to other firms when they too expand.
So as the industry grows, technology improves and prices fall.
Chipman (1970) first showed the existence of an equilibrium in a model with
external economies of scale, which was later generalized by Suzuki (1995; 1996; 2009).
Since then, others have used external economies of scale in a range of models, including
trade, growth, innovation, and even environmental regulation (see Mohr 2002 for the
last). Key papers include Romer (1986), who incorporated external economies of
scale into a model of long-run growth, and Krugman (1979; 1991), who utilized them
extensively in models of trade. In general, however, this work does not seek to use
economies of scale to evaluate different wealth distributions within a single society.
Technically, the model presented here bears the closest relationship to those in
the development literature that seek to model how a society moves through phases of
consumption. For example, our variety-seeking preferences are very similar to those
utilized by Matsuyama (2002). Our preference structure produces the same ‘flying
geese’ pattern, in which households gradually consume additional goods as prices rise
(although unlike the ‘flying geese’ model we do not cap total consumption). Notably,
Matstuyama indicates that this pattern has been demonstrated to be very consistent
across countries at different stages of development. However, while Matsuyama used
this technique to model product diffusion, we use the same preferences to model the
importance of inequality.
Baland and Ray (1991) likewise use non-homothetic preferences to show the impor-
tance of inequality, but consider a completely different mechanism from our own. In
their case, they look at whether inequality might keep the economy at an undesirable
equilibrium, where unemployment is low. Our model does not rely on labor-market
frictions, but is more focused on the consumption response.
Murphy et al. (1989) combine non-homothetic preferences with external economies
of scale, as is done in this paper. However, their goal is to model the process of
7industrialization — essentially, selecting from the multiplicity of equilibria generally
available in these models (see Matsuyama (1991) for details). They require firms to
have an initial monopoly, and extract initial monopoly rents, in order to encourage
them to enter the market. This has the effect of rendering a perfectly equal economy
incapable of industrialization. Foellmi and Zweimüller (2006) take a similar approach.
Our model contains no such requirement, in part because we do not demand that
products enter at the level of the rich before trickling down to the poor. It may
appear as if trickle-down must happen, because the rich consume additional products
that the poor do not, but we believe it is just as plausible for a firm with a truly
novel product to enter at a level where it is consumed entirely by both the rich and
the middle-class, or even the poor if the product has a sufficient benefit:cost ratio.
Thus we do not want to place limits on the process by which society chooses their
consumption bundle.
2.3 Model setup
Consider a general equilibrium model where households have a taste for variety in
consumption and firms have external economies of scale over some range of produc-
tion.
The term ‘goods’ refers to classes of goods rather than specific types of goods.
This is important, because we are abstracting from specific tastes. One person, for
instance, may prefer to have chocolate ice-cream whereas another would prefer vanilla,
but the technology to produce them is almost exactly the same. Furthermore, house-
holds will have a very high elasticity of substitution between such goods, and will be
excessively sensitive to relative variations in their prices. However most of this indi-
vidual substitution will cancel out at the aggregate level. Consequently, we clearly
distinguish the class of ice-cream from, say, iPads and other electronic tablets. As a
rough guide, consider goods to be in the same class if they (a) draw on very similar
technologies or (b) perform the same practical or social functions (resulting in a high
elasticity of substitution between them).
82.3.1 Households
There are i = 1, ..., n households, who consume k = 1, ..., l goods (where a good is
denoted xk, and forms part of a bundle x). Households have varying endowments of
perfectly divisible labor (L) and capital (K), which constitute their wealth. Labor
attracts a wage (w), and capital attracts rents (r), which are set in competitive factor
markets and make up total household income. Households have shares in firm profits
(θj, where j denotes the firm). Consequently, households have a budget set B defined
by the parameters p, Li, Ki, θi (where p denotes the price vector).
Consumption is in accordance with the limitations imposed by the budget set and
the nature of the household’s utility function, which is continuous, monotone, and
twice-differentiable. For simplicity, consumption of all goods is weakly positive (so L
and K do not enter into the utility function).
2.3.1.1 Preference for variety
Households in this economy have a taste for variety in consumption. A taste for
variety in this context means that utility and consumption meet four conditions.
1. No need for variety: u (x) > 0 for all x 6= 0.
It would be too strong to assume that variety is a necessary condition for utility.
Instead, while households prefer variety, they will nevertheless get positive utility
from any good, or subset of goods that they consume1. Equivalently:
u(x) > 0⇔ ∃k ∈ 1, ..., l s.t. xk > 0
2. Weak Variety: The utility function is strictly concave in each good .
This is a standard assumption, since it implies a quasi-concave utility function and
convex preferences. Since the marginal utility of each good is declining, at some point
1This rules out the log-linear approximation to Cobb-Douglas preferences, where utility goes to
−∞ as consumption of any one good goes to zero.
9households would prefer to consume a different good rather than increase the size of
the bundle they are currently consuming. Consequently, this can be viewed as a desire
to consume more variety eventually (as income gets large).
3. Variety: The utility function is separable.
By Green (1961) separability (combined with weak variety) implies that all goods are
normal. Consequently, as income rises, there are no goods that the household would
prefer to reduce or remove from their utility function. This condition can therefore
be viewed as desire to maintain variety as income grows.
4. Strong variety: Piecewise linear income expansion paths .
Combined with the above, this is mathematically equivalent to:
1
px
dU
dx
|x = 1
py
dU
dy
|y ⇒ 1
px
dU
dx
|αx = 1
py
dU
dy
|αy
For all α > 0, for fixed px, py.
This means that for all subsets of goods where consumption of each good is strictly
greater than zero, income expansion paths are linear. Consequently, while a household
may consume a wider range of goods over time, the ratio of the goods we are already
consuming remains the same. This is a stronger version of the variety condition —
rather than just looking to maintain some variety in our consumption, as income
grows we will always maintain at least the degree of variety we started with.
2.3.1.2 Household problem
Given assumptions 1− 4, the household problem becomes:
10
maxu(x)
s.t. x ≥ 0
x ∈ B(p, Li, Ki, θi) =
{
x ∈ Rl : p · x ≤ wLi + rKi +
∑
j
θij · (p · yj)
}
where u : Rl+ → R: satisfies conditions 1-5
This satisfies the regularity conditions to be solvable using the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker
approach.
2.3.1.3 Example utility function
Proposition 2.1: An example of a utility function that fits assumptions 1-5 is the
log-linear approximation to Cobb Douglas with an additional unit added to each x:
U(x) =
l∑
k=1
αk log(xk + 1)
where (xk + 1) has been used instead of xi to prevent utility from going to −∞
when xk is not consumed.
Proof: (1) Since log (xk + 1) ≥ 0 for all xk ≥ 0, U (x) ≥ 0 for all x ≥ 0. (2)
follows trivially from the concavity the log function. (3) follows from the additivity
separability of the utility function. (5) follows trivially from the fact that the log
function is continuous, C2, and monotone, so the summed log function is also.
(4) Assume without loss of generality that good k is being consumed. Then, for
any other good kˆ, either:
1
pk
αk
xk + 1
=
1
pkˆ
αkˆ
xkˆ + 1
or
11
1
pk
αk
xk + 1
>
1
pkˆ
αkˆ
1
In the former case, we know from the use of the log function that the proportions
of goods consumed will be the same at all levels of income. In the latter case, good
xkˆ is not currently being consumed, and so is not part of the bundle of goods being
considered. 
2.3.2 Firms
There are j = 1, ...,m firms in the economy. Firms produce consumption goods in
quantities yk =
∑n
i=1 xik. They produce these using labor (L) and capital (K), which
they acquire on a frictionless input market (so there is full employment).
Each firm operates in a competitive market, but has access to economies of scale
in their production functions (this is discussed in detail below).
In addition, we make the standard assumptions that (a) firms have free dispos-
ability, and (b) periods are long enough that firms can choose to produce nothing at
zero cost in any period.
2.3.2.1 Economies of scale
Firms in the model have access to external economies of scale.2 External economies
of scale result in the marginal cost of production for all firms declining as the total
production of the industry grows, and so are external to any individual firm. Perhaps
the best example of this is innovation. As an industry expands, production processes
are often subject to incremental improvements, which over time spill over from one
firm to another. In addition firms benefit from learning-by-doing at other firms (in
part through ongoing movement of employees), and from the construction of sup-
portive infrastructure by third parties (such as roads, ports, etc) that become more
2Note that this is different from internal economies of scale, which are more prevalent in the
industrial organization literature.
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profitable as the the industry as a whole expands.
As is standard in the external economies of scale literature, we also assume that
each firm is small enough to take total industry output as a given. Firms are essen-
tially operating in a competitive environment, and set price equal to marginal cost.
Firms are assumed to have cost functions that are linear at any fixed level of industry
output. In addition, we assume that there is no interaction between the production
processes for different goods, so that there is no difference between one firm that
produces two different goods and two firms that each produce the equivalent quantity
of one good.
Finally, it is necessary to assume that the marginal cost is bounded below. This is
quite reasonable, since in general manufactured goods require some labor or capital
to be embodied in the good itself, so the marginal costs cannot ever go to zero.
The firm’s production schedule will therefore be given by the following technology
function:
Fj : K × L× R→ R, yk = Fj(Kj, Lj,
m∑
j=1
yjk)
where Fj(Kj, Lj,
∑
yjk) is homogeneous of degree one in K and L, and mono-
tonically increasing in
∑
yjk. Fj(Kj, Lj,
∑
yjk) is bounded for any level of (Kj, Lj).
That is, the marginal cost does not go to zero for any level of
∑
yj,k. Furthermore,
for technical reasons, I will assume that the technology function is continuous in
Kj, Lj,
∑
yk.
Note that it is not essential ex-ante that Fj be the same for each j. However, if
there are variations, it is only the most efficient firms that will operate at each level
of demand. It is therefore sufficient to consider an industry-wide F (Kj, Lj,
∑
yjk)
that incorporates the most efficient production of any firm at each level.
2.3.2.2 Firm problem
Consequently, the firm will face the following problem:
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maxpi = p · y − rK − wL
s.t. y ≥ 0
yk = F (K,L,
m∑
j=1
yk)
where F : K × L× R→ R; w, r,K, L ∈ R+; p, y ∈ Rl+,
F (λK, λL,
∑
yk) = λF (K,L,
∑
yk) and∑
yk ≤
∑
y′k ⇒ F (K,L,
∑
yk) ≤ F (K,L,
∑
y′k)
Since firms are therefore maximizing a continuous profit function over a bounded
set in Rn, this problem has a unique solution.
2.4 Equilibrium
Given the above setup, we first need to establish the existence of an equilibrium. We
then refine the set of equilibria, and determine some key characteristics of demand
and supply in equilibrium.
2.4.1 Existence
Proposition 2.2: A competitive general equilibrium exists.
Proof: By Suzuki (2009), an equilibrium exists so long as:
1. Consumers have continuous, convex, locally-non-satiated preferences.
2. Firm’s have free disposability, possibility of no production, and a continuous
technology function.
3. Consumers satisfy the minimum income condition.
4. The set of feasible allocations is bounded.
The setup directly implies all of the above conditions are met. See appendix 2.7
for full details. 
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2.4.2 Equilibrium characteristics of demand
We assume that households are small enough that they take prices to be fixed when
making their consumption decisions. This is similar to our assumption that firms are
too small to consider their prices when making their production decisions. Conse-
quently, the household problem remains the same as outlined above, even within a
general equilibrium setting.
One key characteristic of demand is that the number of different types of goods
will increase as household incomes rise. In fact, the bundle of different types of goods
consumed will be subject to a range of cutoffs. Initially, households will consume
only a certain group of goods (we can think of these as food and other staples)
with relatively high marginal utility relative to price. As income rises, the marginal
utility of staples declines, and other goods with lower marginal-utility:price ratios
will become more attractive to households. They will therefore begin to consume
additional goods.
An example of the number of types of goods consumed using the utility function
U(x) =
∑l
k=1 αk log(xk + 1) and a fixed set of parameters is given in the example
below. As this example demonstrates, our assumptions on the utility function not
only ensure that households have a desire for variety, but also that they are able to
better realize that desire as their income increases.
Example 2.1: 2.1is a graph of a household’s optimal consumption given this utility
function and various levels of income.
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Figure 2.1: Number of different types of goods consumed as income increases*
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* αs range from .02 to .18, and prices are randomly generated. Initially, the consumer’s income is divided between 2 goods. Then, once
it reaches a threshold of around 20, the consumer starts dividing their wealth between 5 goods. Once wealth reaches 25 the consumer
consumes a total of 6 goods, above 26 7 goods, and 29 8 goods and so on.
This result holds in general, as outlined in the two claims below.
Proposition 2.3: Households will consume weakly more goods as their income grows.
Proof: See appendix 2.7.
Proposition 2.4: Assuming conditions on the utility function hold, either (a) when
the household consumes nothing, the ratio of marginal utilities for any two goods is
equal the ratio of their prices, or (b) the number of goods consumed strictly increases
over some range of income.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
In addition to the number of types of goods consumed, it is also necessary to
consider how demand for each good varies as income increases. Demand changes in
wealth for a particular good can be represented by a series of upwardly sloping linear
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segments, each of which has a lower slope than the previous one. Each change in the
slope coincides with one or more new goods being added to the bundle.
Proposition 2.5: Household demand for each good is locally linear in income for all
except a finite number of points, and globally concave.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
Because demand for each good is increasing linearly within the fixed bundle of
goods consumed, it is clear that any households that are consuming the same bundle
of goods — regardless of household income — can be represented by a single rep-
resentative consumer. This consumer, however, is not the representative consumer
for a household that consumes a different bundle of goods. Consequently, there is
not one representative consumer for the entire economy, but rather a finite set of
representative consumers, as outlined below.
Proposition 2.6: Given fixed prices, any continuous distribution of income can be
reduced to a finite number of representative consumers.
Proof: Since the income expansion paths are linear within subsets of goods, and
all households have the same preferences, all households who would consume a set
number of goods have a single representative consumer.
Since there are finite goods, there are also finite subsets of goods consumed given
a set of prices, (≤ l to be precise) and therefore a finite number of representative
consumers. 
2.4.3 Characteristics of production
In order to consider how equilibrium changes as we adjust the distribution, we need
to have some idea as to how prices and profits change with demand. Firstly, it is
worth noting that profits at all stages are zero, since production is constant in labor
and capital. This simplifies the analysis considerably, since we can avoid considering
any inter-class conflict that arises from the desire of factory owners to stimulate
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consumption of their own goods in order to elevate profits, at the expense of the
consumption of goods that consumers may prefer.
Secondly, and unsurprisingly given the existence of economies of scale, if demand
for any one good exogenously rises, holding wages and rents constant there will be a
fall in the price of the good, as the industry generates more economies of scale.
Proposition 2.7: Holding wages and rents constant, if a firm has external economies
of scale over the necessary range, then price will be decreasing in demand.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
2.4.4 Equilibrium characteristics and refinement
While an equilibrium exists, it will generally not be unique because production tech-
nologies are not convex. While we can do local comparative statics even if there
are multiple equilibria, we wish to consider a degree of refinement so that we can
determine what, if anything, we can say about the global result.
Firstly, it is worth noting that equilibria in this model are subject to coordination
difficulties. Even if all households have the same level of income and the same tastes3
each individual household may be small relative to the economy. So, if all households
have coordinated on consuming good A, they will leverage economies of scale on that
good, and in consequence its price may be sufficiently lower than the price of good B
that no household wants to switch. However, it could also be that everyone is better
off if they all switch to consuming good B.
Example 2.2: Take 3 consumers, each with wealth ω = 10. Then, let the marginal
utility schedule for each good is as outlined in Table 1, and the price schedule for the
production of each good (in per unit terms) be as laid out in Table 2.
3If all consumers have the same wealth and tastes, the whole economy can be represented by a
single agent. That agent faces a budget set that is a bounded (due to finite number of goods and
bounded technology constraint) set of Rn+ and has a continuous utility function and so should have
an optimum (i.e., unique equilibrium).
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Table 2.1: Marginal Utility Schedule
units x1 x2 x3
1 3 2 3
2 2 1 2
3 1 .5 1
Table 2.2: Price Schedule
units x1 x2 x3
1 5 5 6
2 5 5 6
3 4 4 4
4 4 4 4
5 3 3 3
6 3 3 3
...
...
...
...
Then, it is an equilibrium for everyone to consume two units of good 1 and one
unit of good two for a total utility of 7, and a total cost of 10. A quick inspection
reveals that no one would prefer to deviate from this. However, there is an alternative
equilibrium, under which everyone consumes 2 units of good 1 and 1 unit of good
3. This gives a total utility of 8 at the same cost (10) and the same level of overall
economic productivity.
Therefore, as our first refinement: we consider only those equilibria where house-
holds with the same income acting collectively as a class would not prefer to deviate.
4
It is important to note that this refinement does not require that individual house-
holds take into account their effects on price. Each household is too small to take into
4It is worth noting that low levels of inequality may be beneficial, as they can help to resolve
the coordination problem associated with equilibrium selection. If all members of a group have the
same wealth, there may exist an equilibrium where all consume the same good, but would be better
off switching to another good with higher utility per unit and larger economies of scale.
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account the effects of their own consumption on price. Rather, what we are saying
is that those households with the same income cannot be ‘duped’ into consuming a
different bundle when another stable equilibrium exists where they consume a bundle
that they prefer.
However, even if we allow coordination between households with the same income,
we may still encounter coordination issues across income levels. That is, in scenarios
where all households prefer the same equilibrium, a lack of coordination between them
may result in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium.
Example 2.3: Take 2 households, one with wealth ω = 8, and one with ω = 16.
Then, let the marginal utility schedule for each good be as outlined in Table 3, and
the price schedule for the production of each good (in per unit terms) be as laid out
in Table 4. Then there is one equilibrium where everyone consumes only x2, and one
where everyone consumes only x1. Clearly the equilibrium where everyone consumes
x1 is preferable to both households.
Table 2.3: Marginal Utility Schedule
units x1 x2
1 14 13
2 13 12
3 12 11
4 11 10
Table 2.4: Production Schedule
units x1 x2
1 10 10
2 9 9
3 8 8
4 7 7
5 7 7
...
...
...
Therefore, as our second refinement: we will consider only those equilibria that
are not Pareto-dominated.
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However, we may still be concerned about a scenario where a household prefers
one equilibrium, whereas poorer and/or richer households strictly prefer a different
equilibrium. This can arise for many reasons. For instance, we may have inter-class
conflict if goods have different capital/labor ratios. For instance, if the rich have a
higher capital to labor ratio than the poor, they would prefer that the poor consume
those goods which are more capital-intensive. Since we are primarily interested in
the interaction between consumption, economies of scale, and inequality, this adds an
unnecessary complication to the model. We would therefore assume that capital/labor
ratios are independent of the consumption decision. The simplest (and certainly
sufficient) method of removing this conflict is to assume that the capital/labor ratio
is constant for all goods at all periods of time.
A constant capital/labor ratio means that a class’s income will be the same in all
equilibria up to a constant α which is the same for all classes. Furthermore, all prices
will scale by the same factor as income. We can therefore create a scaled price vector
for each equilibrium, and show that each equilibrium must have a unique (scaled)
price vector.
Proposition 2.8: Assume that the capital/labor ratio is constant for all goods. Then
for any household in any two equilibria 0 and 1, ω0 = αω1, where α is common to all
households. Further p
1
α
.x1 = ω0 and p0 6= 1
α
p1.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
Eliminating inter-class conflict over returns still does not ensure that we have a
unique equilibrium. For example, we might have a situation where all goods have
the same production schedule, but where households have different levels of income.
Since goods are ranked by marginal utility we may still encounter differences in the
ideal equilibria for households with different levels of income. Example 4 outlines one
such case.
Example 2.4: Take 3 households with wealth ω = 7 and one individual with ω = 31.
Then, let the marginal utility schedule for each good be as outlined in Table 5, and
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the price schedule for the production of each good (in per unit terms) be the same as
in example 3.
Table 2.5: Marginal Utility Schedule
units x1 x2
1 3 2
2 2 1.8
3 1 1.6
4 .5 1.4
Now, left to their own devices, the three households with less wealth would prefer
to coordinate on all consuming good x1 for a total utility of 3 each. In that case, if
the wealthy household enters later, they will consume 3 units of good x1, and one unit
of good x2 for a total utility of 8.
However, the wealthy household would prefer that all of the other households co-
ordinated on consuming good x2 (for a utility of 2 each), and themselves consume 3
units of good x2 and one unit of good x1, for a total utility of 8.4. Note that in both
equilibria the productive capacity is the same, so we can take income as given5.
The reason for the above result is that the marginal utility curves — while both
concave — cross, between 1 unit and 2 units. Consequently, at low levels of consump-
tion one prefers to consume good A, while at high levels of consumption one prefers to
consume good B. In a standard model this is not a concern, as one simply consumes
good A until the marginal utility has declined sufficiently, and then consumes good
B. However, once economies of scale are involved, the price of the good is positively
tied to its consumption, so this strategy is no longer possible.
Proposition 2.9: There is no crossing of marginal utilities. That is, for all α > 0
δU
δx
|x=xˆ > δUδy |y=xˆ ⇒ δUδx |x=αxˆ > δUδy |y=αxˆ.
Proof: By strong variety assumption. See appendix 2.7. 
5Assume for now that the marginal rate of technical substitution is the same at each level of
production for both goods.
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However, even this is not enough to ensure that all equilibria are Pareto-ranked.
Even when marginal utilities do not cross, it is possible to encounter the same problem.
Example 5 demonstrates such a scenario. If we allow marginal costs to move too
closely together, or to cross, we will have even more potential for multiple equilibria
that are not Pareto-dominated.
Example 2.5: Take 3 households, one with wealth ω = 7, one with ω = 15 and one
with ω = 30. Then, let the marginal utility schedule for each good be as outlined in
Table 6, and the price schedule for the production of each good (in per unit terms) be
as outlined in table 7.
Table 2.6: Marginal Utility Schedule
units x1 x2
1 14 13
2 12 11
3 10 9
4 8 7
Table 2.7: Production Schedule
units x1 x2
<3 20 20
3 8 8
4 8 8
5 8 8
6 8 8
>6 7 7
Clearly, the poorest individual prefers an equilibrium where everyone consumes
only good x1, since their utility is higher in that case. On the other hand, the middle-
class household prefers to consume 1 unit of good x1 and one unit of good x2 to
consuming 2 of x1, but will not deviate on their own. Finally, the richest household
wants to consume 2 of good 1 and 2 of good 2, rather than ≈ 41
3
of good 1, but again
they cannot deviate themselves because of the high initial cost. The two wealthier
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households can coordinate on an equilibrium that improves their outcomes, but this
will be a the expense of the poorest household.
In order to eradicate this, we make an additional assumption — that all technolo-
gies are the same. This is restrictive, but slightly less restrictive than it sounds, since
we can manipulate the size of a unit of x (we do not need to compare, say, a gallon
of milk to a t-shirt, it may be a quart of milk or a pack of t-shirts). Of course we still
need to allow that the economies of scale on these goods move in essentially the same
direction at essentially the same rate, but this is not significantly more restrictive
than the assumptions we were already making by putting the goods into classes in
the first place, and is illuminating. We should also point out that this assumption is
a sufficient one — one could easily establish a range of cases where we get the same
outcome without making this assumption at all.
We have already established that we can order the classes of goods based on their
marginal utilities. With the additional assumption about production technologies we
know that any equilibrium that does not have higher-ranked goods being consumed
in greater volumes must be Pareto-dominated.
Proposition 2.10: If there are two goods x and y s.t. δU
δx
|0 > δUδy |0, the capital/labor
ratio is constant for all goods and the production technology is the same, then any
equilibrium where a household does not consume x > y must be Pareto dominated by
another equilibrium.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
This leaves us with a subset of Pareto-superior equilibria from which to choose.
Since we are looking to show that it is possible to undertake a Pareto-superior re-
distribution, we would like to choose the equilibrium that makes this as difficult as
possible. Therefore, we want to choose the equilibrium that is best for the group
we are redistributing from (in our case the richest household(s)). That way, the im-
provement they receive must be from the redistribution process, and not just from
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switching to an equilibrium they like better. We therefore make the final refinement:
the equilibrium must be the most preferred for the wealthiest households.
In most cases, the equilibrium is unique. This follows from the fact that if the
rich are indifferent between two equilibria, all other groups must be indifferent or
prefer the equilibrium with more consumption of the higher-ranked good. This may
break down if there are not as many classes as goods, but this is not interesting as
we must either have a very equal (or at minimum very structured) society or a very
small number of households. Alternatively, if three or more goods have untapped
economies of scale then we could have an ‘ends against the middle’ scenario. We rule
the three-or-more good case out also since in the next section we are concerned with
a three-good scenario where goods consumed by the poor are consumed in such large
quantities that economies of scale are exhausted.6
Proposition 2.11: Assume the capital/labor ratio is constant for all goods, the pro-
duction technology is the same and neither equilibrium is Pareto-dominated. As-
sume there is sufficient inequality between households that there are at least as many
classes as goods in all equilibria. Finally, assume that there are only two goods whose
economies of scale are not exhausted at all equilibria. Then if there is more than one
equilibrium, there is a unique equilibrium that is preferred by the wealthiest house-
hold(s).
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
This is the equilibrium we will consider when we consider the comparative statics
of redistribution in the following section.
2.5 Comparative statics and wealth distribution
Having established the existence and some key characteristics of an equilibrium, we
can now return to our original question: if we change the distribution of income
6An alternative would be to continuously break ties in favor of the next-wealthiest household,
since the poor in our subsequent comparative statics have no real sway over the equilibrium selection.
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within a society, how does our equilibrium change? Will a move to a more equal
society increase or decrease social welfare? Will it increase or decrease output? And
can it, under some circumstances, be better for everyone?
From the sections above, it is clear that obtaining general comparative statics
for this model is extremely complicated. A general solution would need to take into
account what happens at every equilibrium, and would need to apply to all possible
wealth distributions in an economy.
A general solution, however, is empirically unnecessary. Most societies have a
skewed bell-shaped distribution of households, with large numbers of “poor”7 with
few resources, scaling up to a very few households that are very rich, who often own
a very large proportion of the economy’s capital.
We will therefore divide our economy into three classes of household: the poor, the
middle-class, and the rich (subscripted by r, p, and m, respectively). Households in
each class are identical, but levels of labor and capital endowment vary across classes.
We note that even at the end of the boom in 2007, the bottom 60% of the population
held only 4.2% of the total assets (Wolff, 2010). Therefore, for the purposes of the
model we assume a large fraction of the population (np) are poor, and the poor
households have only a labor endowment, and but no capital endowment (Kp = 0).
At the same time, the top 5% of society held over 60% of total assets in 2007 (Wolff,
2010), so we assume that the rich are a very small fraction of the population (nr) who
have a very large capital endowment (Kr). The middle-class are those that remain —
smaller in number than the poor, larger in number than the rich (np > nm > nr) —
and have some degree of capital endowment (Km). We abstract from human capital,
and assume that the labor endowment (L) is the same for all households.
This leads us to the next question: if we are going to compare this society with
a more equal one, what do we mean by more equal? Here we consider two possi-
bilities: an ‘intervention’ model (section 2.5.1) and a taxation model (section 2.5.2).
In the first case, we will select some small subset of rich households at random, and
7Clearly our definition of poor varies with the economy — we do not claim that the poor in
sub-saharan Africa are directly comparable with the poor in the United States
26
reallocate the difference between their income and a middle-class income to the num-
ber of poor households, such that the reallocation is sufficient to convert those poor
households into middle-class households. In the taxation case, we leverage a tax τ
on rich households, from which we generate a transfer to middle-class households. In
both cases, average income remains the same, as does the total number of households
(although we will relax the latter in section 2.5.3).
In the first case, the change results in a Lorenz curve that lies weakly above the
Lorenz curve for our original society. Thus, the societies can be strictly ordered in
terms of inequality (Sen, 1973) (it also implies that the Gini coefficient is lower for
our more equal society).8 The second case does not result in a change in wealth, but
results in income streams to each class that would be consistent with a more equal
society.
For simplicity, in our societies we will have 3 goods: y, x, z. Consistent with section
2.4.1, prior to any intervention or taxation taking place, the poor consume good y
only, the middle-class consume goods y, x, and the wealthy consume goods y, x, z.
Also consistent with section 2.4.1, we note that our households are too numerous and
too small to consider their own effects on the price of the goods they are consuming.
2.5.1 Output and ‘intervention’
For the purposes of this section, we will consider the case where we have a change
in the number of people in each class. We call this the ‘intervention’ model. The
change in equality results from some subsection of the poor being re-allocated wealth
from some subsection of the rich, converting both groups involved into middle-class
households. We will denote the economy prior to the intervention as economy 1,
and the economy post-intervention as economy 0. We will, however, note that our
proposed ‘intervention’ is very small in scale, since big shifts may propel us toward
alternative equilibria.
8This is equivalent to saying that if we order both societies from richest to poorest, and choose
any person from the unequal society, then those who are richer than that person will hold more
cumulative wealth than the same ranked person in the equal society (unless they are the poorest
person, in which case the total capital will be the same under both societies)
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Mathematically, this means that L1 = L0, K1r = K0r , K1m = K0m. By definition,
we will also have that the proportion of households who are wealthy (nr) and poor
(np) are greater in the unequal society than the equal society, and the proportion
of middle-class households (nm) is greater in the equal society than in the unequal
society.
The first step for determining the effect of this change is to consider the first-
order effects. Specifically, if our intervention occurred without having any impact
on the prices of goods, households would (unsurprisingly) increase their collective
consumption of both poor and middle-class goods. This is simply a function of the
fact that we are re-allocating income away from households who would spend some
fraction of it on rich goods toward households who spend it only on poor and middle-
class goods.
Proposition 2.12: As a first-order effect, there will be more consumption of poor
and middle-class goods in the equal society than under the unequal society, at the
equal society’s prices.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
Given this information, we can show that for everyone who is not in the households
which have been displaced, it is possible to achieve an increase in total consumption.
This is because the above results extend easily into the case where we have economies
of scale, so there is a sharp increase in the consumption of middle-class goods. Since
middle-class goods are where all of the gains from economies of scale are taking place,
both the middle-class and the wealthy gain from facing cheaper prices. The key point
here is that economies of scale cannot be too large (or, alternatively, the middle-class
good cannot be too desirable relative to the poor good), as this would attract the
poor away from the poor good in large enough numbers so as to raise the price of
that good.
Proposition 2.13: Assume that the optimal labor/capital ratio is the same for all
goods, at all levels of production. Assume also there are sufficient numbers of poor
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households to exhaust economies of scale on poor goods. Assume that production
quantities are too small for economies of scale to exist on rich goods. Then, if the
intervention is small enough and economies of scale are not too large, every member
of the equal society (excluding those who have lost wealth) will consume weakly more
than the equivalent member of the unequal society (at the equal society’s prices), and
will therefore be better off than their counterparts in the unequal society.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
Finally, we show that total output is higher in the equal society than in the
unequal society. This results from the fact that, at the old prices, the transfer is
output-neutral. However, the change in the prices is overwhelmingly negative, so
society can afford to purchase more at the new prices than at the old prices.
Proposition 2.14: Total economic output is higher at equilibrium 0 than at equilib-
rium 1, at the equal economy’s prices.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
Redistribution therefore increases productivity (and therefore our economy’s ver-
sion of GDP).
2.5.2 Output and taxation
In the taxation case, we will consider a transfer from the rich, rather than a change in
the number of rich people. Mathematically, this means that ω0r < ω1r , and ω0m > ω1r .
Since giving additional income to the poor will not increase their consumption of
goods other than poor goods unless the transfer is large enough, for the purposes of
this section we consider only a transfer to the middle-class. Class conflict in this case
is between the middle-class and the rich, rather than between the rich and the poor.
While it may seem odd that conflict is not with the poor, in fact a great deal of the
conflict regarding who should bear the costs of public goods tends to be between the
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rich and the middle-class. We can view the redistribution here as simply a shift of
that burden.
We also have that the proportion of households who are wealthy (nr), middle-class
(nm), and poor (np) are equal across both societies. We will fix the transfer rate so
that each wealthy consumer pays τ . Therefore, each middle-class household receives
a transfer of nr
nm
τ .
Once again, our first step is to consider the first-order effects of the reallocation.
As in the previous section, the fact that we are shifting resources from groups who
purchase rich, poor, and middle-class goods to consumers of only middle-class goods
raises their relative consumption.
Proposition 2.15: As a first-order effect, there will be more consumption of middle-
class and poor goods under the equal society than the unequal society at the equal
society’s prices.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
Given this information, what we want to know is whether we can achieve a welfare
improvement for everyone for some τ. If so, then we can show that there is some
Pareto-optimal reallocation.
It turns out that this is in fact possible for some τ . This reflects a certain degree
of intra-class conflict. Since there are economies of scale on middle-class goods, every
rich person would prefer all of the other rich people to give their money to the middle-
class. However, they do not individually wish to make the same transfer.
Proposition 2.16: Assume that the optimal labor/capital ratio is the same for all
goods, at all levels of production. Assume that there are enough poor that if they
choose to consume only poor goods, they can exhaust all economies of scale on poor
goods. Assume also that production quantities are too small for economies of scale
to exist on rich goods. Then, if economies of scale are not too small on middle-class
goods, then there is some τ > 0 transfer from the rich to the middle-class such that
we can achieve a Pareto-improvement.
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Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
Corollary 2.1: Given the framework in proposition 2.16 there is a limit to redistri-
bution beyond which no additional transfer is Pareto-improving.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
Corollary 2.2: Given the framework in proposition 2.16, even if economies of scale
are not large enough locally to produce a small Pareto-improving transfer, there may
be a large Pareto-improving transfer, so long as the threshold in corollary 2.1 is not
crossed.
2.5.3 Welfare, distribution, and size
One of the key drivers of the claims above is that the change in distribution increases
demand for certain products, which in turn drives down their price. It will therefore
be obvious to the careful reader that economy size is just as important as distribution
in determining, not only total output but output per capita.
Proposition 2.17: Holding the distribution constant, a small proportional increase
in the number of households will increase the amount of output per capita.
Proof: As the number of rich and middle-class households increases, then demand
for middle-class goods must also increase (at current prices). Since there are still
economies of scale to be leveraged on these goods, their price must fall. Consequently,
the price of the same bundle is cheaper for all existing consumers, while their incomes
are constant. They can therefore consume additional goods, and output must rise. 
Given this impact on output per capita, it becomes immediately clear that an
unequal economy that is sufficiently large relative to its more equal counterpart may
actually have a larger output per capita. This is because the increase in consumption
of middle-class goods from adding more households can offset the losses from making
households more or less wealthy.
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Note that this does not mean that it is more efficient for the larger economy to be
unequal. It is still possible (in line with the proofs above) to make the more unequal
economy produce even more output per capita by making that economy more equal
also.
Proposition 2.18: Any losses from moving toward a more unequal society can be
overcome if they are matched by a sufficient increase in the size of the economy.
Proof: See appendix 2.7. 
2.6 Conclusion and future work
This paper examines some important circumstances under which the income distri-
bution may affect output and efficiency. Specifically, we allow poor, rich, and middle-
class households to have a taste for variety over three goods, and allow many small
firms to leverage external economies of scale. Economies of scale can be leveraged
only once consumption is reasonably large, and become exhausted once consumption
reaches a very high level. Then, given our assumption of a constant capital-labor ra-
tio, we achieve output gains both by redistributing the entire wealth of the rich to the
poor, and from a smaller tax applied to the rich and transferred to the middle-class.
Furthermore, if economies of scale are neither too large nor too small, this tax can
be Pareto-optimal if set at the right level.
These results are obviously subject to the range of assumptions made. For in-
stance, it would be useful to weaken the assumption of a constant capital/labor ratio,
as this is likely to increase inter-class conflict. Allowing multiple goods whose tech-
nologies vary to be consumed by each class may offer avenues for modeling large
economic shifts such as industrialization.
Finally, it would be ideal to further consider ways in which to empirically test
these results. Since the model is output-focused, it may be possible to compare inter-
temporal or inter-state output. Furthermore, the results on the role of economic size
are very important, since we demonstrate that it is not possible to directly compare
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different-sized economies even with the same Gini coefficient. This may open up
additional avenues for empirical consideration.
2.7 Appendix
Proposition 2.2 A competitive general equilibrium exists.
Proof: Additional notation: ωi = wLi + rKi
By Suzuki (2009), an equilibrium exists so long as:
1. Consumers have continuous, convex, locally-non-satiated preferences.
2. Firms have free disposability, possibility of no production, and a continuous
technology function.
3. Consumers satisfy the minimum income condition (pωi > inf pXi = {px|x ∈ Xi} , i =
1, ..., n)
4. The set of feasible allocations is bounded.
(1) follows directly from the set of assumptions on the utility function. (2) follows
directly from the assumptions on the technology function. This leaves (3) and (4).
Since consumers always have the option to consume nothing, for any price vector
p, 0 ∈ Xi, where Xi is the set of possible consumption vectors. Therefore, we must
have that for every price vector p ≥ 0 with p 6= 0, inf {p · x|x ∈ Xi} = 0. Therefore,
to satisfy the minimum income condition, we need to show that for all ωi, p · ωi > 0.
Since firms have linear production functions for any given
∑
ykj, we have that
firms do not ever make a profit or a loss. So
∑m
j=1 θijpkyjk = 0 for all i and for
all k. Therefore, since all individuals have a labor allocation, and so long as wages
are greater than zero (true, always, since marginal productivity is always >0), we
must have that the pωi > 0 for all i. Therefore, we have that for every price vector
p ≥ 0 with p 6= 0, pωi > inf pXi = {px|x ∈ Xi} , i = 1, ..., n, so the minimum income
condition is satisfied.
(4) follows from the fact that Fj
(
K,L,
∑m
j=1 yj
)
is bounded (by assumption) for
any (K,L). Since
∑
K,
∑
L are also bounded (by the endowment) we must have
that:
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F =
((xi) , (yj , kj , lj)) ∈
n∏
i=1
Xi × R4+|
n∑
i=1
xi ≤
m∑
j=1
(yj −Kj − Lj) +
n∑
i=1
(Ki + Li) , yj ≤ Fj
Kj , Lj , m∑
j=1
yj

is also bounded. 
Proposition 2.3 Given fixed prices, households will consume a weakly greater variety
of goods as their income grows.
Proof: Let ω = wL + rK, where L and K are the household’s labor and capital
endowments. Randomly select ω and ω′ where ω′ > ω. Fix an arbitrary price vector
p.
By continuity of the utility function (and since perfectly divisible goods allow for
a compact budget set), we know that there is a unique x (p, ω) and a unique x (p, ω′)
which optimize the household’s utility at ω and ω′, respectively.
We know that x (p, ω) is the solution to the problem:
max
x
= u (x)
s.t. p.x ≤ ω
xk ≥ 0 ∀k
Therefore, by differentiability of u (x), we know that for all k = 1, ..., l:
du (x)
dxk
− λpk = 0
xk > 0
or
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du (x)
dxk
− λpk < 0
xk = 0
Therefore, since λ is constant, we have that:
1
pk
du (x)
dxk
|xk(p,ω) =
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ(p,ω) (2.1)
For all k, kˆ with xk > 0, xkˆ > 0
Similarly, we know that x (p, ω′) is the solution to the problem:
max
x
= u (x)
s.t. p.x ≤ ω′
xk ≥ 0 ∀k
Which gives exactly the same first order conditions as before. However, if good kˆ
is still consumed when the household has ω′ > ω and good k is not, then:
1
pk
du (x)
dxk
|xk=0 <
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ(p,ω′) (2.2)
We also know that du(x)
dxk
> 0 for all xk ≥ 0. Since p is invariant to changes in ω,
2.1 and 2.2 imply that:
1
pk
du (x)
dxk
|xk=0 −
1
pk
du (x)
dxk
|xk(p,ω) <
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ(p,ω′) −
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ(p,ω)
Now, by strict concavity of u, we know that if xkˆ (p, ω
′) > xkˆ (p, ω), we must have:
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1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ(p,ω′) −
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ(p,ω) < 0
⇒ 1
pk
du (x)
dxk
|xk=0 −
1
pk
du (x)
dxk
|xk(p,ω) < 0
⇒ xk (p, ω) < 0
So we have a contradiction.
In that case, the household cannot replace one good in their bundle by consuming
more of another good in their bundle. In order to consume less variety of goods as
price goes up, therefore, they must consume at least one good xkˆ at ω
′ that they
don’t consume at ω, and be consuming more than one good xk at ω that they don’t
consume at ω′.
But then, since the household doesn’t consume xk at ω′, we must have that:
1
pk
du(x)
dxk
|xk=0 ≤
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ(p,ω′)
However, since they consume xk and not xkˆ at ω:
1
pk¯
du (x)
dxk¯
|xk¯=0 ≤
1
pk
du(x)
dxk
|xk(p,ω)
<
1
pk
du(x)
dxk
|xk=0 ≤
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ(p,ω′)
So we have a contradiction of concavity. Therefore, we must be consuming xk at
ω′ if we consume it at ω, and we have a contradiction. 
Proposition 2.4 Assuming conditions on the utility function hold and that prices
are fixed, either (a) when the household consumes nothing, the ratio of
marginal utilities for any two goods is equal the ratio of their prices, or
(b) the variety of goods consumed strictly increases over some range of
income.
36
Proof: Given claim 4, it is sufficient to show that if (a) does not hold, there is some
good that would be consumed at some ω, but would be consumed at some ω′ > ω.
If (a) holds, then for all goods k, kˆ:
du(x)
dxk
|xk=0.
(
du(x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ=0
)−1
=
pk
pkˆ
Otherwise, there exists at least one pair of goods xk, xkˆ s.t.
1
pk
du (x)
dxk
|xk=0 6=
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ=0
In that case, there must be an  such that
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ=0 =
1
pk
du (x)
dxk
|xk=0 + 
Therefore, by continuity, there exists a δ > 0 such that:
1
pkˆ
du (x)
dxkˆ
|xkˆ=δ >
1
pk
du (x)
dxk
|xk=0

Then, given condition 1 on the utility function, so long as ω < pkˆδ, the household
would prefer to spend all of its income on xkˆ rather than spend any on xk.
Proposition 2.5 Household consumption of each good is locally linear in income for
all except a finite number of points, and globally concave.
Proof: By assumption 4 on the utility function, household demand is linear each
good, so long as the subset of goods consumed is fixed. By Claim 3, every good that
is consumed at at given wealth level ω¯ and a fixed set of prices p, will be consumed
at p for all ω > ω¯.
Consequently, all goods consumed at a given level of wealth, ω will be consumed
on [ω, ω + δ] for all δ > 0. Furthermore, since the number of goods is finite, there
must be an 1 > 0 such that only the goods consumed at ω are consumed at ω + 1.
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Furthermore, unless a new good is added at ω, there will be some for some 2 > 0,
s.t. the same number of goods is consumed at ω − 2 as at ω. Therefore, so long as
a new good isn’t added at ω, we can take  = min {1, 2}, and demand will be linear
on the interval [ω − , ω + ].
Now, we have restricted non-linearity to the set of ω at which a new good is
added, i.e., where a good x is consumed that was not consumed at ω−  for all  > 0.
However, since the number of goods is finite, there must be a finite number of such
points.
Therefore, demand is locally linear except at a finite number of points.
To show that demand is globally weakly concave, it is sufficient to show that for
any good xk,
δx∗k
δω
does not increase when another good is added.
Choose any good x, and any other good xˆ that we are consuming. Assume that
when we add a new good x˜, our consumption of x increases to αx. Then, by separa-
bility and our assumption on linear wealth expansion paths, we must have that:
1
px
dU
dx
|αx = 1
pxˆ
dU
dx
|αxˆ
Therefore, we must also increase our consumption of xˆ by α. Since this holds
for all of the goods we are consuming, we must have that consumption of all goods
increases by α. Since we are adding another good, however, we must have that δx
∗
k
δω
of
some goods is declining, or we violate the budget constraint. Therefore δx
∗
k
δω
declines
as another good is added, and consumption is globally weakly concave. 
Proposition 2.7 Holding wages and rents constant, if a firm has external economies
of scale over the necessary range for a given good, then the price of that
good will be decreasing in demand for that good.
Proof: In equilibrium, x (p∗) =
∑n
i=1 xi (p
∗) =
∑m
j=1 yj(p
∗).
Now, if demand increases, x (p) increases to x′ (p) with x′ (p) > x (p) for all p. But
then
∑n
i=1 x
′
i (p
∗) >
∑m
j=1 yj(p
∗).
We know that yj (p) satisfies following condition:
38
p∗ = MC
(
m∑
j=1
yj (p
∗) , K(yj (p∗)), L(yj (p∗))
)
where MC is the marginal cost function.
Now, in addition to this, we know that the marginal good requires fixed amount
of capital and labor for any given level of industry production. So, we have that the
marginal cost function is only a function of the total industry output, or: MC
(∑m
j=1 yj
)
Therefore, since
∑
y (p∗) =
∑
x (p∗):
p∗ = MC
(
n∑
i=1
xi(p
∗)
)
But then, if demand increases to x′ (p), we have that
∑n
i=1 x
′
i(p
∗) >
∑n
i=1 xi(p
∗).
So firms will sell more at the current price, and marginal cost will fall. Since firms
operate in a perfectly competitive environment, prices must also fall. But lower prices
increases demand, and further lowers marginal cost. It remains to show that there
must be some p∗∗ such that:
p∗∗ = MC
(
n∑
i=1
x′i (p
∗∗)
)
Or, equivalently, that the process has a fixed point.
Since F (K,L,
∑
yj) is bounded for any (K,L), there is a minimum marginal cost
that is greater than 0 for any value of
∑
yj. Therefore, we must have that ∃p > 0 s.t.
p < MC
(
n∑
i=1
x′i
(
p
))
And since MC is continuous (by F continuous) and we have:
p∗ > MC
(
n∑
i=1
x′i (p
∗)
)
> MC
(
n∑
i=1
x′i
(
p
))
> p
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there must be a p∗∗ ∈ (p, p∗) s.t. MC (∑ni=1 x′i (p∗∗)) = p∗∗. 
Proposition 2.8 Assume that the capital/labor ratio is constant for all goods at all
periods of time. Then for any household in any two equilibria 0 and 1,
ω0 = αω1, where α is common to all households. Further p
1
α
.x1 = ω0 and
p0 6= 1
α
p1.
Proof: Assume not. Without loss of generality, take any two equilibria, 0 and 1.
We know by the constant capital/labor ratio that:
w1
r1
=
w0
r0
Therefore if we have that w1 = αw0, we must have that r1 = αr0 and so:
ω0 = w0L+ r0K =
1
α
w1L+
1
α
r1K =
1
α
ω1
And this holds for all levels of income. Therefore, we can simply compare equilibria
by holding income constant and scaling all the prices, i.e.:
p1x.x
1 = ω1
=
1
α
ω0
⇒ p
1
x
α
.x1 = ω0
From now on, for simplicity we will adopt the convention that when we refer to
p1x we are talking about the scaled version of the price, i.e. p1x.x1 = ω0.
There is only one menu of scaled prices such that an equilibrium can be achieved.
This is because for any pair of goods (x, y) either for at least one group:
1
px
δU
δx
|x = 1
py
δU
δy
|y
In which case, since x is fixed:
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py
px
=
δU
δx
|x
δU
δx
|y
= βy
where the right hand side is fixed. Further we must have that:
pxx+ βypxy + βzpzz + ... = ω
0
which gives a unique solution for px. Alternatively, for all consumers there is a
pair x, y s.t.
1
px
dU
dx
|x > 1
py
dU
dy
|0

But then no one is consuming any y, so the price is simply p(0) (the marginal cost
at 0 given w0 which is defined by ω0).
Therefore, we have a unique scaled price vector for each equilibrium allocation.
Proposition 2.9 There is no crossing of marginal utilities. That is, for all α > 0
δU
δx
|x=x¯ > δUδy |y=x¯ ⇒ δUδx |x=αx¯ > δUδy |y=αx¯.
Proof: Without loss of generality, let x¯ > y¯. Since wealth expansion paths are
linear for a fixed variety of goods, we have that:
1
px
δU
δx
|x=x¯ = 1
py
δU
δy
|y=y¯ ⇒ 1
px
δU
δx
|x=αy¯ = 1
py
δU
δy
|y=αy¯
Note that this holds even when another good is added, because the utility function
is separable. This implies:
1
px
δU
δx
|x=x¯ > 1
py
δU
δy
|y=y¯ ⇒ 1
px
δU
δx
|x=αx¯ 6= 1
py
δU
δy
|y=αy¯
We need to rule out the case where, for some α:
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1
px
δU
δx
|x=x¯ > 1
py
δU
δy
|y=y¯ and 1
px
δU
δx
|x=αx¯ < 1
py
δU
δy
|y=αy¯
Assume that we can have this scenario. Now, since the marginal utility function
is continuous, there must be a α′ < α s.t.
1
px
δU
δx
|x=α′x¯ = 1
py
δU
δy
|y=α′y¯
But then, by the first condition, we must have that β = α
α′ satisfies:
1
px
δU
δx
|x=βα′x¯ = 1
py
δU
δy
|y=βα′y¯ ⇔ 1
px
δU
δx
|x=αx¯ = 1
py
δU
δy
|y=αy¯
So we have a contradiction. Therefore, setting x¯ = y¯, it must be that:
1
px
δU
δx
|x=x¯ > 1
py
δU
δy
|y=x¯ ⇒ 1
px
δU
δx
|x=αx¯ > 1
py
δU
δy
|y=αx¯

Proposition 2.10 If there are two goods x and y s.t. δU
δx
|0 > (=) δUδy |0, any equilib-
rium where an individual does not consume x > (=)y must be Pareto
dominated by another equilibrium.
Proof: Assume not. Without loss of generality, take any two equilibria, 0 and 1.
We also use the subset r to denote the consumption of the wealthiest group. First we
can eliminate any equilibria that are Pareto-dominated.
We know that goods are ranked, and have the same technologies. So we know
that:
1
p (0)
δU
δx
|0 > 1
p (0)
δU
δy
|0 ⇒ 1
p (0)
δU
δx
|x > 1
p (0)
δU
δy
|x
Without loss of generality let 1
p(0)
dU
dx
|0 > 1p(0) dUdy |0. Then, for any given level of
consumption:
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1
p (
∑
x)
δU
δx
|xr >
1
p (
∑
x)
δU
δy
|xr
Therefore, we would always have that yr < xr unless,
∑
y >
∑
x.
Now if
∑
y >
∑
x, however, all groups prefer to move back to consuming more
x. Why? Because if we collectively reverse our consumption of x and y, the prices of
the two goods are the same as before, but our higher marginal utility means that we
prefer the consumption of x, i.e., if x1 = y0 and y1 = x0:
p
(∑
x1
)
x1i + p
(∑
y1
)
y1i = p
(∑
y1
)
x0i + p
(∑
x1
)
y0i 
but U (x0i , y0i ) > U (x1i , y1i )
So if the society as a whole are consuming more of y than x, all groups would
prefer an equilibrium where we switched those two goods around.
Therefore, if we are looking for Pareto-optimal equilibrium, we can exclude this
set.
Proposition 2.11 Assume the capital/labor ratio is constant for all goods, the produc-
tion technology is the same and neither equilibrium is Pareto-dominated.
Assume there is sufficient inequality between households that there are
at least as many classes as goods in all equilibria. Then if there is more
than one equilibrium, there is a unique equilibrium that is preferred by
the wealthiest household(s).
Proof: Without loss of generality choose two equilibria and some group i. Take any
good x s.t. i consumes more x in equilibrium 0. Then take any good y s.t. i consumes
more y in equilibrium 1. Because preferences are the same for all households, if one
household wants to increase consumption of one good and decrease consumption of
another when prices change, no household will want to do the reverse. Therefore∑
x0 >
∑
x1 and
∑
y0 <
∑
y1.
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Now, since i is indifferent between 0 and 1:
p (
∑
y1)
p (
∑
x1)
=
δU
δy
|y1i
δU
δx
|x1i
<
δU
δy
|y0i
δU
δx
|x0i
=
p (
∑
y0)
p (
∑
x0)
⇒ p (
∑
x1)
p (
∑
x0)
>
p (
∑
y1)
p (
∑
y0)
Therefore either p (
∑
x1) > p (
∑
x0) or p (
∑
y1) < p (
∑
y0).
Now if there are no economies of scale on x, then, we know that for each household
in i
p1x.x
0
i + p
1
yy
0
i < p
0
xx
0
i + p
0
yy
0
i
(note here that we assume each individual household in y is too small to make
a change on the price. This does not affect our statement about coordination, since
coordination refers to choice of equilibria, not equilibrium stability).
So therefore i can afford to consume as much x and more y at 1 as they did at 0,
with some to spare. So equilibrium 1 is no longer stable.
We can construct an identical argument to show that there must be economies of
scale on y, or the equilibrium must be unique.
Therefore, for there to be two equilibria, we must have that there are economies
of scale on all goods that change.
First we will consider the case where only x and y change. Then assume that x
is the higher-ranked good (so 0 is the equilibrium in which we consume more of the
higher-ranked good).Then, for a contradiction, assume that the wealthiest household
r is indifferent between 0 and 1, and both are Pareto-superior.
First, anyone who is not consuming y but is consuming x will strictly prefer
equilibrium 0, as in equilibrium 0 they face the lowest price. By our assumption that
there is sufficient inequality to generate a class of households for each good at all
equilibria, there must be a household consuming x but not y in equilibrium 1 (and
therefore also in equilibrium 0). Therefore, there must be an l < r who consumes
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both x and y at least in equilibrium 1 and prefers equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 0,
otherwise 1 is Pareto-dominated by 0.
Further l must consume less goods than r, because otherwise l and r are covered
by the same representative consumer, and is therefore also indifferent between the
two equilibria. However, in that case, by separability and our linear expansion paths,
we know that:
1
p0x
dU
dx
|x0r =
1
p0y
dU
dy
|y0r
⇒ 1
p0x
dU
dx
|ωr
ωl
x0r
=
1
p0y
dU
dy
|ωr
ωl
y0r
dU
dx
|x0r
dU
dx
|ωr
ωl
x0r
=
dU
dy
|y0r
dU
dy
|ωr
ωl
y0r
But then also
dU
dx
|x1r
dU
dx
|ωr
ωl
x1r
=
dU
dy
|y1r
dU
dy
|ωr
ωl
y1r 
So the utility ratios must be the same. So if we are indifferent between (x1r, y1r) ∼
(x0r, y
0
r) then we must have that (x1l , y1l ) ∼ (x0l , y0l ).
Once again, by our piecewise linear expansion paths, we know that if r is indiffer-
ent between two bundles, l must be indifferent between two bundles with the same
ratios of goods (otherwise our expansion paths would break down). Therefore, if l is
consuming x and y in both equilibrium 0 and equilibrium 1, they must be indifferent
between both equilibria, and again we have a contradiction. So it must be that l is
consuming both x and y in equilibrium 1, but only x in equilibrium 0.
But in that case, l can afford to consume
(
ωl
ωr
x0r,
ωl
ωr
y0r
)
, and are be indifferent
between that bundle and their bundle at equilibrium 1
(
ωl
ωr
x1r,
ωl
ωr
y1r
)
. But instead, at
0 they choose (x0l , 0), which must therefore be preferred to
(
ωl
ωr
x1r,
ωl
ωr
y1r
)
. Therefore l
also prefers equilibrium 0.
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Proposition 2.12 As a first-order effect, there will be more consumption of poor and
middle-class goods in the equal society than under the unequal society, at
the equal society’s prices.
Proof: Since everyone in both societies is consuming the poor goods, the demand
curve for any one good x must be concave across its entire relevant range.
Poor goods: By the weak concavity of the demand function, we must have that
n0py (p
0, kp) + n
0
my (p
0, km) + n
0
ry (p
0, k0r) ≥ n1py (p0, kp) + n1my (p0, km) + n1ry (p0, k0r).
So we have that the total level of consumption is higher under the equal society if we
fix the prices at the equilibrium prices of the equal society.
Middle-class goods: Because society 1 has the same amount of capital, and the
same number of people as the unequal society:
(
n1r − n0r
)
kr =
(
n0m − n1m
)
(km − kp)−
(
n0r − n1r
)
kp
which is > 0 since by the increase in inequality we have that n1rkr > n0rkr.
⇒ (n1r − n0r) (kr − kp) = (n0m − n1m) (km − kp)
⇒ (n1r − n0r) (kr − kp)(km − kp) = (n0m − n1m)
Fixing the price vector at p0, the difference in consumption of middle-class goods
between the two societies is:
D = n1rxm
(
p0, kr
)
+ n1mxm
(
p0, km
)− n0rxm (p0, kr)− n0mxm (p0, km)
=
(
n1r − n0r
)
xm
(
p0, kr
)− (n1r − n0r) (kr − kp)(km − kp)xm (p0, km)
Note that kp = 0. Therefore, for a contradiction, assume that D > 0. Then:
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(
n1r − n0r
)
xm
(
p0, kr
)− (n1r − n0r) (kr − kp)(km − kp)xm (p0, km) > 0
⇒ xm (p
0, kr)
xm (p0, km)
>
(kr − kp)
(km − kp) (2.3)
⇒ xm (p
0, kr)
xm (p0, km)
>
kr
km
as kp → 0
But we know that:
⇒ p
0x (p0, kr)
p0x (p0, km)
>
kr
km
>
rkr + wL
rkm + wL
≥ p
0y (p0kr)
p0y (p0km)
Therefore, x must be increasing faster than y as income increases, which contra-
dicts our assumption of linear wealth expansion paths.
Note that we can prove this more generally (for kp > 0), so long as the rich are
sufficiently wealthy.
Fix kp, km. Then, if we increase kr, we have (by 2.3):
δ (kr−kp)
(km−kp)
δkr
=
1
(km − kp) > 0
which is necessarily constant.
We also have:
δ
x(p0,kr)
x(p0,km)
δkr
=
1
x (p0, km)
δx (p0, kr)
δkr
> 0
δ2
x(p0,kr)
x(p0,km)
δk2r
=
1
xm (p0, km)
δ2x (p0, kr)
δk2r
< 0 through large enough range of kr
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Since the right hand side of (1) is increasing at a constant rate, whereas the
left hand side is increasing at a declining rate, at some point the two must cross.
Therefore, so long as kr is sufficiently large, we must have that D is negative, and
consequently the total consumption of middle-class goods is smaller under the unequal
society than under the equal society. The point will depend on values of kp (the
smaller kp, the smaller the crossing point), the taste for variety (this will determine
the concavity of xm), and the quantity of income from labor (if x(p0, 0) > 0, then the
crossing point will require a higher kr). 
Proposition 2.13 Assume that the optimal labor/capital ratio is the same for all
goods, at all levels of production. Assume also there are sufficient numbers
of poor households to exhaust economies of scale on poor goods. Assume
that production quantities are too small for economies of scale to exist
on rich goods. Then, if the intervention is small enough and economies
of scale are not too large, every member of the equal society (excluding
those who have lost wealth) will consume weakly more than the equiv-
alent member of the unequal society (at the equal society’s prices), and
will therefore be better off than their counterparts in the unequal society.
Proof: Since there is an constant optimal capital/labor ratio, we know that by
proposition 2.8 that there is only one set of scaled prices (prices will scale by the
same factor as income, so we can ignore the effects of changes in income). We will
work with scaled prices for the remainder of this proof.
It is sufficient to show that p0.x1 < p0.x0 for everyone. This is clearly sufficient
for the change in output, and is also sufficient for a change in welfare since otherwise
a household could defect and purchase the bundle that they purchased at 1. So, for
a contradiction, we need to show that p0.x1 > p0.x0 for someone.
This is equivalent to saying that:
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p0.x1 − p0.x0 ≥ 0
⇒ p0.x1 ≥ w0L+ r0K
=
w0
w1
[
w1L+ r1K
]
=
w0
w1
p1.x1
So we must have that p0 ≥ w0
w1
p1 for some good.
Now, we know that for all rich goods, p0r ≤ w
0
w1
p1r. This is simply because the price
of the rich goods cannot rise any higher. Therefore, the good that increases in price
must be either a poor good or a middle-class good.
By the proposition 2.12, we know that if we hold prices constant, consumption of
middle-class goods will rise, under this scenario. The middle-class good will therefore
only increase in price if either the rich or the middle-class choose to consume less
of the middle-class good than they did in the unequal equilibrium (the poor cannot
consume less, since they weren’t consuming any before).
Remember that in equilibrium 1, rich households faced the first-order condition:
1
p (n1mx
1
m + n
1
rx
1
r)
dU
dx
|x1r =
1
p (n1rz
1
r )
dU
dz
|z1r
=
1
p (n0rz
1
r )
dU
dz
|z1r
However, after the re-allocation, the rich face the following:
1
p (n0mx
1
m + n
0
rx
1
r)
dU
dx
|x1r >
1
p (n1mx
1
m + n
1
rx
1
r)
dU
dx
|x1r
So the rich will substitute away from rich goods and toward middle-class goods.
Both the middle-class and the rich will also substitute away from poor goods, since:
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1
p (n0mx
1
m + n
0
rx
1
r)
dU
dx
|x1 > 1
p (n1mx
1
m + n
1
rx
1
r)
dU
dx
|x1
=
1
p
(
n1my
1
m + n
1
ry
1
r + n
1
py
1
p
) dU
dx
|y1
=
1
p
(
n0my
1
m + n
0
ry
1
r + n
0
py
1
p
) dU
dx
|y1
Where the last equality follows from the fact that the first-order effect is to increase
demand for poor goods (for which prices cannot fall).
Thus, we have a second-order increase in demand for middle-class goods, and
their price will fall. Subsequent-order effects follow the same pattern. However, since
economies of scale are bounded, and marginal cost is declining, there must be a point
at which
1
p (n0mx
0
m + n
0
rx
0
r)
dU
dx
|x1 = 1
p
(
n0my
1
m + n
0
ry
1
r + n
0
py
1
p
) dU
dx
|y0
So we have convergence on a lower price.
It remains to consider the impact of prices on poor goods. Since the poor have
sufficient numbers (and have not lost any income), by our equilibrium refinement
if they choose an equilibrium where they consume less poor goods than would be
sufficient to exhaust all the economies of scale, then they must be better off. By our
construction, if they choose to consume less poor goods, they must be consuming
more middle-class goods, and since they didn’t do that in equilibrium 1 the prices of
middle-class goods in equilibrium 0 must be lower than in equilibrium 1. However, if
the poor do choose to make the switch, then:
u(z0p , x
0
p, 0) > u(z
1
p , 0, 0)
So the middle-class will consume (ω
0
m
ωp
z0p ,
ω0m
ωp
x0p, 0), by linear expansion paths. Now
if this is not as good as the middle-class’s previous option, then:
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u(
ω0m
ωp
z0p ,
ω0m
ωp
x0p, 0) < u(z
1
m, x
1
m, 0)
⇒ u(z0p , x0p, 0) < u(
ωp
ωm
z1m,
ωp
ωm
x1m, 0)
< u(
ωp
ωm
z1m,
ωp
ωm
x1m, 0)
≤ u(z1p , 0, 0)
So the middle-class must be better off too. The same construction can be used
to show that the rich must also be better off. Therefore, even if the prices on poor
goods rise everyone will be better off. 
Proposition 2.14 That total economic output is higher at equilibrium 0 than at equi-
librium 1, at the equal economy’s prices.
Proof: Assume not. Then, it must be that:
n1rp
1 · x1r + n1mp1 · x1m + n1rp1 · x1p > n0rp0 · x0r + n0mp0 · x0m + n0pp0 · x0p
⇒ (n1r − n0r) p1 · x1r + (n1p − n0p) p1 · x1p > n0r (p0 · x0r − p1 · x1r)+ (n0m − n1m) p1 · x1m
+n0m
(
p0 · x0m − p1 · x1m
)
+ n0r
(
p0 · x0p − p1 · x1p
)
But, since we know that we maintained the same average wealth when we redis-
tributed, and the consumption bundles for each group are lower under 1 than 0, we
know that:
(
n1r − n0r
)
p0 · x0r +
(
n1p − n0p
)
p0 · x0p =
(
n0m − n1m
)
p0 · x0m
⇒ (n1r − n0r) p1 · x1r + (n1p − n0p) p1 · x1p < (n0m − n1m) p0 · x0m
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Combining this result with the above gives:
⇒ (n0m − n1m) p0 · x0m > n0r (p0 · x0r − p1 · x1r)+ (n0m − n1m) p1 · x1m
+n0m
(
p0 · x0m − p1 · x1m
)
+ n0r
(
p0 · x0p − p1 · x1p
)
⇒ n1m
(
p1 · x1m − p0 · x0m
)
> n0r
(
p0 · x0r − p1 · x1r
)
+ n0r
(
p0 · x0p − p1 · x1p
)
⇒ 0 > n1m
(
p1 · x1m − p0 · x0m
)
> n0r
(
p0 · x0r − p1 · x1r
)
+ n0r
(
p0 · x0p − p1 · x1p
)
> 0 
And we have a contradiction.
Proposition 2.15 As a first-order effect, there will be more consumption of middle-
class and poor goods under the equal society than the unequal society at
the equal society’s prices.
Proof: We know that (because society 1 is more unequal):
nrω
1
r + nmω
1
m = nrω
0
r + nmω
0
m
nrω
1
r > nrω
0
r
Since, at fixed prices, the change in demand for poor goods with respect to income
for the middle-class is higher than the change in demand with respect to wealth for
the rich, we must have that:
nry
(
p0, ωr − τ
)
+ nmy
(
p0, ωm +
nr
nm
τ
)
> nry
(
p0, ωR
)
+ nmy
(
p0, ωm
)
⇒nry
(
p0, ωr − τ
)
+ nmy
(
p0, ωm +
nr
nm
τ
)
+ npy
(
p0, ωp
)
>nry
(
p0, ωr
)
+ nmy
(
p0, ωm
)
+ npy
(
p0, ωp
)
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So we have that the total level of consumption of poor goods is higher under the
equal society if we fix the prices.
Fixing the price vector at the equal society’s prices, the difference in consumption
(at equal prices) of middle-class goods between the two societies is:
D = nrx
(
p0, ω0r
)
+ nmx
(
p0, ω0m
)− nrx (p0, ω1r)− nmx (p0, ω1m)
= nr
[
x
(
p0, ω0r
)− x (p0, ω1r)]+ nm [x (p0, ω0m)− x (p0, ω1m)]
By the concavity of the demand function:
nm
[
x
(
p0, ωm +
nr
nm

)
− x (p0, ωm)] > x (p0, ωm + )− x (p0, ωm)
> x
(
p0, ωr
)− x (p0, ωr − )
> nr
[
x
(
p0, ωr
)− x (p0, ωr − )]
Which implies that:
nr
[
x
(
p0, ωr
)− x (p0, ωr − )] < nm [x(p0, ωm + nr
nm

)
− x (p0, ωm)]
⇒ nr
[
x
(
p0, ω1r
)− x (p0, ω0r)] < nm [x (p0, ω0m)− x (p0, k1m)]
⇒ 0 < nm
[
x
(
p0, ω0m
)− x (p0, ω1m)]− nr [x (p0, ω1r)− x (p0, ω0r)]
⇒ 0 < D
So we consume more middle-class goods under the more equal society. 
Proposition 2.16 Assume that the optimal labor/capital ratio is the same for all
goods, at all levels of production. Assume that there are enough poor
that if they choose to consume only poor goods, they can exhaust all
economies of scale on poor goods. Assume also that production quanti-
ties are too small for economies of scale to exist on rich goods. Then, if
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economies of scale are not too small on middle-class goods, then there is
some τ > 0 transfer from the rich to the middle-class such that we can
achieve a Pareto-improvement.
Proof: Since there is an constant optimal capital/labor ratio, we know that by
proposition 2.8 that there is only one set of scaled prices (prices will scale by the
same factor as income, so we can ignore the effects of changes in income). We will
work with scaled prices for the remainder of this proof.
For the poor, τ = 0. Since there are enough poor to exhaust economies of scale on
poor goods (z), then regardless of what they choose as their bundle after redistribution
(equilibrium 1), they can (as a class) afford their bundle under the pre-redistribution
equilibrium (equilibrium 0). Therefore they must be weakly better off under the new
equilibrium.
For middle class, τ < 0. Therefore, it is sufficient to show that prices do not
rise, since in that case the middle class can also afford their former bundle. Rich
good prices cannot rise. Middle-class good prices cannot rise unless poor good or rich
good prices rise, since at those prices the middle-class will purchase more middle-class
goods (and if they do not, there is a Pareto-improving equilibrium where they do),
see proposition 2.15.
Since the poor have sufficient numbers (and have not lost any income), by our
equilibrium refinement if they choose an equilibrium where they consume less poor
goods than would be sufficient to exhaust all the economies of scale, then they must be
better off. By our construction, if they choose to consume less poor goods, they must
be consuming more middle-class goods, and since they didn’t do that in equilibrium
1 the prices of middle-class goods in equilibrium 0 must be lower than in equilibrium
1. However, if the poor do choose to make the switch, then:
u(z0p , x
0
p, 0) > u(z
1
p , 0, 0)
So the middle-class will consume (ω
0
m
ωp
z0p ,
ω0m
ωp
x0p, 0), by linear expansion paths. Now
if this is not as good as the middle-class’s previous option, then:
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u(
ω0m
ωp
z0p ,
ω0m
ωp
x0p, 0) < u(z
1
m, x
1
m, 0)
⇒ u(z0p , x0p, 0) < u(
ωp
ωm
z1m,
ωp
ωm
x1m, 0)
< u(
ωp
ωm
z1m,
ωp
ωm
x1m, 0)
≤ u(z1p , 0, 0)
So the middle-class must be better off too. The same construction can be used
to show that the rich must also be better off. Therefore, even if the prices on poor
goods rise everyone will be better off. Further, if that is the case middle-class good
prices must still fall.
So the middle class must be strictly better off.
If rich good prices do not rise and poor good prices do not rise, then middle-class
good prices must fall, so long as:
1
p (nmx0m + nrx
0
r)
dU
dx
|x0m >
1
p (nry1r)
dU
dy
|0
This is because, holding the other prices constant, increasing the income of the
middle-class will result in more income being spent on middle-class goods, which will
in turn lower their price (see proposition 2.15) for details.
For the rich, τ > 0. Therefore, they will lose a percentage of each type of good
at the initial stages. For the rich to be better off, in that case, we must have the
middle-class prices fall enough to offset both the tax and any price increase on poor
goods.
Then, for the rich:
U = u(x, y, z) = u
(
z, x,
[
ω − τ − pzz − pxx
py
])
So:
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dU
dτ
=
du
dz
dz
dτ
+
du
dx
dx
dτ
+
du
dy
1
py
(
−dpz
dτ
z − dpx
dτ
x− pz dz
dτ
− pxdx
dτ
− 1
)
− 1
p2y
dpy
dτ
du
dy
(ω − τ − pzz − pxx)
⇒ dU
dτ
|τ=0 = du
dz
dz
dτ
+
du
dx
dx
dτ
+
du
dy
1
py
(
−dpz
dτ
z − dpx
dτ
x− pz dz
dτ
− pxdx
dτ
− 1
)
=
(
du
dz
− du
dy
pz
py
)
dz
dτ
+
(
du
dx
− du
dy
px
py
)
dx
dτ
+
du
dy
1
py
(
−dpz
dτ
z − dpx
dτ
x− 1
)
= −du
dy
1
py
(
dpz
dτ
z +
dpx
dτ
x+ 1
)
Then, we know that if pz doesn’t change:
⇒ dU
dτ
= −du
dy
1
py
(
dpx
dτ
x+ 1
)
Which is weakly positive so long as:
dpx
dτ
x+ 1 ≤ 0
⇒ dpx
dτ
≤ −1
x
If pz does change it must increase. So in that case, economies of scale on x need
to be larger:
dpx
dτ
≤ −1
x
(
1 +
dpz
dτ
z
)
Therefore, so long as the economies of scale are sufficiently large dpx
dτ
≤ − 1
xr
(
1 + dpz
dτ
z
)
,
since the rich are consuming some rich goods in equilibrium 1 there must be some
transfer that is sufficiently small that there is a Pareto optimal redistribution.
Finally, we need to consider whether it is possible to obtain the same result without
redistribution. In that case, however, because the wealthy are consuming rich goods
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in a fixed quantity, if given more income at this stage they will spend more of it on
rich goods and less on middle-class goods. Therefore, the price of middle-class goods
must rise, and we cannot sustain the equilibrium. 
Corollary 2.1Given the framework in proposition 2.16 there is a limit to redistribution
beyond which no additional transfer is Pareto-improving.
Proof: At equilibrium 1, the middle class have the following constraint:
1
px1
dU
dx
|x1m >
1
py1
dU
dy
|0
After the transfer, the middle-class consume more x, so
dU
dx
|x0m <
dU
dx
|x1m
However, price is also falling so
p0x < p
1
x ⇒
1
px0
>
1
px1
and 1
py1
dU
dy
|0 remains constant.
now, we know that there is a lower limit to p0x (>0). So at some point, p0x must
stop declining. However, dU
dx
|x0m → 0 as x0m → ∞. Since 1py1
dU
dy
|0 = 1py0
dU
dy
|0 and is
constant, at some point we must have that, as the transfer gets large:
1
px0
dU
dx
|x0m <
1
py0
dU
dy
|0

At that point, the middle-class will start to consume rich goods. By linear ex-
pansion paths the middle-class will consume goods in the same ratios as the rich. At
that point, any additional transfer from the rich to the ‘middle class’ will result in
the same aggregate ratios being consumed as before that additional transfer (since
we are in equilibrium). Thus no additional transfer can result in a price change for
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any goods, so the rich will simply lose the value of the transfer and not gain anything
in return. Thus the transfer cannot be Pareto-improving.
Corollary 2.2 Given the framework in proposition 2.16, even if economies of scale are
not large enough locally to produce a small Pareto-improving transfer,
there may be a large Pareto-improving transfer, so long as the threshold
in corollary 2.1 is not crossed.
Proof: Since economies of scale are not decreasing at a strictly decreasing rate, it is
possible that while there is no small transfer from the rich to the middle-class, there
is a large transfer.
By the same arguments as in proposition 2.16, the poor (weakly) and middle-class
(strictly) must always be better off after the transfer. It remains to show that that
can also be true for the rich.
It is sufficient to show that if economies of scale are sufficiently large, then for the
rich:
p0.x1 − p0.x0 ≤ 0
⇒ p0.x1 ≤ w0L+ r0K − nr
ni
τ
=
w0
w1
[
w1L+ r1K
]− nr
ni
τ
= p1.x1 − nr
ni
τ
⇒ (p0 − p1) .x0 ≤ −nr
ni
τ
Now we know that: p0y = p1y , p0z ≥ p1z and p0x ≤ p1x.
Therefore, for the rich we need that:
(
p0x − p1x
)
x0 +
(
p0z − p1z
)
z0 ≤ −τ
⇒ (p0x − p1x) ≤ − 1x0 (τ + (p0z − p1z) z0) 
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Which is essentially exactly the same condition as in proposition 2.16. However
it is not required to be true for consecutive values of τ . This is because p0x − p1x may
be small for low values of τ(since dpx
dx
is not strictly declining, so dpx
dτ
need not be
either) but larger for large values of τ.Of course, once the threshold in corollary 2.1
is crossed, it is no longer clear that there will be a benefit from the transfer.
Further by the same argument as in proposition 2.16, this cannot be supported
by another equilibrium.
Proposition 2.18 Any losses from moving toward a more unequal society can be over-
come if they are matched by a sufficient increase in the size of the economy.
Proof: “intervention” Case: Take n
0
m
n1m
. Then, if we multiply the number of people in
the unequal society by this fraction, we will have:
n0m
n1m
n1r > n
0
r rich households;
n0m
n1m
n1p > n
0
p poor households; and
n0m = n
0
m middle-class households
“Taxation” Case: Simply add sufficient additional players to both the rich and the
middle-class, such nˆmωm = nm (ωm + τ). Add a proportional number of players to all
other classes.
In either case, as a first-order effect, the price of middle-class goods will fall to their
same level as under the respective equal equilibria. Since there are more members of
other classes also, the total movement of purchasing power into middle-class goods
will be weakly higher. Therefore, the price of middle-class goods will be weakly lower,
and we are done. 
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Chapter 3
Political Economy of Housing Supply
— Evidence from Australian Cities
3.1 Introduction
Steadily climbing housing prices and increasing housing shortages have become key
features of major cities across the world. These trends have been ongoing for several
decades, interrupted only briefly by crises as occurred in 2008. These trends are not
limited to well-known US examples such as New York and San Francisco, but extend
to major cities globally, including London, Sydney, and Vancouver.
While a body of literature ascribes these dynamics to increased regulation (see
Glaeser et al. (2005b) for example, or Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) for a summary),
this merely pushes the question back one step. Why does this regulation exist at
all? And if regulation is in fact the driver of housing price growth and slow supply
responses, why has regulation become more restrictive over time?
This paper considers these questions. First, what are the demographic drivers
of increased housing development regulation (and therefore slower housing growth)?
And secondly, what political structures support this process? To answer these ques-
tions, we develop a model of housing markets, where residents are averse to conges-
tion. Our model predicts that homeowners will tend to be more averse to growth than
renters, and therefore more likely to vote for any one of the various broad categories
of regulation we consider. We also model voting, to demonstrate that neighborhood-
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level preferences will matter more when the government is decentralized.
Australia is a good location to test the predictions of the model. In Australia,
unlike the US, local governments (the primary town planning regulators) do not pro-
vide essential public safety or schooling services. This allows us to test the impact of
demographic factors on housing regulation without worrying about the overwhelming
selection effects that would otherwise result. In addition, Australia offers us variation
in the degree of governance centrality, and rich 5-yearly census data.
We find that rates of home ownership are closely tied to slower growth in cities
with a decentralized governance structure. Our finding is consistent with existing
theories that homeowners oppose growth, as growth reduces their expected home val-
uations and increases home price risk. We do not find the same relationship between
neighborhoods in a city managed by a single local government, which supports our
hypothesis that homeowners act as housing ‘insiders’ who construct artificial barriers
to entry to reduce local congestion.
In addition, we find that the presence of large numbers of pensioners is negatively
correlated with housing growth in a given neighborhood regardless of the governance
structure. Perhaps surprisingly, higher incomes seem to be correlated with slightly
higher rates of housing development.
Section 3.2 presents the current literature on housing growth and regulation, and
also provides some historical background. Section 3.3 outlines a model of develop-
ment that incorporates congestion preferences, and examines the predictive of various
demographical variables and governance structures on housing outcomes. Section 3.4
describes the data used for testing these predictions in major Australian cities. Sec-
tion 3.5 presents our results.
3.2 Literature Review
Recent years have seen the accumulation of a preponderance of evidence that reg-
ulation is a driving force in determining housing supply and prices. Glaeser et al.
(2005b) first demonstrated that for Manhattan, at least 50 percent of the value of the
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mean owned apartment in Manhattan in 2003 was the result of regulatory constraints.
Similar results have followed for other areas, including Boston (Glaeser et al., 2006)
and California (Quigley and Raphael, 2005).
There is little consensus on why this relationship exists. It appears to affect some
places more than others, specifically coastal cities Gyourko (2009). This has led some
to argue that the limiting factor is geography, not regulation (Saiz, 2010), but this
stands in contrast with the finding that the relationship between land regulation and
housing prices has strengthened over time (Glaeser et al., 2005a).
One hypothesis is that “homevoters” use their political power to enhance their
asset values. Externalities from new developments may have positive or negative
effects on housing prices, and existing residents will be opposed to anything that either
reduces their house price in expectation (Cooley and LaCivita, 1982) or increases their
exposure to housing price risk in the event that they are using their homes as a hedge
against consumption or productivity shocks (Ortalo-Magné and Rady, 2002; Ortalo-
Magné and Prat, 2007). Risk aversion is higher for those whose wealth is concentrated
in their home, rather than diversified across a range of assets (Fischel, 2001).
Empirically, Dubin et al. (1992) analyzed voting data from growth control mea-
sures proposed in San Diego, and found that homeowners were in fact more likely to
vote in support of those measures. They also found an increase in support for growth
control from those living in areas with high levels of traffic congestion.
There is also considerable debate over what conditions would allow homeowners to
have the most political power. On the one hand, Ellickson (1977) suggests that small
areas with limited local government issues may be more likely to exclude development,
and for this reason Gottlieb and Glaeser (2008) argue that a national policy should
be implemented to reduce the power of local homeowners. On the other hand, White
(1975) and Hamilton (1978) proposed the “monopoly zoning hypothesis”: larger towns
will have stricter land use regulations as they can more easily exploit market power.
Extensive econometric analysis has failed to resolve this question.1
An alternative view is that slower housing development is the result of inequality.
1Fischel (1980); Thorson (1996); or see Quigley and Rosenthal (2005) for a summary.
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There is evidence to suggest that income inequality may raise the cost of housing
for the lowest income earners (Matlack and Vigdor, 2008), and there is a long-run
correlation between UK housing prices and income inequality (Green and Shaheen,
2014). Inequality is usually hypothesized to reduce ‘filtering’, where new middle-
class housing deteriorates and eventually becomes housing for the poor (Quigley and
Raphael, 2004), thereby limiting demand rather than supply. However, Quigley and
Rosenthal (2005) argue that wealthy communities may also prefer stricter regulation
which may in turn elevate housing prices.
One final characteristic that may be important is age. It has been well established
that those over 65 are more likely to be members of a political party, and to vote
in voluntary elections (Verba et al. 1995). Higher rates of civic participation may
mean that their preferences effectively carry more weight than those of other citizens
in local government decision-making. In addition, there is evidence that, at least
in the case of homeowners, the elderly are less likely to move (Burkhauser et al.,
1995). This could increase their incentives to ensure that their existing neighborhood
meets their desires in terms of congestion and development. While it is possible that
the incentives could work in either direction — the elderly may be more opposed to
congestion and change than younger residents, or alternatively be more price-sensitive
on average — we consider this an important avenue of investigation.
Beyond simple correlations these theories have suffered from a lack of clear ev-
idence. The legal framework behind housing supply is extremely complicated —
housing is governed directly by zoning laws, and indirectly by environmental, her-
itage, health and safety and other legislation, depending on the jurisdiction. On-
paper regulation may also not translate directly into what occurs in practice. This
makes regulation incredibly difficult to measure (Quigley and Rosenthal, 2005).
In addition, there are difficulties in establishing the size of the impact of any given
regulation. There may be a long gap between the implementation of regulation and
the production of new housing. Furthermore, a single jurisdiction provides very little
variation in the proportions of owners, renters, wealthy, poor, young, and elderly
voters required to test their effects on home growth. By leveraging within-city and
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across-city differences over a relatively long time period, this paper seeks to fill that
gap.
The majority of the literature on local governments assumes a localized economy,
and thus incorporates production as well as housing consumption in determining a
general equilibrium. We would argue that this is approach is misguided in the case of
a modern city that is divided into various ‘sub cities’, which are separately governed.
In many cases, the ‘city’ as conceptualized by the strength of economic ties across a
contiguous area has no government of its own. Instead, administration of the area is
divided between smaller cities, which have little or no general oversight.
This is highly visible in in the Australian context. In recent years, the Australian
Bureau of Statistics has defined a Greater Capital City Statistical Area (see figure 3.1)
for each city, which denotes the area that includes the whole urban sprawl, including
those areas where people regularly commute to the middle of the city for recreation or
employment. The Sydney Greater Capital City Statistical Area includes all or part
of 40 separate local government areas, and there is no single authority responsible for
the area as a whole.
This creates an assortment of citizen ‘clubs’ which take little or no account of the
externalities they impose upon their neighbors. For instance, it is established that
housing regulation in any one area has spillovers for housing prices in other close
geographical areas (Levine, 1999). These impacts need not be considered by those
who choose to impose that regulation. One could consider this a ‘voting externality’;
since geographical areas are not isolated from one another, all political decisions in a
decentralized system have impacts on people outside the voting population. However,
unlike economic externalities, the construction of the political system does not allow
for these externalities to be offset by economic transfers.
3.2.1 Local government and housing in Australia
In the event that there is a correlation between one or more of the proposed demo-
graphic variables and housing growth, we would like to know whether this is partially
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Figure 3.1: Sydney Greater Capital City Statistical Area — density map
the result of the governance structure. In particular, we would like to know if de-
centralizing the planning process results in stronger feedback from local preferences
to local outcomes. In order to test this, we need to be able to compare areas with
different governance structures.
The primary responsibility for zoning and housing approvals in Australia generally
rests with local governments, which are similar in form and function to US cities and
counties. However, as this is the result of a devolution of power on behalf of the
States, its exact form is thus slightly different in each State.2
2The Australian Constitution does not recognize the existence of local governments, and allocates
all power over zoning (as a residual power) to the States, although some environmental matters of
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Unlike US counties Australian local governments are in general not responsible
for schooling, police, health, transportation, or fire services — these services are
supplied by the State governments. Australian local governments tend to provide
more localized services — local roads, local water and sewerage infrastructure3, street
lighting, and footpaths.4
As a result, in many cities local governments have little impact on household’s
locational choices. As noted in the final report of the Independent Local Govern-
ment Review Panel (2013) (page 14) “On the whole, people appear satisfied with the
performance of local government...However, the overall level of awareness and under-
standing about the role and functions of councils is quite low...” As a result, we can
ignore clustering on the basis of local public good provision, which would otherwise
generate endogeneity.
Nonetheless, turnout for local government elections in some parts of Australia is
comparatively high. Under the Local Government Act 1993 5 and the City of Brisbane
Act 1924 6 residents in Sydney and Brisbane respectively are compulsorily required to
vote in local council elections or pay a fine.7 As a result, turnout averages 83 percent in
New South Wales local government elections (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010).
Similarly, turnout for Brisbane City Council elections was 86 percent in 2008 and
82 percent in 2012 (Electoral Commission of Queensland, 2012). This substantially
reduces complications from voter selection.
national importance are still dealt with at the federal level.
3Within cities with multiple local governments, local governments tend to source water from the
same source, and return sewerage to the same endpoint, and thus they tend to provide only the local
portion of the water and sewerage infrastructure.
4Brisbane City represents an unusual departure from this model, as they have historically been
responsible for the entire greater capital city statistical area, and as such have partnered with the
Queensland State Government to provide additional services such as transportation and major roads.
However, as all the Brisbane data comes from the same local government area, the level at which
these services are provided should not result in variation between areas, and should therefore not
affect our results.
5Compulsory voting for local elections was first required under the Local Government (Electoral
Provisions) Act 1947.
6This clause later fell under the Local Government Act 2009 and the Local Government Electoral
Act 2011, but the effect has remained consistent.
7Slightly different provisions exist (and have existed) for the Sydney City local council. However,
since this area is removed from our data for other reasons, these variations have no effect on our
results.
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One key area of local government responsibility is town planning, zoning, and
building approvals, although their involvement in this area is recent and evolving.
The first legislation allowing (and, in fact, requiring) town plans did not appear in
Australia until after WWII. New South Wales passed the Local Government (Town
and Country Planning) Amendment Act 1945, giving their local governments the
authority to create town plans and manage development8 (Hamnett and Freestone,
1999). Thus we have a devolved governance structure that is responsible for a sizable
proportion of housing development regulation, and which varies in structure from city
to city.
Of course, zoning legislation is much more complicated than a simple town plan.
Zoning legislation is supplemented by environmental and heritage legislation, which
can be used to slow or block development at the local, State, or national level. This
legislation is even more recent — New South Wales passed the first Heritage Act and
the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act in 1977 and 1979 respectively, and
the national government passed the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Con-
servation Act in 2001. To complicate matters even further, exceptions are routinely
given to all of the above legislation.
The increase in the volume and complexity of legislation makes it very difficult to
determine either the source of the legislation or its impact on housing supply. As a
result, we take an indirect approach, and examine the differences between the results
of the different types of governance structures. By tracking the evolution of develop-
ment over time, we demonstrate how the different structures and demographics lead
to different development outcomes.
3.3 Supply, demographics, and governance structure
In this section we will outline a single period model of housing markets. We will
then consider how owners and renters will react to various categories of regulation.
Finally, we will consider how these preferences are likely to translate into outcomes
8Victoria and Tasmania released similar legislation at around the same time.
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in a democratic political system, depending on whether city governance is centralized
or decentralized.
3.3.1 Single period model
Consider a city with a single neighborhood. The utility of living in that neighborhood
in a period is given by:
U = u (h, y)− c (n,G)
where h is the size of the house/land, y is consumption of other goods, G is the
exogenous allocation of local public goods in the neighborhood (for example beaches
etc), and n is the number of houses in the neighborhood.
Given a budget constraint of mi, and a house price of p, we have that in any given
period:
U = u (h,m− ph)− c (n,G)
We assume that utility is concave in h and y, and that the congestion function c
is convex in n and concave in G. Income m is distributed in the population according
to F (m). We make no assumptions on F (m) other than it is fixed over time, and is
positive only for positive values of m.
The assumption that the utility function is additively separable in congestion is
akin to stating that all public goods are equally accessible to all residents of the
neighborhood, and that congestion affects all residents equally regardless of wealth.
Furthermore, we assume that for allG <∞, as n→∞, c(n,G)→ 0, or in other words
as if the population is large enough an individual’s value from any public goods will
tend to zero. Residents and prospective residents do not recognize their own effect
on the congestion function, as urban areas are characterized by a large number of
dwellings per square kilometer, and each new home is likely to represent less than a
1% change in this variable.
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Each period individuals choose whether to live in the neighborhood or outside the
city, and whether to purchase a home at a price P (p), or whether to rent a home
at cost p. The nature of the neighborhood (in terms of public goods, congestion,
or demographic makeup) does not impact this decision, but rather we assume it is
a function of exogenous finance constraints. The area of the neighborhood is then
costlessly divided into multiple parcels depending on the preferences of the individual
residents, and the cost of dwelling construction is then incurred. This creates the
additional constraint for each area that:
∫ ∞
m˜
h∗ (m, p) df(m) = A
Note that this means we do not distinguish between four-apartment block on a
one hectare block and four single-dwelling units each on 1/4 hectare.
Finally, if the individual lives outside the neighborhood we assume they obtain a
fixed endowment of housing, and no public goods. Their utility is therefore given by:
U = u(H,m)
where H is the fixed endowment of housing.
A single-period free market equilibrium for this model exhibits monotonicity in
income. Essentially, a higher-income individual will never want to live outside the
neighborhood while a lower-income individual lives in it, because non-housing con-
sumption has diminishing marginal utility in income. Thus, as income rises an in-
dividual would like to diversify into consuming housing and public goods by moving
into the neighborhood.
Proposition 3.1: If we have two individuals with income m and mˆ > m, then if
individual with incomem wants to live in the neighborhood then individual with income
mˆ wants to live in the neighborhood also.
Proof: By concavity of utility function — see appendix 3.8. 
69
We can utilize this monotonicity to demonstrate that a single-period equilibrium
exists. Essentially, because the outside option is fixed, individuals will sort monoton-
ically by income, and there will be a cutoff point above which all individuals will live
in the neighborhood and below which they will live outside it.
Proposition 3.2: There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if there is only one
area.
Proof: See appendix 3.8 for full proof. Essentially we can divide the process into two
stages — in the first stage individuals choose whether to live in the neighborhood,
and in the second stage they maximize their utility given the price of land in the
neighborhood. Given the monotonicity of the utility function we can establish a
cutoff point and a price. 
3.3.2 Regulation and responses to growth
Having established the existence of a market equilibrium in the previous section, we
can now compare it with a regulated equilibrium. If we allow residents (and only
residents) to vote, they may choose to vote for regulation that limits supply. We can
use our model to determine whether preferences for regulation (as opposed to the
market equilibrium) vary depending whether an individual owns or rents their home,
how wealthy they are, and so forth. This allows us to determine whether individuals
are likely to support or oppose policies that limit growth relative to what they expect
the status quo to be in the next period.
We require additional assumptions. First, and most importantly, we assume that
the price of housing is perfectly predictable. Therefore if we assume a particular set
of expectations regarding price and then adjust regulation, we can predict the impact
of that on price and therefore establish the preferences for regulation.
We also maintain our assumption regarding the perfect divisibility of housing;
in fact, for the purposes of this section we do not distinguish between housing and
lot size. We also assume that housing can be costlessly re-allocated every period in
any fraction. This is clearly an abstraction from reality, as in reality the existing
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housing stock has value from period to period. However, introducing costs of division
should bias against our findings, as larger blocks are easier to divide than smaller
blocks, creating a reversion to the mean across areas as growth occurs. Based on this
assumption there is essentially no difference between an owner selling their property
and buying another of equal size in the same area, and the owner keeping their original
property.
Finally we assume that all residents of the neighborhood have the right to vote
for regulation in the neighborhood, but those outside the area do not.
The menu of possible regulation is extensive, far too extensive for us to consider all
possibilities. Instead we identify three restrictions that incorporate many of the most
common forms regulation as subsets. First, we consider changes in the area of the
neighborhood, A. This covers two common areas of regulation: staggered land release
and environmental regulation. If residents oppose new land releases in their area,
they are essentially requesting regulation to reduce A in the next period. Similarly,
preventing home production by creating space for trees or parkland, however this is
paid for, reduces A. We assume that land cannot be forcibly reclaimed from existing
residential development.
Due to their aversion to congestion and the fact that home costs are sunk, ex-
isting homeowners will support regulation that restricts future land releases relative
to a free market equilibrium. On the other hand, renters will prefer to allow land
releases, as they will be compensated for any increased congestion through lower
prices. Thus we should expect opposition to land releases in areas withe higher rates
of homeownership.
Proposition 3.3: Homeowners will support regulation that restricts any increase in
A. If housing is a constant factor share of income, renters will oppose it.
Proof: Full proof is in appendix 3.8. Essentially, increased congestion would de-
crease both utility and prices, and thus be negative for owners as they have sunk
costs. Renters, on the other hand, will be fully compensated through the price mech-
anism.
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Note that housing being less than a constant factor share of income is not sufficient
to render this untrue, but the outcome would then be dependent on the exact form
of the utility function. 
Second, we consider a blanket restriction on n, or limiting the number of houses
in an area. Essentially, the government indicates that no new homes may be built
unless an equivalent number of homes are destroyed. It is similar to stating that all
homes must be detached single-family dwellings, although not entirely. Once again,
we assume that the area cannot ‘go backwards’; that is, we cannot forcibly remove
anyone from the area, only prevent new entry.
In this case, our restrictions are no longer both binding — in order to restrict the
number of people in the area prices must rise, but then we can no longer fill the area as
at the higher price residents will want to reduce the size of their houses. Homeowners
will therefore support this policy only if there is a third party to purchase any excess
land. Renters will once again prefer the free market equilibrium.
Proposition 3.4: Homeowners will support regulation that restricts any increase in
n so long as there is a third party to purchase any excess land. If housing is a constant
factor share of income, renters will oppose it.
Proof: Full proof is in appendix 3.8. Essentially, the negative impact of congestion
makes homeowners who wish to stay oppose development, and the price effect makes
those who wish to leave oppose development.
Note that housing being less than a constant factor share of income is not sufficient
to render this untrue, but the outcome would then be dependent on the exact form
of the utility function. 
The final policy limits the smallest possible size of homes, or in our model sets
a minimum h. This is perhaps the most well known, and is most commonly seen in
height and block size restrictions. This also covers a great deal of heritage legislation
which prevents existing homes from being divided into smaller dwellings.
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In this case, the impact on prices is mixed. Owners who wish to stay will obviously
prefer to reduce congestion. Furthermore, since they do not have to leave if the
minimum exceeds their current block size, they will (unlike renters) also not oppose
the policy due to concerns about having to leave the area. However, the effects of
such a policy on price are less clear-cut.
Proposition 3.5: Independent of the effects on price, owners are more likely than
renters to support minimum size regulations. The effect on price depends on the
nature of the distribution, the relative concavity of the utility function, the value of
the outside option, and the degree of impact of congestion. Higher prices in response
to a minimum size regulation will result in owners supporting the policy, lower prices
will result in renters supporting the policy.
Proof: Full proof is in appendix 3.8. 
We would argue that the value of the outside option is increasing less rapidly with
income than we have modeled here (as one is likely to lose one’s city job if one does
not live in the city), which increases our chance of a price increase in response to a
minimum size regulation. Furthermore, while here we have allowed owners to ‘pool
resources’ to extract the optimal number of new housing units, in reality these are
likely to be spread across the city, thus meaning that instead of two houses being
turned into three we must have one house remaining the same size and the other split
into two. This reduces the positive impact on price for any one owner of allowing the
group to divide homes into smaller units, as it forces departing owners to compete
with each other to attract new demand. Finally, we would argue that in fact housing
demand is pretty price inelastic, especially as one moves down the income distribution,
thus supporting the view that prices are likely to rise as minimum lot sizes increase.
Overall, these three propositions suggest that a given neighborhood with more
owner-occupiers relative to renters will have a political preference for more restrictive
regulation. We therefore predict that a larger number of owners relative to renters
will reduce the quantity of new houses produced in the neighborhood in the next
period.
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In contrast, wealth alone also does not necessarily lead a resident to prefer more
restrictive regulation. On the one hand, wealthy individuals would prefer to pay more
than less wealthy individuals for less congestion, as the utility from congestion is fixed
whereas utility from housing and other goods are declining in income. On the other
hand, if congestion is higher in poorer neighborhoods, there may be a larger return to
the expenditure of resources to reduce congestion (depending on the marginal value
of decreased congestion).
For those owners who are selling, the incentives are equally mixed. While a wealthy
owner has more to gain from a price increase in absolute terms, they also have a lower
marginal utility from increasing their wealth, so they may care less. Furthermore, if
they are divided into areas where they are consuming more public goods but not larger
houses, giving up a fixed y for a larger p may not result in much change. Therefore
our model (in contrast with some of the literature) does not unambiguously predict
that regulation will be tighter in neighborhoods that are wealthier.
Finally, we need to consider age. Like wealth, the effects of age may run in two
conflicting directions. On the one hand, the expected length of future tenure in the
home is likely to decline with age. On the other hand, for some elderly residents their
home represents the bulk of their assets, and they have limited future labor income.
Further, they may have a strong bequest motive, and wish to maximize the value of
the house they pass to their heirs. As a result, they may be more concerned about
price effects and may be more supportive of regulation. Furthermore, the elderly
may have stronger preferences against congestion (through a different c function), for
historical or age-related reasons.
In either case, as noted in section 3.2, the there is considerable evidence that
the elderly have higher rates of civic participation. Thus their preferences may be
more represented. Overall, however, our model does not predict the direction of those
preferences.
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3.3.3 Decentralization
Even were our data to support our predictions, a single neighborhood city such as
described above would not allow us to identify whether the relationships were the
result of supply factors or demand factors as theorized. We would therefore like to
exploit a comparison between the impact of those variables on multiple-neighborhood
cities with different governance structures.
The first step is to ensure that an equilibrium exists for a city with multiple
neighborhoods. Obviously any given equilibrium may not be unique, as households
are interested in the interaction between public goods and congestion. If we have two
areas we may have that the area with more public goods has higher congestion and
a lower price, or lower congestion and a higher price.
We can simplify this problem by noting that our previous results on monotonicity
extend naturally to the case where we have multiple neighborhoods, since individuals
with higher incomes will prefer to live in less dense and/or higher endowment areas.
Furthermore, the neighborhoods where the wealthy live will have higher prices per
unit of land than areas where the poor live (proposition 3.6). Therefore individuals
will generally sort themselves according to income, except for the set of knife-edge
cases where two or more areas have differences in congestion that completely balance
out the difference between their public good endowments (proposition 3.7).
Proposition 3.6: If we have two individuals with incomes m and mˆ > m, and in-
dividual m strictly (weakly) prefers neighborhood B to neighborhood A while indi-
vidual with income mˆ strictly (weakly) prefers the reverse, then we must have that
pA > pB (pA = pB).
Proof: By concavity of utility function — see appendix 3.8. 
Proposition 3.7: If we have two individuals with income m and m˜ > m, and indi-
vidual m strictly (weakly) prefers A to B while individual m˜ strictly (weakly) prefers
B to A, then any individual with income mˆ > m strictly (weakly) prefers neighborhood
A to neighborhood B.
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Proof: By proposition 3.6, we know that if m strictly (weakly) prefers A to B and
individual m˜ strictly (weakly) prefers B to A, then pA > pB (pA = pB). But by the
same argument, if mˆ ≥ m prefers B to A, we must have that pB > pA, which would
be a contradiction. So we must have that individual mˆ prefers A to B. 
Proposition 3.8 demonstrates that we can therefore use the same sorting mecha-
nism we outlined in propositions 3.6 and 3.7 to construct at least one equilibrium.
Proposition 3.8: For a city with multiple areas, there is at least one separating
equilibrium for n > k, and at most one pooling equilibrium.
Proof: See appendix 3.8. 
We have shown in the previous section that some types of voters prefer a regulated
equilibrium to a free market equilibrium, whereas others do not. These preferences
are defined by their demographic characteristics. So far, however, we have only looked
at the case where the city is composed of one neighborhood. We need to know if the
same preferences result if the city is divided into multiple neighborhoods.
We argue that if the demographic characteristics of voters affect their taste for
regulation, then we would expect a stronger regulatory response at the level at which
regulation is set. Essentially, if a neighborhood does not have the jurisdiction to
create its own housing regulation in our model, the number of owners versus renters
(or wealthy vs poor, or old vs young) does not matter. Since everyone in the whole
city can vote, the city as a whole may exhibit these same relationships9, but the
pivotal voter will never be in any given neighborhood. Since all neighborhoods prefer
to reduce congestion in their neighborhood, they will prefer to relocate development
away from themselves, and into other neighborhoods.
Furthermore, if we consider the multiple area case, prices will tend to need to
adjust by more in response to regulation, as reducing land availability, increasing
minimum housing size, and/or limiting the number of residents creates congestion in
9Voters may have preferences against congestion at multiple levels — neighborhood and city as a
whole. But preferences for reduced congestion from the city as a whole should not cause noticeable
variation between areas.
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other neighborhoods, reducing the relative attractiveness of the outside option as the
outside option.
Therefore, we would expect our predicted relationships to hold in neighborhoods
where governance is decentralized to the neighborhood level, but not if regulation is
set more centrally.
3.4 Data and empirical strategy
3.4.1 Data
We selected data for local government and statistical local areas in the Australian
cities of Sydney and Brisbane. The Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) collected
the data as part of the Australian Census program in 1933, 1947, 1954, and then
in 5-yearly intervals from 1961 to 2011. We obtained data from 1933 to 1961 from
the original ABS census publications. The Australian Data archive provided us with
most of the data for the period 1966-1991 in electronic form, translated from the
original microfiche. Some demographic information from the 1986 census was trans-
lated directly by us from the microfiche at the University of Queensland archives. We
obtained the remaining data from the ABS online census portal.
From the data, we selected the two larger cities for analysis: Brisbane and Sydney.
We chose these cities for several reasons.
• They are two of the three largest cities by population in Australia.
• Both cities have compulsory voting at the local government level, and very
similar rates of voter turnout.
• Both cities are situated on the east coast on natural harbors.
• Both cities and are limited spatially by mountain ranges to the west.
• Both were originally founded as British convict colonies.
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Australia’s population is concentrated, with around 60 percent of people living in
just five major cities in 2014 (calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2015).
While we may also wish to include Australia’s second-largest city (Melbourne) in
our analysis, this city went through a complete restructuring of local government
boundaries in 1993, resulting in an insufficient quantity of data to extract robust
results. Australia’s fourth and fifth largest cities, Perth and Adelaide, do not have
compulsory voting at the local government level, and has low turnout rates (33 percent
in the former case) so they were also not considered (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
2010). The remaining Australian cities are much smaller, housing less than 3 percent
of the Australian population each (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2015).
The boundaries of Sydney are based on the greater capital city statistical areas
for 2011, which are determined by the ABS based on economic linkages and activity.
Sydney is composed of several local government areas (LGAs) which are separately
governed, and there is no central city-wide authority. Data for these cities is therefore
reported on a local government basis in each census. The exact number of local
government areas varies over time, but was 43 in 2011. Brisbane, on the other hand,
has historically been governed by a single local government10, and because of this
the ABS reports Brisbane data by suburban areas (termed statistical local areas or
SLAs), of which there were over 100 in 2011.
The ABS also provided historical maps for the years 1981-2011, which we used
to calculate the total area of the SLAs and LGAs in each period. We also used
these maps to determine which areas had been merged and divided over time. Every
attempt has been made to ensure long-term consistency in the geographical areas
examined, and more detail can be found in appendix 3.9.
From the census, we selected key demographic and dwellings variables. These in-
cluded the number and type of dwellings (exact definitions and number of categories
varied from census to census, but included houses, flats, semi-detached dwellings,
villas, etc). Other variables included age (by 5-year intervals), and tenancy arrange-
10By 2011, the greater capital city statistical area for Brisbane included some areas outside that
were outside the Brisbane local government area. However, this is, for the most part, a handful of
suburbs in neighboring local government areas.
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ments (divided into owned outright, owned and mortgaged, rented privately, and
rented from a government authority).
The ABS did not collect income data until 1976, which is also the year that the
SLA boundaries for Brisbane were stabilized. We therefore limited our analysis to
1976 onward. Unfortunately, the income data bins (intervals) were inconsistent, in
that they did not represent a fixed fraction of households in each year. We therefore
created a new bin that represents as close to the top 15 percent of households in the
city (we also replicated this for families and individuals) as possible. The same data
was used to calculate the median income in each area in each year.
We calculated similar variables using binned rent and mortgage data, for the years
in which these were available (1933 onward, excluding 1966 and 1971 for rent data
and 1976 onward for mortgage data). Once again, the variable contains some noise,
due to variation in the bin cutoffs.
Construction costs were calculated using ABS data. Each city has its own con-
struction cost index published quarterly by the ABS. We took the average of this
construction index for the 5-year period preceding each census, and then discounted
it by the relevant (again city-based) price index. This measures the real variation in
building costs over time.
One concern with our model is that at very low levels, congestion preferences
may in fact be positive. This is partly the result of an interaction effect between the
availability of basic infrastructure (such as street-lighting, roads, and public water
supply) and the number of people. This makes fringe suburb growth more difficult to
predict. In addition, new greenfields space may be partially controlled by the State
government, particularly around the edges of the city, and even once sold large estates
may be held for long periods by developers in order to generate monopoly rents. We
therefore limit our analysis to areas which are ‘established’ suburban areas. As a
proxy for ‘established’, we use Sydney LGAs that are designated as part of Sydney
city in 1911, assuming that if significant parts of those areas were urban in 1911
they would be entirely urban by 1976. For Brisbane we take a later profile — since
the SLAs are much smaller we assume that these are almost entirely urban by the
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time they are established by the ABS as separate SLAs, and we therefore consider
everything that was a separate SLA in 1954.11
3.4.2 Empirical strategy
Our empirical strategy exploits three types of variation. Firstly, there is variation
in the demographic variables across neighborhoods within the same city. Secondly,
there is variation within neighborhoods over time. And finally, there is variation be-
tween neighborhoods in cities with different governance structures. This allows us to
determine both which demographic variables are likely to result in supply restrictions
and under which political structure those variables are important.
Growth can be measured either in terms of the percentage change in the number
of houses or in the change in housing density. While this changes the interpretation of
the coefficients, the two are mathematically equivalent (for proof see appendix 3.8).
We prefer the density measure, as it automatically adjusts for the size of the local
neighborhood.
In growth terms, therefore, we are interested in testing:
Density−l.Density = α+Xβ+β6ownership+β7high_income+β8median_income+β9pensionage+
where any combination of β6, β7,β8, β9 < 0 are significant.
Some of these variables are likely to be correlated with each other. For example,
the percentage of people with high income is positively correlated with the median
income. As regards the remaining the remaining variables, homeownership rates
are slightly positively correlated with median income (0.28) and slightly negatively
correlated with the proportion of elderly residents (-0.28). Median income is slightly
negatively correlated (-0.28) with the proportion of elderly residents.12 Therefore we
consider both the fully specified model and the partially specified model for each of
11In general we find that those suburbs had a density greater than 4 houses per hectare in 1976,
whereas most of the remainder had a density of less than 2 houses per hectare.
12These statistics are calculated from a mix of the Brisbane and Sydney data, limited to suburban
areas.
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the key variables of interested.
So far we have not distinguished the impact of these variables on demand versus
their impact on supply (via regulation). To do so, we exploit the variation between
the two governance structures. In the case of just two cities, this can be easily tested
by including an interaction term as follows:
Density− l.Density = α+Xβ + γ1city+ γ2demographic+ γ3city_demographic+ 
If we compare two different cities, one where the lowest level of regulation is set at
the neighborhood level, and another where it is set at the city-wide level, we would
expect the impact of the demographic variables to be much larger in the former case.
In order to test the above relationships, we run ordinary least squares on our panel
dataset.13 We allow for fixed effects for local government area and statistical local
area, and also for year.14 We cluster our standard errors by local government area or
statistical local area.
3.5 Results
The stock of housing does not remain constant over time — there is some divergence.
This can be seen from figure 3.2, which shows the growth trajectory for four Sydney
suburbs since 1966. There is some difference in the variation across the two cities, as
can be seen from figure 3.3. Sydney has faster density growth in some areas, which
creates a bias against our hypothesis.
In the absence of political economic factors, we would expect housing growth to
respond in a theoretically consistent manner to market-based supply and demand fac-
13We also considered using a matching methodology. This involves matching areas in Brisbane
and Sydney on area, density and year, and then running ordinary least squares on the Sydney,
ownership and interaction variables, including a binary variable to take into account the fixed effects
of each pair. We used wards instead of statistical local areas, to ensure there was common support
on the size of the area. However, matching produced no improvement in the balance statistics. Also,
matching even with a relatively large caliper dramatically reduced the size of the data set (down to
304 observations). Consequently the results have not been included.
14We considered running each year as a separate cross section, but this limited us to too few data
points, especially for Sydney.
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Figure 3.2: Housing density of four Sydney LGAs over time
Figure 3.3: Change in density in Brisbane statistical local areas and Sydney local
government areas
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tors. For instance, new housing should increase with population growth and decline
with construction costs. In fact, we find that density growth is higher when construc-
tion costs are higher, and population changes have zero significant impact on housing
growth (see table 3.1). Obviously if housing is not positively responsive to population
growth, one would expect higher prices and housing ‘shortages’ to result15.
15When most people discuss housing shortages they are not actually referring to an excess of
demand at the current market price, rather they are referring to the unavailability of housing at a
sufficiently low price point to be sustainably affordable to lower income households.
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Table 3.1: Responsiveness of housing supply to population and construction costs
(1)
Density - L1.Density
L1.Density (dwellings/km2) -0.144***
(0.0356)
Area (km2) -35.00***
(12.08)
Population - L1.Population -15.14
(13.46)
Construction Cost Index 3.984***
(1.385)
Observations 638
Note: Sydney data is based on local government areas (LGAs), Brisbane
data is based on statistical local areas (SLAs). Standard errors are clus-
tered by LGA or SLA, and are presented in parentheses in the table. Re-
gressions include fixed effects for each LGA and SLA and year. L1 refers
to the first lagged value of the variable. x denotes an interaction effect.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Table 3.2 presents the correlations between growth and various demographic char-
acteristics across the two types of jurisdiction. In accordance with our theory, we find
that home ownership rates reduce housing growth in Sydney suburbs (decentralized
system), but not in Brisbane suburbs (centralized system). A 1 percent increase in
ownership rates across Sydney results in around 20,000 fewer dwellings than would
otherwise be built every five years. Over a 40 year period, that is 160,000 dwellings,
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enough to house 1.4 percent of Sydney’s current population on a two-person-per-
dwelling basis (and almost sufficient to compensate for the current predicted ‘housing
shortage’). If instead we consider a 5% drop (the difference between aggregate Aus-
tralian and US rates) we would expect to see supply growth of 800,000 dwellings, or
around 7% of the current population.
Of course, the results suggest that home ownership is not the only factor in play.
Our results also suggest that the same result would not necessarily occur in a cen-
tralized political structure. Setting approvals at the level of the city as a whole,
rather than at the neighborhood level, appears to completely eliminate the negative
relationship between home ownership and growth. Even when we consider Brisbane
‘wards’16 (similar to parliamentary constituencies) instead of statistical local areas,
we cannot recover the relationship that we find for Sydney.
The relationship between ownership and lower growth applies to detached single-
family housing as well as high-rise. However, at the outermost fringes of the cities we
find that the relationship starts to break down. This is not surprising, as a lot of the
land on the city fringes is still owned by the State (rather than local) governments,
who choose whether to release it.
On the other hand if we examine the data at the block level we find that ownership
is negatively correlated with growth regardless of the jurisdictional structure, but we
suggest that this is misleading. When dealing with such small spaces (sometimes as
small as a city block) that micro factors become more important. For instance if one
is in the process of building new houses one will clearly have fewer owner-occupiers
in residence.
In addition to ownership, we are also interested in the effects of income and in-
come inequality on housing supply. We consider whether the spatial differences in
housing growth are driven by spatial differences in income in two ways. Firstly, we
look at whether development levels are affected by average incomes. Secondly, we
consider whether spatial differences are affected by the proportion of residents who
16Brisbane elects one councillor per ward, these together form the council. The mayor is elected
separately. Wards are considerably larger than statistical local areas.
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are wealthy (in the top 15% of incomes). We find that neither average incomes nor
inequality appear to play a role in reducing development. Contrary to the theory,
income and/or an increase in the number of relatively wealthy residents appears to
be, if anything, positively related to development in a neighborhood. In addition to
the results presented here, we also extended our analysis back to 1954 by using rent as
a proxy for income (the correlation between income and rent from the years in which
both sets of data are available is .8). Since the correlation is not clearly sensitive to
jurisdiction, we cannot ascertain whether this is related to supply or demand factors.
One counterargument that could be raised is that income is a poor proxy for
wealth, and that it is wealth that really matters. Even if we had household assets at
this level of detail, however, we would be reluctant to use them. The main residence
usually represents a large proportion of household assets. Since home values are based
on local house prices which are in turn a function of demand and supply, the analysis
would be circular. Instead, we split households into those who have repaid their
mortgage (which we assume are on average wealthier) and those who have not. We
find that more outright owners does not result in slower growth.
Finally, we find that an increase in the number of elderly residents (over 65) has a
substantial negative impact on future housing growth. This is true regardless of the
jurisdictional structure. Once again we cannot distinguish whether this is driven by
supply or demand factors, but we do note that higher proportions of elderly residents
are also correlated with higher property taxes.
86
Table 3.2: Impact of homeownership rates, median income, inequality and proportion
of elderly residents on changes in housing density
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dens-L1.Dens Dens-L1.Dens Dens-L1.Dens Dens-L1.Dens Dens-L1.Dens
L1.Density (dwellings/km2) -0.140*** -0.134*** -0.141*** -0.155*** -0.162***
(0.038) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035)
Area (km2) -34.31*** -30.90** -31.50** -29.69** -30.34**
(12.08) (12.26) (12.94) (13.26) (12.68)
L1.Homeowners (%) 0.501 -0.314
(0.720) (0.623)
L1.Homeowners x Sydney -1.796** -1.986***
(0.770) (0.707)
L1.Top Earners (%) 0.308
(0.601)
L1.Top Earners x Sydney 0.308
(0.779)
L1.Median Income ($’000) 0.495** 0.225
(0.232) (0.261)
L1.Median Income x Sydney -0.019 0.117
(0.294) (0.277)
L1.Over 65 (%) -1.679*** -1.491***
(0.470) (0.501)
L1.Over 65 x Sydney -3.676 -4.298*
(2.387) (2.192)
Observations 638 638 638 638 638
Note: Sydney data is based on local government areas (LGAs), Brisbane data is based on statistical local areas
(SLAs). Standard errors are clustered by LGA or SLA, and are presented in parentheses in the table. Regressions
include fixed effects for each LGA and SLA and for each year. Sydney fixed effects are absorbed by LGA fixed
effects. L1 refers to the first lagged value of the variable. x denotes an interaction effect.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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3.6 Conclusion
A high rate of home ownership in any given period is not unambiguously good. In
fact, one side effect of increasing home ownership now is a considerable reduction
in future housing supply, and associated higher housing prices. We find that a 10
percentage-point decrease in home ownership rates over our period would result in
an increase of around 1.6 million dwellings in Sydney, enough to house 14% of the
2011 population on a two-person-per-dwelling basis. Without additional forms of
intervention, this interaction may make high rates of home ownership unsustainable
in the longer term, as higher prices and limited access to finance reduce housing
affordability.
Second, while decentralization allows local areas to more accurately gauge and
enforce the preferences of their citizens, local districts are not completely independent
and these preferences may impose costly externalities on residents of other districts.
Local governments form clubs which may choose to prevent development in their area,
even if it is supported by the majority of the citizens in the city as a whole. These
concerns should be taken into account when considering the role of local governments
moving forward.
Our results offer an avenue towards uniting two conflicting strands of literature.
It has been argued by one school of thought that the causes of housing supply lim-
itations are geographic. On the other hand, there is evidence to suggest that they
are regulatory. Rather than considering the city as a whole, we look at the impact
of demographic variables at the level of the regulatory body. If local regulatory bod-
ies look to restrict development in their area to prevent congestion, we may still see
significant growth in housing across the city as a whole, if the city is able to expand
outwards, as regional areas with low density may encounter fewer limitations from a
political economy perspective. This provides a possible avenue for future research.
While we primarily consider voting as the mechanism for amalgamating local
political preferences, we reject the idea that wealthy residents directly increase regu-
lation through lobbying. We find the presence of more high income earners tends to
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be, if anything, positively associated with growth. However, we do not look at the
relative impact of home owner associations or the possibilities for corruption at the
local government level, we leave these extensions for further work.
We also find that a large proportion of elderly residents is strongly correlated with
lower growth. This result is concerning, as much of the western world is experiencing
rapid aging. As we do not have any significant variation in this result across the two
political structures we are considering, we cannot determine whether this is driven by
supply factors (such as regulation). Lower growth in areas with more elderly people
may simply be the result of lower demand from outsiders or lower mobility in response
to price changes from residents. However, we consider this to be very relevant, and
it should be considered more throughly in future research.
3.7 Appendix: Robustness
This appendix includes a range of additional robustness checks. These include adjust-
ments for missing data, adjustments to reflect variance, adjustments to time periods,
and others.
Rent
As noted previously, income data is limited to the 1976-2011 period. However, rent
is highly correlated with income over this period (the correlation between being the
proportion of rent payers in the top 15 percent and the proportion of income earners
in the top 15 percent is around .8). Therefore, we can use rent as a proxy for high
income.
As table 3.3 outlines, even if we extend the analysis back to 1954, places with
a high proportion of top rent payers have faster growth. This supports our existing
results that income is not linked to supply restrictions. Furthermore, the effect is
stronger for Brisbane, suggesting that it is in fact the result of the response of supply
to higher demand rather than to political pressures.
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Table 3.3: Impact of proportion of flats with high rent on changes in housing density
(1) (2) (3)
Dens-L1.Dens (Sydney) Dens-L1.Dens (Brisbane) Dens-L1.Dens (Joint)
L1.Density (dwellings/km2) -0.170** -0.143*** -0.150***
(0.066) (0.041) (0.034)
Area (km2) -26.33*** -31.54 -25.84***
(7.396) (22.98) (9.401)
L1.High Rent (%) 68.72 107.2** 111.7**
(69.87) (49.82) (45.30)
L1.High Rent x Sydney -24.50
(78.29)
Observations 138 408 546
Note: Sydney data is based on local government areas (LGAs), Brisbane data is based on statistical local
areas (SLAs). Standard errors are clustered by LGA or SLA, and are presented in parentheses in the ta-
ble. Regressions include fixed effects for each LGA and SLA and for each year. Sydney fixed effects are
absorbed by LGA fixed effects. L1 refers to the first lagged value of the variable. x denotes an interaction
effect.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Wealth, income and ownership
It could be argued that income is not the key variable in determining the impact
of inequality — rather, wealth is the main variable of interest. Income and wealth
are often poorly correlated, and it is especially difficult to use income as a proxy for
wealth when income data is not stratified by age. However, it is also very difficult
to separate wealth from home ownership, since one’s home often represents a large
proportion of one’s wealth. We therefore make the assumption that owner-occupiers
with a mortgage are less wealthy than those without a mortgage on average, and
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compare the two.17
However, as table 3.4 demonstrates, we actually get the opposite results. In
fact, the proportion of mortgages seems more negatively correlated than outright
ownership. A Wald test indicates no difference between the joint coefficients for
mortgagees compared with outright owner-occupiers. However, once the variables
are interacted with the Sydney dummy they are significantly different.
17For completeness, outright ownership rates are negatively correlated with the proportion of
elderly residents.
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Table 3.4: Impact of proportion of homeowners with a mortgage and the proportion
of outright owners (no mortgage) on changes in housing density
(1)
Density - L1.Density
L1.Density(dwellings/km2) -0.134***
(0.038)
Area (km2) -34.43***
(12.03)
L1.Mortgage (%) 0.720
(0.719)
L1.Owned outright (%) 0.206
(0.744)
L1.Mortgage x Sydney -2.101***
(0.764)
L1.Owned Outright x Sydney 1.832**
(0.900)
Observations 638
Note: Sydney data is based on local government areas (LGAs), Brisbane
data is based on statistical local areas (SLAs). Standard errors are clus-
tered by LGA or SLA, and are presented in parentheses in the table. Re-
gressions include fixed effects for each LGA and SLA and for each year.
Sydney fixed effects are absorbed by LGA fixed effects. L1 refers to the
first lagged value of the variable. x denotes an interaction effect.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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High density vs detached housing
It could be argued that in fact people are only averse to high density housing (such as
multi-story apartments), rather than housing as a whole. We therefore ran two ad-
ditional regressions, separating out high density housing (apartments) from detached
housing. Per the results presented in table 3.5, we find that ownership results in less
growth in either form of housing, and again that this result is only significant for
Sydney.
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Table 3.5: Impact of homeownership rates on changes in housing density on high-rise
dwellings and detached dwellings
(1) (2)
Highrise - L1.Highrise House - L1.House
L1.Density (dwellings/km2) -0.012*** -0.026
(0.003) (0.019)
Area (km2) -1.167* -1.797
(0.624) (2.299)
L1.Homeowners (%) 0.041 -0.178
(0.063) (0.181)
L1.Homeowners x Sydney -0.369*** -0.304
(0.073) (0.202)
Observations 638 638
Note: Sydney data is based on local government areas (LGAs), Brisbane
data is based on statistical local areas (SLAs). Standard errors are clus-
tered by LGA or SLA, and are presented in parentheses in the table.
Regressions include fixed effects for each LGA and SLA and for each
year. Sydney fixed effects are absorbed by LGA fixed effects. L1 refers
to the first lagged value of the variable. x denotes an interaction effect.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Fringe vs established suburban growth
As noted above, one concern with our model is that it may not apply as well to
neighborhoods at the city fringe. We therefore limited our analysis to suburban
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areas. The regressions in table 3.6 show the same analysis for fringe suburbs, and we
find that the relationship does in fact disappear as anticipated.
Table 3.6: Impact of homeownership rates on changes in housing density in fringe
suburbs
(1) (2) (3)
Dens-L1.Dens (Sydney) Dens-L1.Dens (Brisbane) Dens-L1.Dens (Joint)
L1.Density (dwellings/km2) -0.373* -0.154*** -0.162***
(0.210) (0.0475) (0.0474)
Area (km2) -1.028* -1.511 -0.929***
(0.528) (4.751) (0.348)
L1.Homeowners (%) -0.870 0.793 0.391
(1.195) (0.692) (0.658)
L1.Homeowners x Sydney 0.705
(1.045)
Observations 128 273 401
Note: Sydney data is based on local government areas (LGAs), Brisbane data is based on statistical local
areas (SLAs). Standard errors are clustered by LGA or SLA, and are presented in parentheses in the ta-
ble. Regressions include fixed effects for each LGA and SLA and for each year. Sydney fixed effects are
absorbed by LGA fixed effects. L1 refers to the first lagged value of the variable. x denotes an interaction
effect.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Rates and approval delays
One way in which local governments can reduce development is simply by delaying
approvals. We therefore considered the number of days to approval (available for
Sydney in 2011) and compared that with our independent variables in 2006 and
2011. We don’t find evidence for or against approval delays (see table 3.7), but we
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do find evidence that demographic factors impact rates. Median income of residents
appears to have no impact on rates at all, but places with high proportions of elderly
have higher rates on average.
Table 3.7: Impact of median income, age and homeownership rates on average resi-
dential rates and approval delays
(1) (2)
Rates ($) Approval Time (days)
Median Income ($’000) 0.743 -0.004
(1.68) (0.186)
Over 65 (%) 41.06** 1.342
(16.91) (1.876)
Homeowners (%) -9.047 -0.336
(6.643) (0.737)
Observations 22 22
Note: Sydney data is based on local government areas
(LGAs). Standard errors are clustered by LGA, and are
presented in parentheses in the table. x denotes an inter-
action effect.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Binned Ownership
One possible area of concern is that ownership rates may be generally negatively
correlated with density growth, but that the relationship may not be linear. An
approach to dealing with this is to divide ownership into intervals called bins. All
coefficients for ownership interacted with Sydney are negative (see table 3.8). The
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only significant variable ownership rates between 70 and 80 percent; however, there
are also relatively few observations in each ownership category.
Micro areas
Given our argument that the difference between cities is due to different jurisdictions,
we wish to check that when we limit our analysis to the block level, we don’t find
any difference between Brisbane and Sydney, and the demographic variables we’ve
identified should cease to matter. We find that the effect does not go away when we
shrink our analysis to the block level (table 3.9), although we believe this is due to
different factors operating at such a small level.
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Table 3.8: Impact of homeownership rates on changes in housing density using home-
ownership bins
(1)
Density - L1.Density
L1.Density (dwellings/km2) -0.155***
(0.039)
Area (km2) -34.12***
(12.41)
L1.Homeowners 50%-60% -11.06
(9.476)
L1.Homeowners 60%-70% -2.930
(11.84)
L1.Homeowners 70%-80% 12.84
(14.92)
L1.Homeowners 80%-100% 24.49
(19.83)
L1.Homeowners 50%-60% x Sydney -3.366
(10.33)
L1.Homeowners 60%-70% x Sydney -19.82
(14.15)
L1.Homeowners 70%-80% x Sydney -34.07*
(18.06)
L1.Homeowners 80%-100% x Sydney -10.39
(19.34)
Observations 638
Note: Sydney data is based on local government areas (LGAs), Brisbane data is
based on statistical local areas (SLAs). Standard errors are clustered by LGA or
SLA, and are presented in parentheses in the table. Regressions include fixed ef-
fects for each LGA and SLA and for each year. Sydney fixed effects are absorbed
by LGA fixed effects. L1 refers to the first lagged value of the variable. x denotes
an interaction effect.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.9: Impact of homeownership rates on changes in housing density at block
level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dens-L1.Dens Dens- L1.Dens Dens- L1.Dens Dens- L1.Dens
L1.Density (dwellings/1000m2) 0.051 -0.055 0.004 0.050
(0.043) (0.041) (0.045) (0.042)
Area (’000m2) -16495.8* -820524.1*** -16532.4*** -16840.3*
(8865.5) (201033.7) (4528.9) (8940.4)
L1.Homeowners (%) -1028.3*** -363.0*** -1229.6*** -203.8*
(256.8) (98.33) (425.9) (105.3)
Sydney 61891.6***
(17422.9)
L1.Homeowners (%) Sydney -836.1***
(231.1)
Observations 1111 338 1262 1449
Note: Data is based on collection districts, which are small areas that the Australia Bureau of Statis-
tics reported data for in 2006. These districts were renamed S1 districts in 2011 and boundaries
were redrawn. Observations include only those areas for which the boundaries did not change. Syd-
ney represents the fixed effect for Sydney. There are no other fixed effects as data is only available
for 2006 and 2011. L1 refers to the first lagged value of the variable. x denotes an interaction ef-
fect. Area is in thousands of metres squared not km squared per the other regressions, and this
also applies to density.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Larger Brisbane areas
One final thing we may be concerned about is that the areas in Sydney are very
much larger than the areas we are looking at in Brisbane. Furthermore, Brisbane is
divided into ‘wards’, which may approximate the Sydney areas. We therefore look
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at the equivalent regression using approximations of Brisbane’s Wards, rather than
its statistical districts (table 3.10). While the significance shrinks, likely due to our
smaller quantity of data, the level of the effect is approximately the same.
Table 3.10: Impact of homeownership rates, median income, inequality and propor-
tion of elderly residents on changes in housing density using wards instead of statistical
local areas for Brisbane
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dens-L1.Dens Dens-L1.Dens Dens-L1.Dens Dens-L1.Dens Dens-L1.Dens
L1.Density (dwellings/km2) -0.414** -0.397*** -0.409*** -0.427*** -0.450***
(0.175) (0.145) (0.145) (0.140) (0.155)
Area (km2) -10.15** -10.12** -10.08** -10.21** -10.11**
(4.128) (4.049) (4.107) (3.978) (4.042)
L1.Homeowners (%) -1.205 -1.997
(2.824) (2.352)
L1.Homeowners x Sydney -1.698* -2.018*
(1.002) (1.015)
L1.Top Earners (%) 1.680
(1.612)
L1.Top Earners x Sydney 0.993
(1.101)
L1.Median Income ($’000) -0.226 0.112
(0.524) (0.459)
L1.Median Income x Sydney 0.866* 0.491
(0.513) (0.400)
L1.Over 65 (%) -0.355 0.459
(1.913) (1.925)
L1.Over 65 x Sydney -9.222** -9.844**
(4.220) (4.356)
Observations 304 304 304 304 304
Note: Sydney data is based on local government areas (LGAs), Brisbane data is based on council wards, which have
been calculated by merging statistical local areas. Standard errors are clustered by LGA or ward, and are presented
in parentheses in the table. Regressions include fixed effects for each LGA and ward. Sydney fixed effects are ab-
sorbed by LGA fixed effects. L1 refers to the first lagged value of the variable. x denotes an interaction effect.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 3.11: Relationship between the number of high-rise dwellings and proximity to
local government area boundaries using block level data in Sydney
(1)
Small Area Highrise
Distance to Boundary -669.2***
(192.7)
Total Highrise in LGA 0.003***
(0.000)
Total Area of LGA (km2) -1.59e-08**
(7.30e-09)
Observations 7102
Note: Data is based on collection districts, which are small areas that
the Australia Bureau of Statistics reported data for in 2006. Distance
was calculated using QGIS software and maps provided by the Aus-
tralian Bureau of Statistics.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Congestion
If congestion is one of the drivers of preferences for reduced regulation we should
expect that development would be clustered on the edge of local government areas,
as this externalizes some of the congestion effect onto other neighborhoods. We used
mapping software to calculate the distance from each block in Sydney in 2006 to
the edge of the local government area, and then tested whether, conditional on the
number of high-rise in an area, the blocks with more high-rise were likely to be closer
to the edge of the local government area. We found that high-rise were more likely
to be clustered closer to the edge for suburban local government areas (see table 3.11
and figure 3.4).
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Figure 3.4: High-rise in Sydney
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3.8 Appendix: Math
Proofs
Proposition 3.1 If we have two individuals with income m and mˆ > m, then if indi-
vidual with income m wants to live in the neighborhood then individual
with income mˆ wants to live in the neighborhood also.
Proof: Assume not. Then, since the individual with income m has utility such that:
U = u (h∗m,m− ph∗m) + c (n,G) > u (H,m)
and the individual with utility mˆ has utility such that:
U = u (h∗mˆ, mˆ− ph∗mˆ) + c (n,G) < u (H, mˆ)
then we must have that:
u (h∗mˆ, mˆ− ph∗mˆ)− u (h∗m,m− ph∗m) < u (H, mˆ)− u (H,m)
However, we know that:
(mˆ− ph∗m)− (m− ph∗m) = mˆ−m
so by the fact that the utility function is concave in y:
u (h∗m, mˆ− ph∗m)− u (h∗m,m− ph∗m) > u (H, mˆ)− u (H,m)
Furthermore, by optimality, we have that:
u (h∗mˆ, mˆ− ph∗mˆ) > u (h∗m, mˆ− ph∗m)
and therefore we must have that:
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u (h∗mˆ, mˆ− ph∗mˆ)− u (h∗m,m− ph∗m)
>u (h∗m, mˆ− ph∗m)− u (h∗m,m− ph∗m) > u (H, mˆ)− u (H,m)
So we have a contradiction. 
Proposition 3.2 There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if there is only one
area.
Proof: To solve for equilibrium, we can divide the problem into two stages. In the
first stage, individuals choose between living in the city and the outside option. In
the second stage they choose how much housing to consume. It is sufficient to show
this for u(m) monotonically weakly increasing in m, since a fixed u is a special case
of this.
Equilibrium in stage 2 is therefore determined as follows. Each individual maxi-
mizes their utility function.
max
y,h
u(h, y) + c(s, L) + λ(m− y − ph)
⇒ u′h − λp = 0
u
′
y − λ = 0
m = y + ph+ P
⇒ u
′
h
u′y
= p
Given the assumptions on concavity, we have that there exists a unique function
for each individual i
h∗(mi, p)
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which is increasing continuously in mi and declining continuously in p. Further
we know that h∗(m, 0) =∞.
On the supply side, we have that
∫
i
h∗i (mi, p) = A
Since each h∗i (m, p) is declining monotonously in pi and h∗(m, 0) =∞,
∫
i
h∗i (mi, p)
must have those same properties. Consequently there is a unique equilibrium p such
that
∫
i
h∗i (mi, p) = A.
It remains to show that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium can also be achieved
once we add stage one.
From proposition 3.1, we know that if an individual with income m prefers living
in the city, the individual with mˆ > m will also prefer living in the city.
Consequently, we know that:
u (y∗ (m˜, p) , h∗ (m˜, p)) + c(
∫ ∞
m˜
f(m), G)
is strictly increasing in m˜, and is continuous in m˜.
Therefore, by continuity of m and u(m), and since we know that u(0) > u(0)
if everyone lives in the area, and u(max(m)) < u(max(m)) if only the person with
maximum income lives in the area, there must be at least one m˜ s.t.
u (y∗ (m˜, p) , h∗ (m˜, p)) + c(
∫ ∞
m˜
f(m), Gj) = u(H, m˜)
and
∫ ∞
m˜
h∗df(m) = A
Therefore there exists at least one pure strategy equilibrium where everyone above
some cutoff m˜ lives in the city, and everyone else lives outside. 
Proposition 3.3 Homeowners will support regulation that restricts any increase in A.
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If housing is a constant factor share of income, renters will oppose it.
Proof: If homeowners choose to stay in their homes in the next period, their utility
will be:
u(h,m) + c(n,G)
in which case, any increase in n will reduce their utility. Thus in that case, they
will prefer to reduce n as much as possible to maximize utility. Thus they will support
any regulation that increases M˜ .
Alternatively, if they move outside the city, they will obtain the following utility:
u (H,m+ ρ(p)h)
where ρ is the discount rate over the infinite future.
In that case, utility is maximized by choosing the development level that maxi-
mizes ph.
We know that p is given by a combination of two equations:
u
(
h∗
(
M˜, p
)
, M˜ − ph∗
(
M˜, p
))
+ c (n,G) = u
(
H, M˜
)
(3.1)
and
∞∫
M˜
h∗ (m, p) dm = A (3.2)
If we increase A then we know from 3.2 that either p must decrease or if not M˜
must decrease. However, we know from the first equation that if M˜ declines then by
continuity we have that p declines also.
Fully differentiating 3.1 with respect to A gives us:
du
dh∗
dh∗
dp
.
dp
dA
+
du
dh∗
.
dh∗
dM˜
.
dM˜
dA
− du
dy∗
dp
dA
h∗+
du
dy∗
.
dM˜
dA
− du
dy∗
.p.
dh∗
dp
.
dp
dA
− du
dy∗
.p.
dh∗
dM˜
.
dM˜
dA
+
dc
dn
.
dn
dA
=
du
dy
.
dM˜
dA
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dh∗
dp
.
dp
dA
.
[
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
.p
]
+
dh∗
dM˜
.
dM˜
dA
[
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
.p
]
− du
dy∗
dp
dA
h∗+
dc
dn
.
dn
dA
−dM˜
dA
 du
dy
(
M˜
) − du
dy∗
(
M˜, p
)
 > 0
⇒ dh
∗
dp
.
dp
dA
.
[
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
.p
]
+
dh∗
dM˜
.
dM˜
dA
[
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
.p
]
− du
dy∗
dp
dA
h∗ > − dc
dn
.
dn
dA
⇒ dh
∗
dp
.
dp
dA
.
[
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
.p
]
+
dh∗
dM˜
.
dM˜
dA
[
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
.p
]
− du
dy∗
dp
dA
h∗ > − dc
dn
.
dn
dA
⇒ du
dy∗
(
M˜, p
) ( dp
dA
h∗
(
M˜, p
))
<
dc
dn
.
dn
dA
< 0
Alternatively, M˜ cannot decline if p stays constant. So we have that both must
decrease.
Thus owners will block anticipated land releases.
Renters, unlike owners, will have utility in the next period of:
u (h∗ (p,m) ,m− ph∗) + c(n,G)
if they stay in the area, as they will need to pay for the housing. Alternatively,
they can have the utility:
u (H,m)
Since the outside option isn’t changing and renters are already in the area, they
clearly prefer to remain in the area rather than exit. If the total population is growing,
then in the next period some existing renters will not make the ‘cutoff’ if A does not
increase. They will prefer the outcome that maximizes their internal utility.
We also know that utility is decreasing in p but also decreasing in n, both of which
increase as we increase A. So it remains to see which effect dominates. Maximizing
renter utility with respect to A gives us:
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dU∗
dA
=
du
dh∗
dh∗
dp
.
dp
dA
− du
dy∗
dp
dA
h∗ − du
dy∗
.p.
dh∗
dp
.
dp
dA
+
dc
dn
.
dn
dA
=
dh∗
dp
.
dp
dA
(
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
.p
)
− du
dy∗
dp
dA
h∗ +
dc
dn
.
dn
dA
= − du
dy∗
dp
dA
h∗(m, p) +
dc
dn
.
dn
dA
>
du
dy∗
(
M˜, p
) dp
dA
h∗
(
M˜, p
)
− du
dy∗ (m, p)
dp
dA
h∗(m, p)
>
dp
dA
 du
dy∗
(
M˜, p
)h∗ (M˜, p)− du
dy∗ (m, p)
h∗(m, p)

Therefore renters will oppose regulation that limits area growth so long as
d du
∗
dy∗ h
∗(m,p)
dm
>
0.
ddu
∗
dy∗h
∗(m, p)
dm
=
du∗
dm
.
dh∗
dm
+
du2∗
dm2
h∗
=
d2u
dy2
(
1− p dh
dm
)
h+
du∗
dy
.
dh
dm
which is definitely positive if
1
p
=
dh
dm
Or essentially if housing is a constant factor share of income. Note that housing
being less than a constant factor share of income is not sufficient to render this untrue,
but the outcome would be dependent on the utility function. 
Proposition 3.4 Homeowners will support regulation that restricts any increase in n
so long as there is a third party to purchase any excess land. If housing
is a constant factor share of income, renters will oppose it.
Proof: If homeowners choose to stay in their homes in the next period, their utility
will be:
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u(h,m) + c(n,G)
in which case, any increase in n will reduce their utility. Thus in that case, they
will prefer to reduce n as much as possible to maximize utility.
Alternatively, if they move outside the city, they will obtain the following utility:
u (H,m+ ρ(p)h))
In that case, utility is maximized by choosing the development level that maxi-
mizes p.
We know that p is given by a combination of two equations:
u
(
h∗
(
M˜, p
)
, M˜ − ph∗
(
M˜, p
))
+ c (n,G) = u
(
H, M˜
)
(3.3)
and
∞∫
M˜
h∗ (m, p) dm = A (3.4)
Completely differentiating 3.3 gives us:
du
dh∗
(
dh∗
dM˜
dM˜
dn
+
dh∗
dp
.
dp
dn
)
+
du
dy∗
dM˜
dn
− du
dy∗
.p
dh∗
dM˜
dM˜
dn
− du
dy∗
h∗
dp
dn
− du
dy∗
p
dh∗
dp
dp
dn
+
dc
dn
=
du
dy
.
dM˜
dn
du
dh∗
(
dh∗
dM˜
dM˜
dn
+
dh∗
dp
dp
dn
)
− du
dy∗
p
dh∗
dM˜
dM˜
dn
− du
dy∗
h∗
dp
dn
− du
dy∗
p
dh∗
dp
dp
dn
+
dc
dn
−dM˜
dn
 du
dy
(
M˜
) − du
dy∗
(
M˜, p
)
 > 0
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⇒ dh
∗
dM˜
dM˜
dn
[
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
.p
]
+
dh∗
dp
dp
dn
[
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
.p
]
− du
dy∗
h∗
dp
dn
> − dc
dn
⇒ dp
dn
<
dc
dn
[
du
dy∗
h∗
]−1
< 0
which implies that as we limit n prices must rise.
Note, however, that M˜ must also increase (since that is how we limit n), so the
second equation must fail to bind. Therefore, some homeowners may be unwilling
to sell their houses since no-one will buy them. To keep this constraint in place,
therefore, there must be an external party who is forced to purchase the slack.
Renters, unlike owners, will have utility in the next period of:
u (h∗ (p,m) ,m− ph∗) + c(n,G)
if they stay in the area, as they will need to pay for the housing. Alternatively,
they can have the utility:
u (H,m)
Since the outside option isn’t changing and renters are already in the area, they
clearly prefer to remain in the area rather than exit. If the total population is growing,
then in the next period some existing renters will not make the income ‘cutoff’ if n
does not increase. They will prefer will prefer the outcome that maximizes their
internal utility.
Differentiating renter utility with respect to n gives us:
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dU
dn
=
du
dh∗
dh∗
dp
dp
dn
− du
dy∗
dh∗
dp
dp
dn
p− du
dy∗
dp
dn
h∗ +
dc
dn
=
dh∗
dp
dp
dn
[
du
dh∗
− du
dy∗
p
]
− du
dy∗
dp
dn
h∗ +
dc
dn
= − du
dy∗
dp
dn
h∗ +
dc
dn
>
dc
dn
 du
dy∗
(
M˜, p
)h∗ (M˜, p)
−1 du
dy∗ (m, p)
h∗ (m, p)− dc
dn
>
dc
dn
 du
dy∗ (m, p)
h∗ (m, p)
 du
dy∗
(
M˜, p
)h∗ (M˜, p)
−1 − 1

> 0 
where the last inequality follows from the same argument presented in proposition
3.3, since
d du
∗
dy∗ h
∗(m,p)
dm
> 0 so du
dy∗(m,p)h
∗ (m, p)
(
du
dy∗(M˜,p)
h∗
(
M˜, p
))−1
> 1
Therefore, renters will oppose regulations that place restrictions on n.
Proposition 3.5 Independent of the effects on price, owners are more likely than
renters to support minimum size regulations. The effect on price depends
on the nature of the distribution, the relative concavity of the utility
function, the value of the outside option, and the degree of impact of
congestion. Higher prices in response to a minimum size regulation will
result in owners supporting the policy, lower prices will result in renters
supporting the policy.
Proof: Since no-one is increasing h over the existing stock, we know that owners
cannot lose what they have. Once again they can only choose whether to continue to
live in the area or sell and move out. Consequently, if they choose to stay then their
utility is:
u (h, y) + c (n,G)
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where everything except n is fixed. Therefore, they will support any regulation
that increases n. On the other hand, if they choose to leave, they will only support
regulation that increases p.
Renters on the other hand will have utility in the next period of:
u (h∗ (p,m) ,m− ph∗) + c(n,G)
if they stay in the area, as they will need to pay for the housing. Since they have
no staying power, however, their current consumption is largely irrelevant. If, after
the expected level of growth, current period renters no longer wish to live in the area
we will ignore them, as they have no clearly defined preferences either way.
If they do choose to leave next period, renters will have the utility:
u (H,m)
Since the outside option isn’t changing with growth, any renters who are already
living in the area clearly prefer to remain in the area rather than exit. They will
therefore prefer the degree of regulation that maximizes their internal utility.
Anyone who wants to consume h∗ < h would prefer not to increase h unless they
are above the new minimum sizing cutoff.
If we place a lower bound on h then in order for the total area constraint to bind
we must have that:
M∫
M˜
hdm+
∞∫
M
h∗ (m, p) dm = A (3.5)
and for the lowest-income individual to live in the area we must have that
u
(
h, M˜ − ph
)
+ c (n,G) = u
(
H, M˜
)
(3.6)
We also define M such that
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u (h∗ (M, p) ,M − ph∗ (M, p)) = u (h,M − ph)
⇒ h∗ (M, p) = h
From 3.5 we know that ceteris paribus increasing h increases total demand, and
that therefore either M˜ must increase or p must increase.
Differentiating 3.6 with respect to h gives us:
du
dy
(
M˜,H
) dM˜
dh
=
du
dh
+
du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
) dM˜
dh
− du
dy
(
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(
M˜,H
)
+ dc
dn
dn
dM˜
dM˜
dh
−
 du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
)p− du
dh

⇒ dp
dh
=
 du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
)h
−1 dM˜
dh
 du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
) − du
dy
(
M˜,H
) + dc
dn
dn
dM˜
−
 du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
)p− du
dh

⇒ dM˜
dh
=
 du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
) dp
dh
h+
du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
)p− du
dh
 du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
) − du
dy
(
M˜,H
) + dc
dn
dn
dM˜
−1
If dM˜
dh
≤ 0 then we have that dp
dh
< 0, which violates what we have already found
from 3.5. Therefore dM˜
dh
> 0.
Therefore, if renters are evenly distributed through the population, some of them
will not make the cutoff for the higher minimum.
For the remaining owners and renters, their housing decision is dependent on the
change in price. Owners who are leaving prefer a higher price, as this is the only
impact that the policy will have on their utility. Differentiating renter optimal utility
with respect to n gives us:
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dU
dh
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du
dh∗
dh∗
dp
dp
dh
− du
dy∗
dh∗
dp
dp
dh
p− du
dy∗
dp
dh
h∗ +
dc
dn
.
dn
dM˜
.
dM˜
dh
=
dp
dh
dh∗
dp
[
du
dh∗
− du
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p
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dh
h∗ +
dc
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dn
dM˜
.
dM˜
dh
= − du
dy∗ (m, p)
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dh
h∗ (m, p) +
dc
dn
.
dn
dM˜
.
dM˜
dh
So renters would clearly prefer less development, unless dp
dh
< 0.
It remains to consider the likelihood that dp
dh
> 0.
Since staying in the area is exogenous, we can simply deduct the total consumption
of those that stay from the area, giving us an adjusted version of 3.5:
M∫
M˜
hdm+
∞∫
M
h∗ (m, p) dm = A (3.7)
where A is the remaining area after owners who are staying have been removed,
and m is the distribution with those people removed. Differentiating 3.7 with respect
to h (using Leibniz rule) gives us:
d
dh
h
 ∞∫
M˜
dm−
∞∫
M
dm
+ ∞∫
M
h∗ (m, p) dm
 =
 ∞∫
M˜
dm−
∞∫
M
dm
− h. dM˜
dh
+
dM
dh
h+
∞∫
M
dh∗
dp
dp
dh
dm− dM
dh
h∗(M,p)
= 0
⇒ −
∞∫
M
dh∗
dp
dp
dh
dm =
∞∫
M˜
dm−
∞∫
M
dm− h. dM˜
dh
=
M∫
M˜
dm− h. dM˜
dh
⇒ dp
dh
= −
 M∫
M˜
dm− h.dM˜
dh
 ∞∫
M
dh∗
dp
dm
−1
Essentially this means that the decrease (increase) in consumption of the people
who are consuming their optimal housing (more than h) must be equal to the increase
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(decrease) in consumption of those who would like to consume less than h but must
instead consume h less the decrease (increase) in consumption from those at the
bottom leaving the area.
Plugging in the value for dM˜
dh
we obtain the following:
− dp
dh
∞∫
M
dh∗
dp
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) dp
dh
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dy
(
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dh
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dy
(
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M˜,H
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dy
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(
M˜, h, p
) − du
dy
(
M˜,H
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dM˜
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 ∗
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dy
(
M˜, h, p
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 du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
) − du
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(
M˜,H
) + dc
dn
dn
dM˜
−1 − ∞∫
M
dh∗
dp
dm

−1
The sign on this is determined by
M∫
M˜
dm− h
 du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
)p− du
dh
 du
dy
(
M˜, h, p
) − du
dy
(
M˜,H
) + dc
dn
dn
dM˜
−1
where the first term is positive and the second term is negative.
Essentially, the change in price is balanced by the nature of the distribution, the
relative concavity of the utility function, the value of the outside option and the
degree of impact of congestion. 
Proposition 3.6 If we have two individuals with incomes m and mˆ > m, and individ-
ual m strictly (weakly) prefers neighborhood B to neighborhood A while
individual with income mˆ strictly (weakly) prefers the reverse, then we
must have that pA > pB (pA = pB).
Proof: We know that individual with income m has
115
u (h∗ (m, pA) ,m− pAh∗ (m, pA))−c (nA, GA) < u (h∗ (m, pB) ,m− pBh∗ (m, pB))−c (nB, GB)
whereas individual with income m˜ prefers:
u (h∗ (mˆ, pA) , mˆ− pAh∗ (mˆ, pA))−c (nA, GA) > u (h∗ (mˆ, pB) , mˆ− pBh∗ (mˆ, pB))−c (nB, GB)
Then assume that pA < PB. Then we have that:
u (h∗ (m, pB) ,m− pBh∗ (m, pB)) < u (h∗ (m, pB) ,m− pAh∗ (m, pB))
< u (h∗ (m, pA) ,m− pAh∗ (m, pA))
So we must have, for m to prefer B to A, that:
c (nB, GB) < c (nA, GA)
But for mˆ to prefer A to B while m prefers B to A, in that case:
u (h∗ (mˆ, pA) , mˆ− pAh∗ (mˆ, pA))− u (h∗ (mˆ, pB) , mˆ− pBh∗ (mˆ, pB))
>u (h∗ (m, pA) ,m− pAh∗ (m, pA))− u (h∗ (m, pB) ,m− pBh∗ (m, pB))
>0
However, based on the utility function we also know that, given a fixed area choice:
u′h
u′y
= p
And furthermore, taking the second derivative of utility with respect to income
and price:
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du
dm
= u′h
dh∗
dm
+ u′y
(
1− pdh
∗
dm
)
⇒ d
2u
dmdp
= u′h
d2h∗
dmdp
+ u′′y
(
1− pdh
∗
dm
)2
− u′y
(
p
d2h∗
dmdp
)
− u′y
dh∗
dm
=
d2h∗
dmdp
[
u′h − u′yp
]
+ u′′y
(
1− pdh
∗
dm
)2
− u′y
dh∗
dm
= u′′y
(
1− pdh
∗
dm
)2
− u′y
dh∗
dm
< 0
Therefore, we know that:
u (h∗ (mˆ, pA) , mˆ− pAh∗ (mˆ, pA))− u (h∗ (mˆ, pB) , mˆ− pBh∗ (mˆ, pB))
< u (h∗ (m, pA) ,m− pAh∗ (m, pA))− u (h∗ (m, pB) ,m− pBh∗ (m, pB))
And so we have a contradiction. 
Proposition 3.8 There is an equilibrium for multiple areas.
Proof: By propositions 3.6 and 3.7, all equilibria are weakly separating. Further-
more, since all areas have different levels of public goods G, there must be only one
equilibrium which equates all values of c(n,G). If c(n,G) is higher or lower for an
area, the price will change. Therefore, we must have that there is at most one pooling
equilibrium.
It remains to show that there is at least one separating equilibrium. This we will
do by construction.
Let h∗j (m, pj) be the optimal housing for any given individual conditional on their
having chosen area j. By the maximum theorem h∗j (m, pj) is continuous in m and
pj. Let f (m) be the distribution of m.
Let there be k locations. Number these so that G1 > G2 > ... > Gk. Let M˜k be
the lowest income level found in group k. Then we have 2k unknowns, since M˜j is
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unknown for all j and pj is unknown for all j.
Then, choose an M < M˜1 < M¯ at random. Then, we know that:
∞∫
M˜1
h∗ (m, p1) f (m) dm = A1
Since h∗(m, p1) is continuous in p1, and the distribution is continuous, then the
above is continuous and strictly decreasing in p1, we know that it must have a unique
solution for p1.
By the same argument for each subsequent area, we have that:
M˜j−1∫
M˜j
h∗ (m, pj) f (m) dm = Aj (3.8)
which gives us a continuous function from pj → M˜j given a fixed M˜j−1. Fur-
thermore, since we have that h∗ (m, pj) is strictly decreasing in pj and M˜j is strictly
decreasing in h∗, we know that M˜j is strictly decreasing in pj and so we have a 1:1
function. Furthermore, as pj → 0, M˜j → M˜j−1 and as pj →∞, M˜j →M .
In addition, we know that:
u
(
y∗
(
M˜1, p1
)
, h∗
(
M˜1, p1
))
− c
(∫ ∞
M˜1
f(m)dm,G1
)
= u
(
y∗
(
M˜1, p2
)
, h∗
(
M˜1, p2
))
− c
(∫ M˜1
M˜2
f(m)dm,G2
)
(3.9)
which has a fixed left hand side. This gives us a continuous function from p2 → M˜2
that is continuous and strictly increasing. In this case, as p2 → 0 M˜2 → M and as
p2 →∞, M˜j → M˜1.
Therefore 3.8 and 3.9 must have a unique crossing point, and must have a unique
crossing point so long as M˜1 > M . Therefore given a fixed M˜1 we have a unique pair
p2 and M˜2.
Furthermore, by 3.8 we know that if M˜1 increases, then either M˜2 increases or p2
increases (or both). However, by 3.9 and since p1 > p2 from proposition 3.7, we know
that:
118
⇒ dM˜2
dM˜1
> 0
Therefore even if p2 is increasing M˜2 is increasing also.
By an iterated version of the same argument, we can continue to allocate individ-
uals to areas until either (a) M˜j = M or (b) we obtain a pk and M˜k.
In the case of (a), raise M˜1 by  < M¯ − M˜1 and repeat.
We know that M˜j is increasing in M˜j−1 and therefore for all M˜j, and therefore
M˜j is increasing in M˜1 for all j. Therefore, by iteratively increasing M˜1, we will
eventually reach case (b).
In the case of (b), we then have the constraint that
u
(
y∗
(
M˜k, pk
)
, h∗
(
M˜, pk
))
− c
(∫ M˜k−1
M˜k
f(m), Gj
)
= u
(
H, M˜k
)
which may or may not hold. If so then we are done. Otherwise, if
u
(
y∗
(
M˜k, pk
)
, h∗
(
M˜, pk
))
− c
(∫ M˜k−1
M˜k
f(m), Gj
)
> u
(
H, M˜k
)
go back and decrease M˜1 by  < M¯ − M˜1. If
u
(
y∗
(
M˜k, pk
)
, h∗
(
M˜k, pk
))
− c
(∫ M˜k−1
M˜k
f(m), Gj
)
< u
(
H, M˜k
)
go back in increase M˜1 by  < M¯ − M˜1.
Since we know that increasing (decreasing) M˜1 increases (decreases) M˜k, it remains
to show that
du
(
y∗
(
M˜k, pk
)
, h∗
(
M˜k, pk
))
− c
(∫ M˜k−1
M˜k
f(m), Gj
)
dM˜1
>
du
(
H, M˜k
)
dM˜1
for all M˜1
In which case we must have convergence to an equilibrium, since the inside utility
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from changing M˜1 is changing faster than the outside utility. Furthermore, since
u (0) < u (0) , we know that we won’t always have everyone living outside, and since
u
(
M˜
)
> u
(
M˜
)
we also won’t have everyone inside.
Solving for the right hand side gives us:
du
(
H, M˜k
)
dM˜1
=
du
dy
dM˜k
dM˜1
Solving for the left hand side gives us:
du
(
y∗
(
M˜k, pk
)
, h∗
(
M˜k, pk
))
− c
(∫ M˜k−1
M˜k
f(m), Gj
)
dM˜1
=
du
dy∗
(
dM˜k
dM˜1
− p dh
∗
dM˜k
dM˜k
dM˜1
− dp
dM˜k
dM˜k
dM˜1
h∗ − pdh
∗
dp
dp
dM˜k
dM˜k
dM˜1
)
+
du
dh
(
dh∗
dM˜k
dM˜k
dM˜1
+
dp
dM˜k
dM˜k
dM˜1
)
− dc
dn
dn
dM˜k
dM˜k
dM˜1
=
du
dy∗
(
dM˜k
dM˜1
− dp
dM˜k
dM˜k
dM˜1
h∗
)
− dc
dn
dn
dM˜k
dM˜k
dM˜1
=
(
dM˜k
dM˜1
)[
du
dy∗
(
1− dpk
dM˜k
h∗
)
− dc
dn
dn
dM˜k
]
And taking the difference gives us:
dM˜k
dM˜1
[
du
dy∗
(
1− dpk
dM˜k
h∗
)
− dc
dn
dn
dM˜k
− du
dy
]
=
dM˜k
dM˜1
[(
du
dy∗
− du
dy
)
− du
dy∗
dpk
dM˜k
h∗ − dc
dn
dn
dM˜k
]
> 0
Therefore we must have that there is a sorting equilibrium for all areas. 
Housing growth vs density
Change in density is mathematically equivalent to percentage growth in housing if
areas are not changing. Since percentage growth in housing is given by:
growth =
housing − l.housing
l.housing
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density =
housing
area
⇒ density − l.density = housing
area
− l.housing
l.area
=
housing − l.housing
area
+
l.area ∗ l.housing − area ∗ l.housing
l.area ∗ area
⇒ (density − l.density) ∗ area
l.housing
=
housing − l.housing
l.housing
+
l.area ∗ l.housing − area ∗ l.housing
l.area ∗ l.housing
→ housing − l.housing
l.housing
as l.area-area goes to 0
⇒ (density − l.density)
l.density
≈ growth
Therefore, change in density is equivalent to percentage growth in housing so
long as areas are sufficiently stable. This means that running the same regression
on housing growth should give the same sign of coefficients, and almost the same set
of coefficients if we multiply everything except l.density on the right hand side by
l.density.
3.9 Appendix: Geographical Boundaries
The ABS has freely available paper maps of statistical areas for most census years,
and electronic maps for the years 1981-2011. This allowed us to check the consistency
of boundaries over the period of study.
Sydney incurred very few boundary changes. The largest boundary changes af-
fected the Sydney, South Sydney, and Leichhardt areas, but these did not affect the
results since all 3 were classified as ‘central’. There were only three other relevant
geographic changes – the division of Warringah into Warringah and Pittwater, the
merger of Colo and Windsor to become Hawkesbury, and the merger of Concord and
Drummoyne to create Canada Bay. Drummoyne and Concord merged in December
2000, so the 2001 data was included twice — both for Canada Bay as a whole (in
order to establish the independent lagged variables for 2006) and separately (in order
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to establish the dependent variable for 2001). The former data was calculated by
simply adding the results (which were reported under the old LGA structure) for the
Concord and Drummoyne together. Colo and Windsor merged in 1981, but since
Hawkesbury was a fringe suburb these were treated as a single area for the 1976-2011
period. Pittwater was more difficult, since it separated in 1992, so there is a much
larger gap between 1992 and 1996 in which housing changes may occur. Ideally, the
local government areas would have been reported separately (at least as separate sta-
tistical local areas) in 1991, but sadly this was not the case. However, since both
were classified as fringe suburbs, the issue became irrelevant.
It was determined that small boundary changes should not lead to two or more
areas being grouped together as a single area in the data, since doing so would obscure
the underlying political dynamics. Furthermore, since voters in a given period have
an impact on the zoning of the area in the next period (regardless of their presence
or absence in that next period), it was determined that it was better to simply keep
the boundaries as they were in each period.
Brisbane, on the other hand, had a number of large and relevant boundary changes.
Furthermore, it was considered that even small boundary changes may be more rele-
vant in the case of Brisbane, since the changes in area had no impact on the underlying
political dynamics, and therefore represented pure noise. Finally, the areas themselves
were somewhat arbitrarily set by the ABS. As such, only very small boundary changes
were ignored. While 110 areas were deemed to have stable enough boundaries to be
kept as single statistical local areas, another 62 areas were amalgamated into 24 larger
areas with more stable boundaries. Below is a list of those areas that were merged
due to large boundary changes.
Suburbs were not amalgamated where it was determined that the boundary changes
only incorporated parkland. Such areas included Taringa, Toowong and The Gap,
all of which lost area to either Brookfield or Upper Brookfield. Since all of this area
is Enoggera State Forest, the SLAs were not merged, but the physical areas (in sq.
km) were adjusted in each period so that they matched the 2011 boundaries. Like-
wise Upper Mount Gravatt, Mount Gravatt, and Nathan were all kept separate (and
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again the physical areas adjusted as appropriate), since all boundary movements only
resulted in an exchange of parkland around Griffith University campus.
Two areas offered significant difficulty. The first was the area around Eaglefarm. In
this case, significant areas were relocated from Nundah and Northgate, to Eaglefarm.
Most of this area appears to consist of golf courses and parkland, but some does
include possible areas of low density dwellings. There is no way to remove this problem
without losing large amounts of data, so no attempt has been made to correct for this
issue.
The other area in question is the area surrounding Carindale. Parts of several
statistical local areas were removed to create Carindale, including some suburban
and some fringe areas. While suburbs have been amalgamated to reduce the impact
of these boundary shifts as much as possible, Carina, and Carina Heights both lose
fairly large areas, and Mansfield gains a fairly substantial area, and these have not
been adjusted for.
Suburbs for Brisbane have been classified as city, suburbs or fringe based on their
classifications in 1954, since in 1911 Brisbane had very few suburbs. ‘City’ are those
areas identified as high density in 1954. ‘Fringe’ includes those areas not listed as
suburbs in 1954, except for Chermside West, which (due to its being merged with
Aspley was included as a suburb). Those classified as suburbs were also suburbs
in 1954. Exceptions are Yeerongpilly, and Nudgee and Northgate, which were re-
classified as fringe (due to mergers with the fringe areas Rocklea and Nudgee Beach
respectively).
List of amalgamations for Brisbane
• Mount Gravatt East and Holland Park (Boundary shifts)
• Ferny Grove and Upper Kedron (Merged in 1976 data)
• Herston and Kelvin Grove (Boundary shifts)
• Moreton Island, Lytton, and Hemmant (Boundary shifts between Moreton Is-
land and Lytton; Lytton and Hemmant merged in 1991 data)
123
• Rocklea and Yeerongpilly (Boundary shifts)
• Fitzgibbon and Taigum (merged in later data)
• Chandler, Capalaba West, and Burbank (Chandler and Burbank merged in
1976 data; Chandler and Capalaba West merged in 2006 data)
• Parkinson, Drewvale, Berrinba, Karawatha and Stretton (Merged in 1976 data)
• Darra, Sumner, Riverhills, Middle Park, and Westlake (all except Darra merged
in 1976 data; Darra and Sumner merged in 1991 data)
• Pallara, Heathwood, Larapinta, and Willamwong (Merged in 1976 data )
• Richlands, Ellen Grove, Doolandella, and Inala (Ellen Grove and Doolandella
merged in 1976; boundary shifts)
• Upper Brookfield Brookfield, Bellbowrie, Anstead, and Pullenvale (Anstead,
Pullenvale, and Upper Brookfield merged in 1976 data; Brookfield and Upper
Brookfield merged in 2006 data)
• Aspley and Chermside West (Boundary shifts)
• Wooloowin, Kedron (Boundary shifts)
• Lower Nudgee, Cribb Island, EagleFarm, Pinkenba, Nudgee, Nudgee Beach, and
Banyo (Nudgee and Nudgee Beach merged in 1976 data; Pinkenba and Eagle
Farm merged in 1991 data; other boundary shifts)
• Nundah and Northgate (Boundary shifts)
• Chermside and Geebung (Boundary shifts)
• Acacia Ridge and Sunnybank Hills (Boundary shifts)
• Wishart, Rochedale, and Eight Mile Plains (Boundary shifts)
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• Ransome, Gumdale, Belmont, Makenzie, Wakerley, and Carindale (Wakerley
and Ransome merged in 1976 data; Ransome and Gumdale merged in 2006
data. Other boundary shifts).
• Cannon Hill and Carina (Boundary shifts)
The electronic maps also provided more accurate estimates of the physical area of
the statistical areas than the reported statistics (less rounding). These were therefore
used for the study. However, since the maps were not available for 1976, these areas
were drawn from the collection district file for 1976 provided by the Australian Data
Association. However, this resulted in some large and unexplainable aberrations.
Therefore, the results were checked using the 1981 areas in place of the 1976 areas,
and they were unaffected in that case.
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Chapter 4
Defined Benefit vs Defined
Contribution Pensions
4.1 The problem of pension underfunding
Recent years have seen a growth in controversy over State and local government em-
ployee pension plans. Many governments have insufficient assets set aside to meet
their expected future payments, resulting in their pensions being “underfunded”. The
present value of these unfunded liabilities to government employees was recently es-
timated at $4.4 trillion (Healey and Hess, 2012).
The underfunding problem stems from a confluence of factors including a failure of
government budgeting, slower than expected market growth, and a century of positive
shocks to longevity. However, it has also raised serious questions about the design of
government pension systems. Specifically, there have been questions raised as to the
efficiency, fairness, and long-run cost of these systems.
Government pension systems at the State and local government level are usually
defined benefit pensions. Defined benefit pensions guarantee employees an ongoing
pension of a fixed nominal or real amount for the entirety of their post-retirement
lifetime. Government defined benefit pensions stand in stark contrast to the defined
contribution systems that predominate in the private sector, which are essentially in-
centivized savings systems. The relative generosity of government pensions, combined
with questions regarding their ongoing solvency, has led to suggestions that govern-
126
ments should switch to providing the defined contribution plans (Kiewiet, 2010).
We argue that in a competitive market the expected utility of remuneration should
theoretically be equal regardless of the form of the pension provided. Since defined
benefit pensions are less risky from the employee’s perspective than defined contri-
bution plans, then assuming that employees are risk-averse, one should expect that a
move toward defined contribution plans would increase the total remuneration bill.
We are therefore left with two conflicting arguments. On the one hand, defined
contribution plans have been proposed as a cheaper alternative to defined benefit
plans. On the other hand, the relative risk model implies that defined contribution
plans are more expensive for employers. There are clear implications in either case
for the underfunded status of government pensions. If remuneration is indeed higher
under a defined contribution system then the problem becomes one of governance
rather than generosity. In fact, costs may even increase, especially in the short-to-
medium term when governments would be required to simultaneously pay the existing
defined benefit holders and pay higher salaries to defined contribution plan members.
The State of Nebraska offers a unique opportunity to compare pension types.
Nebraska, unlike any other State, implemented a compulsory defined contribution
plan for most State and county employees as long ago as 1967. We use econometric
matching techniques to compare the salaries paid in Nebraskan counties with salaries
paid in counties Kansas (matched on observed variables such as size, industry, GDP,
etc) which offer a defined benefit plan. This allows us to compare the costs of two
different types of pension plans over a period of close to 30 years. We limit ourselves
to considering the pension component of the plan and do not consider health care
provision, as this would add an additional level of complication to the analysis.
The first section of this paper outlines the types of pensions and their history
focussing on the counties we are considering. We go on to consider the arguments for
and against each type of plan. We put our discussion in the context of the literature
on State finance and individual risk and return profiles. We go on to compare the
total remuneration package for various types of employees in Nebraska and Kansas.
We find that there is actually very little difference between compensation under the
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two different types of plans. Even when matching counties based on a variety of
different demographic and economic characteristics, we find there is only a very small
difference between the costs of the two different plans. Finally, we find that there is no
consistency in the relationship between the total remuneration package for different
subcategories of employees or across time.
4.2 History of pensions
4.2.1 Types of pensions
Pensions are divided into three broad categories based on the benefits they offer:
defined contribution, defined benefit, and hybrid1. Defined contribution pensions
usually require a certain proportion of the employee’s salary to be placed in a sep-
arate ‘fund’, which is then invested in some subset of the market portfolio. Defined
contribution pensions may be compulsory (as they are for all employees in Australia),
or voluntary (as in the case of US 401K accounts), and contributions are usually en-
couraged by some form of tax incentive. Defined contribution pensions can perform
some or all of the following functions:
• Assist uninformed individuals to save;
• Reduce the moral hazard created by means-tested public pensions, which may
otherwise encourage individuals to reduce savings rates;
• Overcome behavioral biases in savings, such as hyperbolic discounting; and
• Provide redistribution to workers through reduced taxes.
On the other hand, defined benefit pensions consist of an annual payment from em-
ployers to employees for the entirety of their post-retirement lifespan. Payments
1Hybrid plans include both a defined benefit and defined contribution component, and therefore
tend to provide only partial insurance — for instance, they may provide a lifetime pension that is
based on the stock market at the time of retirement or only insures a small collective of people up
to the point where all contributions are spent.
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may or may not be indexed to inflation. These plans can perform most of the same
functions as defined contribution plans, but also provide implicit longevity insurance.
From the employer’s perspective, there are important differences in the timing of
payments for each type of pension. Since the payments for defined benefit pensions
do not fall due until the employee retires and starts to collect their pension, it is
possible that at any one point the employer may not have sufficient assets to fund all
of their future liabilities and remain solvent.2 In addition, the lifespan of the employee
is uncertain, so the employer must rely on actuarial assumptions (which are open to
some degree of manipulation) when assessing the present value of these liabilities. As
a result, employers may end up in a position where they have insufficient assets to
meet the present value of their defined benefit pensions (at which point the pensions
are ‘underfunded’).
In contrast, defined contribution plans require employers to pay the full value of
their contribution to the pension fund at the time that the employee renders their
services. This payment, including all interest, belongs to the employee, and therefore
does not need to be accounted for by the employer (either as an asset or a liability).
Consequently, defined contribution plans can never be underfunded, but their final
value to the employee is subject to market and longevity risk.
4.2.2 History of pensions in Kansas and Nebraska
In the US, the public sector preceded the private sector in both the generosity and
growth of pensions.3 Major cities such as New York established plans for some public
sector workers prior to 1900. These plans were generally funded entirely by worker
contributions, and operated more-or-less as insurance schemes in the event of disabil-
ity (Clark et al., 2003).
However, as plans were generally created and administered by local governments
2Theoretically, retired employees could just be given a share of the employer’s revenue from the
period in which they collect their pension. In practice, under the current legal framework firms and
governments are required to establish contribution funds to fund their future pension payments.
3This is not to suggest that there were no private sector pensions. The Pennsylvania Railroad,
for instance, offered a pension to its employees before the US government (US Congress Committee
on Civil Service Retirement1919).
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there was no consistency in the degree to which pensions were offered. The States
were much later to develop plans, especially for employees that fell outside classic
public service roles like teaching and public safety (Clark et al., 2003).4 The States
now supervise many of the county pension funds in the US5.
For example, the Kansas Public Employees Retirement System (KPERS) operates
the defined benefit plans for most State and County employees in Kansas. KPERS
commenced in 1962, but participation by counties was elective until 1970, after which
time all counties were required to use the fund. Police officers, firefighters, judges,
and school teachers have plans that are administered separately, but most state and
local employees are administered through a single fund.6 The contribution rates have
alternated between being set by legislation (e.g. 1962, 1970) and by the KPERS
board of trustees (KPERS 2013b; 2013a).
While firms have moved away from defined benefit plans and toward defined con-
tribution plans, local government defined benefit plans like KPERS have proven re-
markably persistent (Fore, 2001). In fact, Nebraska actually changed back from a
defined contribution plan to a defined benefit\hybrid “cash balance” plan in 2002.
Only three states have ever had compulsory defined contributions plans for their gen-
eral state employees: Nebraska (1967-2002), Michigan (since 1997), and Alaska (since
2005) (Munnell et al., 2014; Snell, 2010)7. While other states have had optional de-
fined contribution pensions, and many have introduced hybrid programs of various
descriptions, there has been only another handful of specific groups of government
employees who have been enrolled in a mandatory defined contribution pension.
Nebraska was one state which enrolled its county employees in a compulsory de-
fined contribution plan for a significant period of its history. While Nebraska also
4The US government, in turn, created a defined benefit plan for federal government employees in
1919.
5While most of the existing pension funds are supervised locally (Useem and Hess, 2001), only
about 10% of employees were covered by locally operated plans for general local government em-
ployees in 1991 (Mitchell et al., 2001).
6School employees are also covered by KPERS, although these were generally not included until
after 1970, and after 1988 were subject to a different contribution rate from other local government
employees.
7DC has also had a compulsory defined benefit plan since 1987.
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has defined benefit plans for judges, state police, and teachers, the Nebraska Public
Employees Retirement System (NPERS) was established in 1965 as a defined con-
tribution plan, and counties who did not yet have pension systems were allowed to
join. In 1973, those counties that were covered by the former Retirement System for
Nebraska Counties were brought into the plan, and all counties except Douglas and
Lancaster are now required to belong to the system (Kramer and Partner, 2013). Ne-
braska’s defined contribution plan was both compulsory and in effect for a significant
stretch of time, until a defined benefit portion was added in 2001. NPERS requires
county employees to contribute 4% of their salary to their defined contribution funds
while Nebraskan employers contribute an additional 150% of Member contributions
(Buck, 2000).
NPERS and KPERS are similar in terms of the timing of their implementation,
and the types of employees which they cover. On the other hand, they are very
different in terms of the types of benefits they provide. In the next section, we
consider whether one or the other type is likely to be more costly to the county
members.
4.3 Pension cost
While most pension funds remained well funded through the 1990s Fore (2001), the
years 2000 since have seen a growth in the number of underfunded pensions. Many
state and local governments ended up in ‘crisis’ after 2007, and underfunded local
government pension liabilities increased to $4.4 trillion nationwide (Healey and Hess,
2012). In some cases, underfunding has resulted in cuts to local government services,
as more current funding is diverted to pay for the accumulated liabilities Kiewiet
and McCubbins (2014). In addition, crises in bankrupt cities such as Detroit have
actual resulted in some of these liabilities being reduced by the courts, shifting the
cost back on to the employees who were originally promised the entitlement Kiewiet
and McCubbins (2014).
One proposed solution to the underfunding problem is to switch to defined contri-
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bution plans (Kiewiet, 2010). A move to a defined contribution plan clearly eradicates
the problem of underfunded pension plans, as defined contribution plans are always
funded by definition. Defined contribution plans are now favored across the world:
they account for most pension assets globally, and are used by both the US and
international private sectors and foreign governments (Broadbent et al., 2006).
However, it is not clear whether a shift between pension types would result in
lower costs. In addition to the short run costs of such a move8, it may be that a
move to defined contribution plans actually increase costs, if employees need to be
compensated for taking on more retirement risk.
4.3.1 Individual risks and returns
On a purely theoretical level, there is a strong argument that a defined contribution
plan should result in higher total remuneration for employees than a defined benefit
plan, due to its relatively higher risk profile. In its simplest terms, one can model the
remuneration of employees under each system as follows.
Employees work for T years, and have a retirement period of R years, which is
uncertain. For simplicity, we assume that in the case of the defined contribution plan,
the employer pays a salary and then places an additional component into an asset
fund that has an expected return of α. Then, if the utility function is separable:
UDC = u
(
T∑
1
δtsalaryDC
)
+ ER
[
R∑
T+1
δtu (E [withdrawals])
]
where withdrawals represent the optimal withdrawals in each state of the world
given the risk attached to lifespan R, the realized market return, and the original
payments made by the employer.
In the case of the defined benefit plan, the employer again pays a salary, and at
the end of the employee’s working career pays them a fixed pension for the remainder
8In the short term, a move to a defined contribution plan does not absolve the government of its
liabilities for existing underfunded plans, and adds an immediate cost as governments cannot delay
contributions to defined contribution plans in periods where the budget is tight. Thus it brings
forward the cost of the excess pension liabilities that the government already cannot afford to fund!
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of their natural life.
UDB = u
(
T∑
1
δtsalaryDB
)
+ ER
[
R∑
T+1
δtu (pension)
]
From these two equations, we can see that under the defined contribution scenario
the employee faces two additional sources of risk relative to the defined benefit sce-
nario. The primary source of risk is market risk. If the employee is risk-averse, then
to keep expected utility from remuneration constant we must have that:
E [withdrawals] > pension
The second source of risk is longevity risk. The employee may die prior to ob-
taining all their benefits under either system9, but only in the defined contribution
case is it possible to run out of money. If risk-averse, an employee with a defined
contribution must either purchase a private market annuity10 or save more and spend
less in order to smooth consumption. Therefore, the sum of the expected withdrawals
needs to be higher than the defined benefit pension in order to keep utility constant.
There are other important, and more subtle risks associated with each type of
pension. The most important with respect to defined benefit pensions are the pos-
sibility of employee termination, uncertainty regarding the wage trajectory (Bodie
et al., 1988) and, as more recent events have demonstrated, employer bankruptcy.
While we argue that the third is substantially reduced for local governments (though
certainly not eliminated as Detroit proceedings have shown) the first two remain
possibilities. In fact, if labor markets are sufficiently non-competitive for local gov-
ernment employment employees, their uncertainty regarding termination and wage
trajectories should decline, increasing the likelihood that the defined contribution
9Life insurance may be offered under either system, and may or may not include the present
value of any remaining contributions. However, for the purposes of this paper, we do not consider
the complicated process of determining inheritance value.
10Private market annuities still leave employees open to market risk at the time of retirement. In
addition, it is not necessarily that case that the gains from pooling in a private market would be
easily transferred back to the original employer.
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plan should be cheaper.
Based on the difference in employee risk we would expect that lifetime remu-
neration of employees would be higher under defined contribution pensions relative
to defined benefit pensions. Empirical work supports this prediction in the private
sector: individual accumulation of retirement wealth is higher under defined contri-
bution than under defined benefit plans, but has a greater spread (see, for instance,
Samwick and Skinner (2004) and Poterba et al. (2007)). While this does not tell us
the comparative cost to the employer over time (the result may be driven by higher-
than-average market returns), it does suggest that the employee achieves more average
compensation under the defined contribution plan as predicted.
Overall, while it is unclear exactly how the risks play out for each employee, our
intuition remains the same. If the employee expects to take on more risk under one
type of pension than another, they should be compensated by increased remuneration.
4.3.2 Government finances, the holdup problem, and gover-
nance
One reason that the risk and return argument may fail is that it does not take into
account public sector bargaining. Public sector pensions tend to be more generous
than private sector plans across the board (Poterba et al., 2007). This has been
attributed to a number of factors, the most commonly cited being the potential
holdup problem (Ippolito, 1985).
From a theoretical perspective uncompetitive labor markets should not necessarily
alter the relative costs of different types of pensions. While labor unions can theo-
retically increase employee compensation relative to a free labor market, there is no
reason this should only be true in a defined benefit framework. Uncompetitive labor
markets can raise the present value of expected remuneration under either pension
system. Furthermore, it may simply be that the more generous retirement plans are
offset by lower wages during one’s working life Hustead and Mitchell (2001).
It could, however, be argued that if public sector workers extract more generous
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defined benefit pensions due to labor union influence, then local governments should
switch to defined contribution pensions. There is indeed evidence of a negative cor-
relation between funding status and union activity (Mitchell and Smith, 1991).
While the net outcome is unclear, government employees appear to demonstrate a
preference for defined benefit plans as opposed to defined contribution plans. When
Michigan correctional workers were given the opportunity to voluntarily switch from
defined benefit to defined contribution plans, only 1.6 percent opted to make the
switch (Papke, 2004). Even among those men with only one year of tenure (who had
no vested retirement benefits under the defined benefits system as yet), the switching
rate was only 6.1percent. This is so incredibly low, that it may simply have been that
the only people who switched were those who were seeking alternative employment.
The relative generosity of government pensions may, however, have little to do
with their structure. Public sector pensions are more generous than private sector
pensions regardless of design (Poterba et al., 2007; Beshears et al., 2010). Admin-
istration costs for defined contribution plans are also higher Munnell et al. (2008).
Indeed, optimal private sector and public sector pensions need not be the same, as
the two types of employers face very different constraints. Private sector employers
face significant uncertainty at the firm level. For example, future revenues generated
by current employees may be insufficient to fund their remuneration, capital market
imperfections may limit financing, demand shocks may occur, and so forth. Firms
who provide defined benefit pensions are essentially making employees implicit bond-
holders of the firm Cooper and Ross (2001), which may not be desirable to either the
firm (who will then have reduced access to potentially cheaper forms of financing) or
employees (who have to bear too much firm-level risk).
In contrast, short term solvency is less of an issue in the public sector (Anderson,
2009). Local governments have longer timelines and more certain sources of revenue,
through their ongoing ability to tax their resident populations. Even in the event
of a short-term shock to finance markets, the fact that in the longer term there is
less variability to revenues will mean that, in most cases, governments can easily
borrow money to smooth expenditure over time. A stable employer with easy access
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to finance can exploit pooling across employees to reduce aggregate longevity risk and
thereby reduce the gross insurance requirement across all employees.
It could instead be argued that underfunding is less the result of over-generosity,
and more the result of poor governance. There is, for example, no evidence of cor-
relation between a State’s per capita income (or their ability to tax) and whether
and by how much they are underfunded (Fore, 2001). The calculation of present lia-
bilities is incredibly sensitive to small variations in actuarial assumptions (Hustead,
2003). Governments may therefore choose to use an inappropriate discount rate for
their asset returns, or fail to accurately account for accumulation of expected future
liabilities (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2009).
Even a move to a defined contribution plan would not necessarily eradicate all
governance issues. In the case of Alaska, pension underfunding increased from $5.7
billion when the change to defined contribution occurred in 2005, to $12.4 billion
in 2013. Local government pensions have also historically been subject to the same
governance issues as social security, including the tendency for governments to borrow
from their own pension funds to fund other activities, by having their pension funds
purchase their own bonds (Clark et al., 2003). This kind of “double dipping” is an
additional and often hidden form of underfunding, not included in the underfunding
statistics. A move to a defined contribution plan will not change this dynamic, unless
the borrowing-from-oneself option is eliminated.
Overall, it is unclear whether the generosity of government pensions is the result
of a holdup problem or governance issues more generally, or merely an alternative
to paying a larger wage. We also do not know how much of the problem would
potentially be mitigated by a change in the design of pension schemes, or how much
any savings would be offset if employees demand compensation for a shift in retirement
risk. In the remainder of the paper, we examine how the adoption of the different
types of pension schemes actually affected gross compensation across similar counties
in Nebraska and Kansas.
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4.4 Data and econometric method
The State financing literature makes clear that pension liabilities are a very important
component of government budgets, and yet it says little about which type of plan is
of lower cost in the long run. On the other hand, while the literature on risks and
returns clearly outlines some of the plan tradeoffs from the individual’s perspective,
it gives no answer to the problem of underfunded government pensions. This leaves
open the question of whether underfunding is the result of using a more expensive
type of plan or an issue of governance and accountability.
Rather than comparing ex-post returns from the different pension plans we com-
pare the ex ante cost to local county governments. This approach allows us to capture
the average expectation of the employees, eliminating individual variations. We use
nearest-neighbor propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) to com-
pare counties in Nebraska (defined contribution scheme) and Kansas (defined benefit
scheme11) to test whether in fact there is a difference in total remuneration. We cal-
culate the propensity scores using a logit regression, based on a number of important
county-level characteristics.12
The advantage of this approach is that we can leverage the variation in county
salaries in a way that we could not at the state level. Since so few states have had
defined contribution plans for any substantial period, there is not enough variation
in the remuneration of state level employees to separate the effect of the plan from
the other characteristics of the state, such as degree of urbanization, population,
industry, and GDP. However, since individual counties set their own salaries we can
match counties across states and use those to control for county characteristics that
are unrelated to the retirement plan. In addition, while there may be endogeneity in
the decision to move to a defined contribution plan at the State level, the endogeneity
does not exist at the county level as the county is not responsible for the choice of
11While states other than Kansas had defined contribution plans over the period we focus on
Kansas as the plan is centralized for the whole state, and among the states the Kansas’ and Nebraskan
economies are relatively similar in size and structure.
12We considered using a geographic regression discontinuity design, but this would have required
more dense geographical data, especially close to the Kansas/Nebraska boundary.
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pension plan.
We obtained data on the number of full-time equivalent employees and total pay-
roll data at the county level for all counties since the 1950s from the Census of
Governments. Employee data includes only employees of the county governments,
and dependent agencies. Independent agencies, such as school districts, are not in-
cluded.13
We use both the average wage full-time equivalent and the average total remu-
neration (adjusted to include the employer compensation to the retirement fund) as
output variables. We use total remuneration as we have argued in the previous section
that there is essentially no difference between the cost to the employer of paying for
a wage now and a pension later. The Nebraskan employer contribution rate was 150
percent of employee contributions (Committee, 2010). Since employees were required
to contribute 4% of their salaries, we therefore used 6 percent as the mandated contri-
bution figure. The Kansas historical contribution rates were obtained from KPERS
annual reports (KPERS 1973-2000). Average remuneration for Kansas and Nebraska
are shown in figure
Since employee data is based on full-time equivalents, we include the proportion
of part-time employees in our match. In 1985 total number of employees was reported
instead of the number of full-time equivalents, so we drop this year entirely from our
data set. We adjust the payroll data for inflation using the implicit price deflator
obtained from the OECD (2010). To limit the effects of long-run trends in national
real wage growth, we manipulate our propensity scores slightly so as to ensure that
matching occurs only within the same year.
The county Census of Governments also provided data on counties’ annual rev-
enue, expenses, and population. These were included in the basis for the match, in
order to control for the size and scope of the county government. We also match
on area14, and 1989 median household income data, also obtained from the United
States Census Bureau.
13No data was available for the year 1996, so this was omitted.
14We use the area provided for the year 1990.
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Figure 4.1: Average remuneration for counties in Kansas and Nebraska
In addition to considering the effect of the choice of plan for county employees as
a whole, we also consider its effect by employee types, based on the classifications in
the Census of Governments. By looking at subsets of employees we can determine
which groups, if any, are benefitting most from the choice of pension structure. We
control for the demand for each type of employee by matching on the total number
of each type employed by neighboring counties. In addition, we match based on the
total number of similar employees (based on the Standard Industrial Classifications)
in the private sector across the county and its neighbors for the year 1990, again
obtained from the United States Census Bureau.
4.5 Results
We find that there is no appreciable difference between the costs of the two different
types of pension plan. After using a logit regression to calculate propensity scores, we
then determined a nearest neighbor match for each county in Nebraska15 Figures 4.2
15Kansas has more counties than Nebraska.
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Figure 4.2: Ratio of defined benefit to defined contribution wages in matched counties
: by year*
* Each dot point represents the ratio between the average full-time equivalent wage in nearest-neighbor
matched counties in Kansas (numerator) and Nebraska (denominator). The average wage ratio takes
the annual average across all matched counties.
and 4.3 graph the ratios of the average full-time equivalent wage and remuneration
(limited to the subset of occupations covered by NPERS county plan) for the matched
counties. In each case the numerator is the Kansas (defined benefit) county, and the
denominator is the Nebraskan (defined contribution) county. It is clear from the
graphs that the ratios are concentrated around 1. This pattern suggests that the
choice of plan type is not a big contributor to the average cost per full-time equivalent
employee.
Table 4.2 further supports our findings. Once again, we use a logit regression to
determine propensity scores. We then match counties with their nearest neighbor
based on propensity scores, and using the defined contribution plan to represent the
treatment, determine the average effect of treatment on the treated. The matching
process considerably improves the balance statistic, as demonstrated in table 4.1.
The defined contribution plan is significantly cheaper (the average treatment effect
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Figure 4.3: Ratio of defined benefit to defined contribution remuneration in matched
counties : by year*
* Each dot point represents the ratio between the average full-time equivalent remuneration (includ-
ing gross payroll and employer contributions to the employee’s retirement fund) in nearest-neighbor
matched counties in Kansas (numerator) and Nebraska (denominator). The average remuneration
ratio takes the annual average across all matched counties.
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Table 4.1: Balance and balance improvement for matching parameters
Mean Mean %reduct
Matched Treated Control %bias |bias| t p>|t|
Percent employees fulltime N 91.805 92.597 -12.9 -3.65 0.000
Y 93.471 92.757 11.6 9.9 1.97 0.049
Med household income ’89 N 22490 23573 -29.1 -8.00 0.000
Y 22512 22703 -5.1 82.3 -0.85 0.394
Total gov revenue N 3720 10138 -33.3 -8.54 0.000
Y 3493.2 4503.9 -5.2 84.3 -1.10 0.272
Total gov expenditure N 3592.3 9895.8 -34.2 -8.78 0.000
Y 3362 4392.5 -5.6 83.7 -1.13 0.260
County population N 13795 30692 -35.3 -9.17 0.000
Y 12800 14218 -3.0 91.6 -0.87 0.386
County population density e N 26.54 56.834 -25.8 -6.77 0.000
Y 23.452 24.815 -1.2 95.5 -0.28 0.778
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods. Some subsets of
employees were not hired by all local governments in all periods. The number of observations
varies with the availability of data and the number of employees hired.
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on the treated is negative and significant), but the difference represents only a very
small proportion of the real wage (less than 5 per cent of the constant). Once the
annual employer contribution to the fund is accounted for, the benefit drops even
further, to below 2.5 per cent of the constant. The result is the same for both the
average full-time wage across all sectors16 (the first two columns) and the average
full-time equivalent in sectors definitely covered by the considered plans (second two
columns). This result is robust to the type of match used (nearest-neighbor, k-
neighbor, kernel, and with or without replacement).
Table 4.2: Impact of defined benefit contribution on wages and remuneration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fulltime wage Fulltime remuneration Wage Remuneration
Impact of defined contribution -88.23*** -56.00*** -90.47*** -59.58***
fund ($/month) (14.54) (14.87) (13.71) (14.08)
Constant 2163.1*** 2255.4*** 2127.7*** 2219.0***
(9.361) (9.574) (8.831) (9.063)
Observations 3146 3146 3145 3145
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods. Some subsets of employ-
ees were not hired by all local governments in all periods. The number of observations varies with
the availability of data and the number of employees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Our regression does not take into account underfunding. KPERS local plan was
97.56 per cent funded as at the year 2000, with a net unfunded liability of $36 million
KPERS (2000). If we assume that there this cost should have been spread equally
spread across counties and years in the previous two decades, we would need to
increase wages under the defined benefit plan by an average of around 0.15 per cent.
Even though the aggregate cost of the defined benefit contribution is smaller, table
4.3 indicates that the defined contribution plan is significantly more expensive for
16Teachers are not included in the data for Nebraska or Kansas because they are employed by
school districts rather than counties. The main concerns here are police and fire employees, which
in Kansas are covered by a different plan with a slightly different contribution rate.
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some sub-sectors of employment.17 While the results for each sector use a different set
of variables to match counties (to include regional public and private sector variables
that are relevant to the county), the results are also robust to limiting the matching
variables to the same subset used in table 1. In all cases, neither size nor significance
changes to any notable degree. Once again the results are also robust to the type of
matching framework used, and to use of least squares.
In general there is a degree of variation in the impact of the type of plan depending
on the type of employment. The results for the remaining employment sectors are
presented in appendix 4.7.
Table 4.3: Impact of defined contribution pensions on remuneration in different sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Finance Environmental Welfare Sanitation Admin
Impact of defined contribution 62.64*** -302.0*** 270.2*** 747.5*** 684.0***
fund ($/month) (14.70) (32.92) (30.72) (107.7) (136.0)
Constant 2030.6*** 2303.1*** 1968.7*** 2363.5*** 2153.7***
(9.410) (21.93) (24.47) (21.71) (27.42)
Observations 3099 1437 1301 1082 1082
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods. Some subsets
of employees were not hired by all local governments in all periods. The number of obser-
vations varies with the availability of data and the number of employees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Finally, we note that the data covers two periods with very different average
market returns. Market returns were relatively flat in the 1970s and early 1980s,
17Not all local governments hire all kinds of employees. Further, there are missing data for some
counties and some sub-sectors Restricting the subset of counties to include only those that report
positive wages for all types of employees presented in table 4.3 leaves only 162 data points. As a
result, the number of observations is not the same across all sectors.
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but grew rapidly from around 1987 onward. In table 4.4 we split our sample into
pre-1987 and post-1987 to determine whether this has any effect on the relationship
between the two types of plan. We find that prior to 1987 defined contribution funds
were if anything slightly more expensive than defined benefit funds, whereas from
1987-2000 they were more cheaper. We find a similar pattern for most sub-categories
of employees, as we note in appendix 4.7.
Table 4.4: Impact of defined contribution pensions on wages and remuneration pre-
1987 and post-1987
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FTWage<87 FTRemun<87 FTWage>=87 FTRemun>=87
Impact of defined contribution 11.40 15.87 -202.9*** -136.7***
fund ($/month) (15.51) (16.23) (24.55) (25.41)
Constant 2021.2*** 2138.6*** 2335.0*** 2396.7***
(10.13) (10.60) (15.51) (16.06)
Observations 1759 1759 1387 1387
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods. Some subsets of employ-
ees were not hired by all local governments in all periods. The number of observations varies with
the availability of data and the number of employees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
4.6 Conclusion and further questions
Our findings suggest that to the degree that there is an additional risk factor associ-
ated with provision of defined benefit vs defined contribution plans, this has at best
a small impact on overall government budgets. On the other hand, there is little
evidence to suggest that defined benefit pensions are tied to a significant degree of
extraction. A wholesale move to defined contribution plans is unlikely to lower local
government pension costs or reduce the burden on taxpayers.
There is evidence of variation in the optimal plan between employee types. This
may be due to the ability of various types of employees to bargain with their employ-
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ers, due to either the strength of their unions or their outside options. Nevertheless,
the savings from one plan or another are relatively small, and given the number of
employees involved it seems likely that it would be more costly to run multiple plans
than the savings would compensate for.
Finally, we see an increase in the relative cost of the defined benefit plan after 1987,
when average market returns were higher. This finding is interesting in a number of
ways. For one, it appears that employees slightly prefer the defined contribution
plan when market returns are higher, but that they are potentially not adjusting
sufficiently for market risk. On the other hand, the increase in market returns does
not result in a 100% offsetting decline in county employer contributions. The latter
finding is encouraging from a policy perspective, since it suggests some degree of long
run smoothing.
This paper does not consider health care costs. These are likely to be a significant
contributor to funding issues, and should be considered in further research. We also
do not consider how aggregate shocks may lead to unanticipated future costs, and
the way in which governments would be best placed to deal with them. We believe
this is another important avenue for others to pursue.
4.7 Appendix
Additional sub-sectors
There are a number of additional sub-sectors that we did not consider in the results
section. We present the results for the remainder of these in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 below.
We note that there is insufficient data to measure the effects for sewerage workers.
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Table 4.5: Impact of defined contribution pensions on remuneration in different sectors
1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Highways Parks Housing Libraries Waste
Impact of defined contribution 6.823 -122.3 -353.9 -427.3*** 711.8***
fund ($/month) (18.61) (116.8) (300.2) (118.8) (120.4)
Constant 2392.9*** 2224.3***3323.3*** 2148.5*** 2314.1***
(11.91) (32.47) (191.8) (87.22) (22.62)
Observations 3078 401 49 141 963
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods. Some
subsets of employees were not hired by all local governments in all periods. The
number of observations varies with the availability of data and the number of em-
ployees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.6: Impact of defined contribution pensions on remuneration in different sectors
2
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All Health Hospitals Health Other
Impact of defined contribution -83.98** 124.5*** -222.4***-53.32**
fund ($/month) (32.65) (46.29) (38.26) (24.37)
Constant 2300.2*** 2281.8*** 2325.5***2125.1***
(16.03) (17.76) (24.35) (15.56)
Observations 2026 1671 773 2740
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all peri-
ods. Some subsets of employees were not hired by all local governments
in all periods. The number of observations varies with the availability of
data and the number of employees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Fire and police
While there are no teachers in the data, there were two other groups who were covered
by plans other than the standard county employee plans. The first group includes
public safety employees such as police and fire, who were covered by the standard
defined contribution plan in Nebraska but were covered by a separate defined benefit
Kansas from other county workers18. In table 4.7 we show that there is no statistical
difference between the wages paid to police and fire workers under either system.
Once we add employer contributions to the police and fire plan for Kansas we find
that wages are significantly higher for police, but not statistically different (and signed
18It should be noted that in Nebraska State troopers were administered separately.
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negative) for firefighters (see table 4.8).
Table 4.7: Impact of defined contribution pensions on police and fire wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Total Police Police Officers Total Fire Firefighters
Impact of defined contribution 29.59 29.59 679.8 537.3
fund ($/month) (24.34) (24.34) (584.4) (589.0)
Constant 2610.6*** 2610.6*** 2392.7*** 2535.2***
(15.52) (15.52) (60.59) (61.41)
Observations 2574 2574 279 276
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods. Some sub-
sets of employees were not hired by all local governments in all periods. The number
of observations varies with the availability of data and the number of employees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.8: Impact of defined contribution pensions on police and fire remuneration
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Police Officers Total Fire Firefighters
Impact of defined contribution -202.6***-202.6*** 521.4 360.5
fund ($/month) (26.55) (26.55) (660.7) (661.4)
Constant 3001.2***3001.2*** 2735.5*** 2896.4***
(16.93) (16.93) (68.51) (68.95)
Observations 2574 2574 279 276
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods.
Some subsets of employees were not hired by all local governments in all
periods. The number of observations varies with the availability of data
and the number of employees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Judicial and legal
The second category of employees that was not included in the standard county plans
is judges. The standard county plan does not cover judges in either state, but both
states offer judges a defined benefit plan. In table 4.9 we show that judicial and
legal wages are higher in Nebraska. However, while the contribution rates Kansas are
available, the contributions for Nebraska are not paid as a proportion of the wage, so
we cannot determine if the same result applies to total remuneration.
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Table 4.9: Impact of defined benefit pensions on judicial and legal wages
(1)
Judicial
Impact of Kansas -226.7***
fund ($/month) (64.66)
Constant 2564.6***
(32.80)
Observations 587
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data
available for all periods. Some subsets of employ-
ees were not hired by all local governments in all
periods. The number of observations varies with
the availability of data and the number of em-
ployees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Pre and post 1980
The Reagan era is associated with rapid growth in private market expected returns.
Were this to feed into expectations, we would expect the cost of defined contribu-
tion plans to drop relative to defined benefit plans. In the results section we noted
that there was a clear switch between the remuneration under each type of plan as
returns rose. In tables 4.10 and 4.11 we document a similar pattern in many of the
employment sub-sectors.
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Table 4.10: Impact of defined contribution pension on total remuneration pre-1987
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Finance Environmental Welfare Health Admin
Impact of defined contribution 102.7*** -237.9*** 304.1*** -122.4***629.8***
fund ($/month) (16.56) (50.66) (33.41) (39.57) (116.9)
Constant 1936.9*** 2280.4*** 1942.1***2207.1***1952.6***
(10.80) (34.43) (28.37) (20.01) (25.25)
Observations 1757 656 814 1095 450
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods. Some sub-
sets of employees were not hired by all local governments in all periods. The number
of observations varies with the availability of data and the number of employees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 4.11: Impact of defined contribution pensions on total remuneration post 1987
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Finance Environmental Welfare Health Admin
Impact of defined contribution 24.53 -357.4*** 228.1*** -11.87 775.5***
fund ($/month) (25.15) (43.08) (61.16) (52.68) (222.0)
Constant 2145.7*** 2321.1*** 1993.2***2405.2***2295.3***
(15.67) (28.21) (42.85) (24.90) (42.35)
Observations 1342 781 487 931 632
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods. Some sub-
sets of employees were not hired by all local governments in all periods. The number
of observations varies with the availability of data and the number of employees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Least squares
We present the results from running the same regression in a least squares in table
4.12. 19 There are no discernible cost differences between the two pension funds in
this framework.
19We do not assume linearity here, we simply include this as a robustness check to ensure that a
least squares framework does not produce the opposite result from the matching methodology we
have used.
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Table 4.12: The impact of defined contribution pensions on wages and remuneration,
calculated using an ordinary least squares framework
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Fulltime Wage Fulltime Remuneration Wage Remuneration
Impact of defined contribution -7.279 26.78 -20.38 11.96
fund ($/month) (27.56) (28.86) (26.39) (27.64)
Median household income 1989 ($) 0.0332*** 0.0349*** 0.0292*** 0.0307***
(0.00526) (0.00549) (0.00518) (0.00541)
Total revenue ($) 0.000869 0.00115 0.000754 0.00103
(0.00181) (0.00190) (0.00182) (0.00190)
Total expenditure ($) 0.00247 0.00186 0.00247 0.00189
(0.00281) (0.00287) (0.00298) (0.00303)
Population 0.000976** 0.00113*** 0.000695 0.000832*
(0.000411) (0.000429) (0.000448) (0.000461)
Population density 0.138 0.145 0.159 0.167
(0.138) (0.143) (0.176) (0.181)
Percentage of employees -0.226 -0.250
working fulltime (1.960) (2.060)
Observations 3146 3146 3145 3145
Note: Some subsets of employees do not have data available for all periods. Some subsets of employees were not
hired by all local governments in all periods. The number of observations varies with the availability of data
and the number of employees hired.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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